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Congo

* Nguesso Assesses PCT Performance, Growth

34190022 Brazzaville MWETI in French
2 Aug 89 p 4

[Article by A. Kombo-Moukouyou: "Party and People's Organizations. A Balance Sheet Without Complacency"]

[Text] Army General Denis Sassou-Nguesso took on the occasion of the opening of the sessions of the fourth Ordinary Party Congress on 26 July to take a critical look at the workings of the party, the state, and the people's and social organizations. In a speech on the balance presented on this occasion, the president of the Central Committee [CC] of the PCT [Congolese Labor Party], Comrade Denis Sassou Nguesso, who had judged the working of these instances on the whole encouraging, nevertheless, brought out certain insufficiencies which, once they are solved, will there and then open the path to greater efficiency.

The president of the republic, drawing up a balance of the activity conducted by the Central Committee for the last 5 years, emphasized that it had confirmed itself even further as the guiding organ for the party and the state throughout 10 ordinary and 4 extraordinary sessions.

It is thus that the Central Committee has strengthened its authority all along its mandate by putting to work and evaluating all agencies thanks to its rules. However, the president of the republic states that the work committees of the Central Committee have operated normally, but have not always played their role as true laboratories of reflection, often limiting their activities to the adoption of activity reports from concerned departments just before the beginning of the Central Committee's sessions.

As far as the Political Bureau is concerned, whose chief activity on the political horizon has concerned the orientation and coordination of the activities of the directive and fundamental organs of the party, the president of the republic estimated on the basis of the documents presented by the secretariat of the Central Committee that it had acquitted itself validly of its tasks. Sixty-six meetings covering the period from August 1984 to May 1989 were held, during the course of which all documents submitted for evaluation by the CC secretariat were examined.

At the party level, he noticed a certain number of insufficiencies that had not always facilitated a harmonious administration of the decentralized local collectivities. They concern chiefly the relatively reduced number of cadres and personnel, the lack of material and financial means, the deficiencies of the reception structures, the illiteracy recorded in the party ranks, the UJSC-JP [Union of Congolese Socialist Youth] and the URFC [Revolutionary Union of Congolese Women] and the small numerical representation of workers, women, and the young within the party organs.

An Evolution

Since its creation in 1969, and until 31 December 1988, party membership has grown from 169 to 13,674 members, of which 9,912 are members and 3,762 candidates, that is to say, an average increase of 24.1 percent per year. The last 5 years have seen a considerable broadening in the registration of the young in the party. Thus, 1,587 UJSC-JP activists are members of the party. This good example of conversion, however, does not exclude good quality. This is why on the territorial plane, in the regions and the Brazzaville township in the course of this mandate, 125 notifications, 68 disapprovals, 95 exclusions, and 250 cancellations were pronounced.

It was deemed necessary to curtail the circuit to remedy the delay observed in confirming the disciplinary sanctions. In addition, out of a concern for a better follow-up in the staff, a specialized structure was set up. The present state according to the president of the Central Committee had shown the existence of a rather high number of staff relieved of their functions and not being used. The check done in certain ministries has made it possible to take into account that numerous staffs are in "paid unemployment." This situation, in the eyes of president Denis Sassou Nguesso, must be corrected without delay.

As far as the political commissars are concerned, whose experience has shown undeniable advantages, their prolonged absence from their regions because, among other reasons, of their participation in the sessions of the National Popular Assembly, constitutes a problem that must be solved.

The governmental institutions have also operated regularly during the last 5 years. If the National Popular Assembly, which controls the second portion of the execution of the first Five-Year Plan and government belt-tightening policies, was asked to see to it that all those elected by the people are always comrades able to interpret correctly the aspirations of the latter and to understand the situation of the domestic and international state. [as published] On the other hand, the constitutional council was asked to pursue its actions with greater dynamism so as to establish in a stable manner our aspiration to being a lawful state.

As far as public power is concerned, its operation has improved in spite of some difficulties, especially the insufficiency of high-level staff in the regions. It is thus that, taking into account this weakness that has caused a certain underadministration of the country's interior, it is desirable to appoint the district and region chiefs from the center.

In its turn, the UJSC-JP has undertaken to strengthen permanent contact with its base, to mobilize staff and assure revolutionary agitation to keep the young on their guard and to caution them against disinformation and indoctrination.

In spite of the problems inherent in the economic context, the president of the Central Committee states that the start made in the period that is ending should allow the young people to better adapt themselves to any situations in the field toward a massive, concrete, and efficient participation in the establishment of the party programs.

For the Congolese Confederation Union (CSC), which has won numerous victories in spite of hard times, it has identified numerous problems in the area that demand appropriate solutions. The president of the Central Committee quoted the application of the determining trilogy. As far as what the form of collective and democratic management of production means by the social partners is concerned, it has appeared in many respects as a stumblingblock in the relationships between workers and management or administration.

It is appropriate in the course of the next mandate, as the president of the republic has indicated, to proceed with an evaluation of the trilogy, 15 years after its institution, for its application.

With respect to the URFC, the necessity was recognized to strengthen the mobilization capacity of its militants by better staffing of categorial mixtures. This question had been considered vital for the satisfactory operation of the bonding and for the increased participation of Congolese women in the grand scheme of national education.

In addition, in spite of the missions the UNEAC [expansion unknown] had assigned itself, among others the strengthening of its organization together with the promotion, popularization, and spreading of Congolese culture nationally and internationally, insufficiencies at the level of revitalizing of structures were found, administrative and financial management and realization of the economic program. [as published]

Zaire

* Progress in Economic Reform Analyzed

90EF0009 Kinshasa ELIMA in French
1 Sep 89 pp 1, 7

[Text] That's it! The relationship between Zaire and the International Monetary Fund [IMF] is on again. The consecutive decisions made at the beginning of June by the World Bank's [IBRD] board of directors and by the International Monetary Fund to set up a joint program with the Republic of Zaire confirm it. The immediate effect of this is that the International Monetary Fund is finally freeing up a loan of some 260 million American dollars for Kinshasa. That is on top of the 82.5 million U.S. dollars recently released to shore up Zaire's economic and financial adjustment by the institution Mr Walter Conable manages.

But that's not all. At the same time, or nearly, the majority of Zaire's industrialized partners are

announcing foreign financial contributions. Examples: 43.5 million ECUs [European currency unit]—nearly 50 million dollars—from the United States; 29 million dollars announced by Japan; 9 million ECUs promised by Italy; and 3 million sterling pounds from the United Kingdom. It takes but a small leap, easy to make, to conclude that confidence in Zaire has been restored.

Is this confidence a favorable reaction to Marshal Mobutu's repeated, fist-pounding opposition to negative capital transfers? A positive response to criticisms made by the XIIth ordinary session of the MPR (People's Movement of the Revolution) central committee? The result of the executive council's excellent work in the field? Surely all three at once.

Now that the Zairian economy is back on track, it must be admitted that Zaire has come a long way, particularly in the areas of the price system, public finances, and inflation.

A quick retrospective look at the price system shows that it was distorted until the end of last year (at least). A few relevant facts: an excessive gap between the official exchange rate and the price of foreign exchange on the underground market; a Bank of Zaire guideline rate still set at 32 percent while inflation galloped along at 94 percent annually; domestic prices for oil products held below world prices, resulting in dangerous losses for import and distribution companies; and public transportation fees likewise set at below operating costs, threatening transport companies with bankruptcy, with dramatic consequences for users.

As for the state financial deficit, it was steadily and sharply worsening. The drop in the share of tax revenues making up the gross domestic product [GDP] (12.5 percent in 1988 compared to 13.4 percent in 1987) went hand in hand with a chaotic increase in public expenditures (from 17.7 percent of GDP in 1987 to 23.2 percent the following year). This led to considerably expanded monetary financing. The "money-press" operated at twice the speed in 1988 that it had the previous year, and this perilous Treasury shortcut accounted for 8 percent of GDP in 1988 compared to 4.1 percent in 1987.

The speeded-up depreciation of Zaire's money, the lifting of the freeze on domestic prices, and the financial instabilities of the public sector could, therefore, only exacerbate negative expectations and capital flight and at the same time encourage a proliferation of speculative and fraudulent activities. A trend that locked economic growth into a level lower than the rate of demographic growth, with serious consequences for the state-party militants' most disadvantaged classes.

To reverse this trend, or at least stop it, it was necessary to "grab the bull by the horns." So, between November 1988 and April 1989, the Executive Council was forced to implement a series of measures that affected many sectors and at the same time complemented each other.

Order was restored to the price system through a combination of measures: a gradual and continuous rise in the currency rate on the official market, with monthly hikes of about 8 percent; money prices set at 35 to 60 percent; and a gradual increase in oil-product prices and mass transportation fees.

State coffers were redeemed by sharply boosting tax revenues, substantially wiping out the state's domestic and foreign outstanding debts, controlling public running expenses, and cutting back monetary financing.

The Central Bank intervened in the exchange market by selling 30 million American dollars each month. This flooded the market for consumer goods with various imported products, sharply curbing the shock of the inflationary spiral. For once, raises of 40 to 100 percent for government workers and cuts in income taxes of company personnel that resulted in salary increases of between 20 and 80 percent did not trigger the perverse habit of anticipatory price hikes.

What should we expect, then, from these measures to combat the economic crisis? In the short term, there has already been a spectacular return to a stable economic environment. Here are a few facts to prove it: the gap between the official exchange rate and the underground rate has steadily shrunk, dropping from 79.9 percent at the start of January 1989 to less than 4 percent at the end of last May (on the eve of the IMF agreement); the rate of inflation has slowed remarkably, reaching a monthly price increase estimated at roughly 1 percent in May, which puts yearly projections at around 50 percent; and the price of the American dollar has stabilized and even dropped on the underground market from 500 to 300 zaires a dollar during the period under review.

On an altogether different front, a few businessmen, faced with the extremely high cost of domestic credit, are repatriating capital tucked away abroad. They are making these transfers either to lighten their current debts to Zairian banks or to finance their working capital without resorting to bank loans. This triple movement (reduction in speculative stocks, repayment of current debt, and repatriation of capital from abroad) has decisively eased tensions in both the currency and commodity markets, thereby, consolidating the stability of the economy.

Given the relative stability of prices and the fact that markets were adequately supplied, the salary hikes in 1989 had unexpected positive effects on economic activity as a whole, and particularly on the informal urban economy and on manufacturing. Indeed, in the very flexible and diversified informal Zairian economy (agriculture, commerce, building trades, and various service activities), the initial injection of purchasing power from large salary increases, during a period of relative price stability, spurred the development of all productive activities. As a consequence, it stimulated the manufacture of mass-produced goods. Primary income triggered by salary increases was followed by secondary

income created by the expansion of informal economic activities, resumed manufacturing, and a mushrooming of jobs. This overall growth in income today benefits the least advantaged members of the work force.

Paradoxically, this transfer of purchasing power to the poorer classes was only made possible, from a macroeconomic standpoint, by applying reform measures in combination with a supply-side policy. Hence, for the first time and very probably without fully realizing it, the Executive Council has at once applied a severe policy of regulating and reforming demand, a (classic IMF-type) supply-side policy after structural adjustment, and an original macroeconomic policy of rechanneling overall demand to benefit disadvantaged classes.

This set of policies reforms the economy without making the poor bear the burden of adjustment. Even more important, by including the social effects of adjustment in macroeconomic considerations, overall economic activity can be supported while making it easier to implement necessary reforms. It also contributes to a recovery in structures and the balance of payments.

The Executive Council's action proved that the failure or success of an adjustment policy hangs less on the successive application of individual measures than on their proper combination, strict chronological sequence, and adaptation to a country's sociocultural realities.

Please the gods that this African premiere, remarkably executed over the last 8 months, may continue and produce a policy of measured, long-term growth.

The IMF and World Bank Satisfied With Initial Results

Mr Grant B. Taplin, assistant director of the Equatorial Africa Division of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Mr Jerome Chevalier, resident representative of the World Bank, explained the purpose of the two-week mission being carried out by the joint IMF-IBRD delegation to the press yesterday, Thursday 31 August 1989, on their way out of Council Hall. The delegation has come to observe the progress, latest developments, and outlook for the structural adjustment program which was started 9 June, 1989.

Mr Taplin said there were good signs, then added that the task force had noted "positive elements and improvements which will have to be continual." The assistant director of the IMF Equatorial Africa Division said that the agreement signed last June provides for regular structural contacts and that, after completing the evaluation, the performance criteria decided on for these contacts had been met. The evaluation takes into account, from a macroeconomic standpoint, the budget, banking system, balance of payments, and so on.

Accordingly, Mr Chevalier, resident representative of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank), congratulated the Executive Council for its first-semester results. He said that his

institution would be "Zaire's advocate" at the annual joint IMF-IBRD assembly, planned for the final week of next September in Washington, and at the meeting of moneylenders scheduled for 5 and 6 October, 1989, in Paris.

During yesterday's meeting with the Central Committee member and Head State Commissioner, Citizen Kengo wa Dondo, resumption of the highway program and mobilization of financial resources for Zaire were discussed. The World Bank, which, in Mr Jerome Chevalier's words, has taken steps to solicit funds for poor sub-Saharan countries, will be able to defend Zaire's interests in a very concrete way and make the board of directors and moneylenders see the necessity of freeing up financial resources. "We have," he said, "meetings with moneylenders every 6 months to let them know that such or such a country has made huge efforts, so that they can provide the necessary resources for attaining the goals of the structural adjustment program."

The resident representative of the World Bank concluded that, after seeing results of the programs being implemented, it is easy to be Zaire's advocate.

* **Chinese Joint Coffee Export Venture Reported**

90EF0010a Kinshasa ELIMA in French
22 Aug 89 p 3

[Article by Bayeba N'gogo: "New Zairian-Chinese Oasis: 2,000 Tons of Commercial Coffee To Be Exported in 1989"]

[Text] The New Zairian-Chinese Oasis, a mixed-interest company, intends to export 2,000 metric tons of commercial coffee this year, compared to 1,200 tons in 1988. The company, located in Boende, at the equator, disperses its activities over six rural regions: Boende, Befale, Bok'Ungu, Ikela, Djolu, and Opala.

The New Zairian-Chinese Oasis purchases coffee and foodstuffs from rural folk to whom it provides work (230 Zairians and 4 Chinese work there) and essential products. It is an example of active cooperation between Zaire and China, which supplied 15 Toyotas and built the coffee-processing factory.

Citizen Botuli Ekofa Nkasa, CEO of the New Zairian-Chinese Oasis, told the press he appreciated the positive support provided by the cooperative effort to improve the income of peasants in that part of the country.

Ethiopia

* Rebel Leader Outlines Views on Peace Process

34000709a London ADULIS in English
Jul-Aug 89 pp 2-4

[Text] EPLF [Eritrean People's Liberation Front] Secretary General, Isaia Afewerki, gave a press conference at the Foreign Press Association in London on June 29, 1989. Full text follows:

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you for honoring the invitation of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front to attend this press conference. From the outset, I would like to say that I am here today to announce the willingness of the EPLF to enter into negotiations with the Ethiopian regime in Addis Ababa—and to underline our determination to find a peaceful end to a war that has now engulfed the Eritrean people for more than 28 years, becoming a major factor for the destabilization and turmoil in the region. As the importance of the issues, and the complexities of the conflict are not ones that are always easily understood, I believe I should give a short summary of past peace efforts before I spell out in detail the position of the EPLF for negotiations with Ethiopia.

But I shall keep my remarks short in order to allow more time to answer your questions.

It is generally agreed that these are momentous times, times of unprecedented opportunity for peace in the world. In the past, little real attention has been paid to what is now one of the longest running wars in history. But, the quest for a peaceful solution to the Eritrean question has—at last—begun to gather momentum and attract genuine international interest and concern. While the war has lasted almost three decades, the Eritrean people have, in fact, been seeking peace and respect for their right to self-determination for nearly 50 years. The peaceful petitions they lodged to the international community, during the decade when the Federal Arrangement was gradually being breached and before they were compelled to rise up in arms in 1961, were not heeded. From 1961 until 1974, in the first thirteen years of the armed struggle, the policy of the Haile Selassie regime was to deny in public the existence of the conflict itself while on the ground, the strategy was to make maximum force and "secure the land even without the people." Under these conditions, there was not even a flicker of hope for peace and negotiations. As a result, the war continued to rage—ultimately contributing to the overthrow of the Haile Selassie regime in 1974.

In its early years, the new regime—commonly known as the Dergue—did pay lip service to peace. This was, however, mere posturing until it consolidated its power. The old policy of crushing the Eritrean question by sheer force remained unchanged. The military propensity of the Dergue in fact became unambiguously clear in 1977 and 1978 when it secured unrestrained Soviet support

and the Ethiopian Armed Forces became the largest army in Sub-Saharan Africa. Apart from the blatant partiality of the host government, the main reason for the failure of the talks held from 1977 until mid 1978 through the mediation of East Germany was the over-confidence and intransigence of an Addis Ababa regime intoxicated by its new-found military strength. In Berlin, the approach of the Dergue was outright blackmail serving us an ultimatum to accept its 9-point plan for regional autonomy or face a military onslaught.

From 1978-1982, when the sequence of Ethiopian large-scale offensives reached its peak during the Red Star Campaign (or Sixth offensive), the Dergue's language of force continued unmellowed. After the failure of the Sixth Offensive, however, the Dergue indicated its willingness to talk and in September 1982, contacts between the two sides again resumed. A series of 10 meetings were held in the subsequent three years until March 1985. Again, these encounters reached a deadlock and failed. For a simple reason: The Addis Ababa regime refused to consider the indispensable requirements for substantive negotiations made by the EPLF. These constituted that the talks be public, held in the presence of a third party and both sides allowed to present working papers for the negotiations without preconditions. The Ethiopian regime even ruled out the elementary requirement of keeping official internal records of the talks.

In the process of continued peace efforts, in June last year the EPLF reached a common understanding with the Sudanese Government on three basic requirements for the resumption of peace talks. These were again the three procedural requirements; namely, negotiations to be without preconditions, publicly acknowledged and in the presence of a third party. When these views were communicated to Ethiopia by the Sudanese Government, the requirements were misconstrued as a precondition and rejected. The Ethiopian regime similarly dismissed the offer for mediation by the North Yemeni Government at the end of last year claiming that it saw no need for a third party.

It must be realized here that the only challenge to the Addis Ababa regime has not been the EPLF's resolve to meet fire with fire or the military victories that the EPLF has achieved. In spite of its repeated claims of enjoying the support of the Eritrean people who, we are told, have endorsed the Dergue's constitution, the regime remains an anathema to democratic mechanisms that allow the free choice of the people. This is the reason why the Dergue continued to reject the EPLF proposal of settling the conflict through a popular referendum. This myopic fear and its lack of courage to face reality and seek appropriate solutions is further illustrated by its repeated attempts to destroy the territorial integrity of Eritrea. To that end, the regime has first announced its plans for carving out the Dankalia region and recently entertained superfluous structures designating the Western Lowlands and Highlands as separate autonomous regions by resorting to worn out tactics of divide and rule. These tactics have, however, failed to impress

even the reliable segments of its establishment, let alone deceive the Eritrean people. Its policy of committing everything to the war front has only served to cause yet more death and more destruction. As a consequence, the tolerance of the Ethiopian people, and in particular of the army entangled in this brutal war, has increasingly worn thin—breeding a growing resistance to the regime.

Indeed, what was starkly conspicuous during the recent coup attempt was the widespread opposition in Ethiopia to both the dictatorial regime and its war policy. Obviously embarrassed and challenged by this precarious situation which has put its future on line, the Dergue has been driven to embrace the EPLF's requirements that it had been rejecting for years. Although it has now declared its readiness to sit in open negotiations—without preconditions—and in the presence of third parties—this initial offer was immediately qualified and therefore effectively annulled.

The EPLF issued a prompt response—on June 8th—to the Dergue's offer clarifying its position. This was not a new position—but indeed the same one we had taken as early as 1985. In tinkering with our proposals and our requirements, and through contradictory offers, the Dergue seems to have pinned its hopes on provoking a rejection by the EPLF—and thus to refrain from serious negotiations. The aim is to find a pretext to whip up support for pursuing and escalating the war; a campaign that it has already started.

However, these are not times for pettiness or back door maneuvering. Efforts that evade the direct road to peace have no future. No body can or should be fooled by false gestures. The EPLF wants a just peace—the Eritrean people demand it. In this context, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front again announces its readiness—now, today—to enter into immediate and serious negotiations with the regime in Addis Ababa, negotiations that are:

- One: Without preconditions of any kind whatsoever;
- Two: Publicly acknowledged by both sides; and
- Three: Are held in the presence of third parties.

Through this press conference, and without reservation, the EPLF today appeals to the international community to help ensure that this opportunity for a lasting peace in Eritrea, and the Horn of Africa region as a whole, is not squandered.

Surely the time has come for this war to end. We, for our part, are ready to help make this happen.

Thank you.

Somalia

* SNM Official on Regional Ties, Unrest

34040003 London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
21 Aug 89 pp 8-9

[Interview with SNM Foreign Minister Abdurahman Ahmed Ali by Kamal Samari: "AL-DUSTUR Interviews Somali Opposition Leader: 'We Are Calling for a Weapons Embargo Against Siad Barre';" first four paragraphs are AL-DUSTUR introduction; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Once again events in Somalia made headlines last month. Reports from western embassies and western firms in Somalia concurred that "the fall of Siad Barre's regime was imminent and that the Somali president's reliance on the army was no longer enough to guarantee that he would stay in power." This was mentioned in a report prepared by an American firm, a copy of which was obtained by AL-DUSTUR.

The aforementioned report ends with an unequivocal statement that "conditions in Somalia cannot improve until Siad Barre is overthrown."

Did western countries, which are supporting the regime in Somalia—and Washington and Rome head a list of countries supporting that regime—decide to abandon Siad Barre? What is the position of Arab countries, some of which are still supporting Siad Barre's regime? What is the solution which is being proposed by factions of Somalia's opposition to get Somalia out of its predicament?

I took these questions to Mr Abdurahman Ahmed Ali, Somalia's former ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and foreign relations secretary for the Somali National Movement [SNM].

[AL-DUSTUR] What are the most recent developments in Somalia? Is it true that calm has been restored to the capital, Mogadishu?

[Ali] The uprising of our people last July 14 was the result of deteriorating conditions throughout the country. It was the people's reaction to the horrible crimes committed by Siad Barre's regime and the policy of total destruction which he practiced in the northern part of the country. Although the security forces and the armed forces of Siad Barre's tribe, the Marihan Tribe, !! are deployed in the capital, Mogadishu, that fact did not prevent our people from fighting to resist this ruling clique. Leaflets were distributed in the streets, and posters were posted calling for the fall of the regime and expressing support for the SNM. Prayer leaders delivering their sermons in the mosques condemned the crimes which were committed by these troops against unarmed citizens and demanded that this tribal regime which devastated the country be overthrown.

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Calls for the government's resignation, recognition for opposition parties, and honest legislative elections were heard even during the conference which was held recently, from 17 June to 2 July, by the so-called Revolutionary Socialist Party, which is the only recognized party in Somalia. And yet, Siad Barre ordered conference proceedings stopped, and he took a series of repressive measures against citizens in north Somalia.

In addition to these factors, Siad Barre's policy, with regard to human rights violations, on the one hand, or the deterioration of economic and social conditions, on the other, did, of course, have negative effects. Somali citizens' opposition to Barre's regime grew everywhere in the country, even in Mogadishu, which is considered the only stronghold for Siad Barre's regime.

Faced with this explosive situation, Siad Barre and his clique killed a Christian bishop in Mogadishu, whose only crime was to condemn the massacres committed by the army and to demand an end to human rights violations. It seems that the regime was also accusing the bishop, who had been living in the Somali capital for 40 years, of leaking information to an Amnesty International delegation which had visited Somalia late last June. The regime tried to pin the assassination on Muslim clerics to justify, on the one hand, its repressive policies against the imams, and, to try, on the other hand, distracting international public opinion away from the stifling crisis in which Barre's regime has been floundering.

The first confrontation between demonstrators and Siad Barre's troops resulted in the death of 750 citizens and the kidnapping of approximately 1,000, who may have been killed but whose fate remains unknown. Approximately 1,500 citizens from north Sudan were also arrested, and incidents of rape, looting, and killing are still taking place. Neutral sources indicated that approximately 46 persons, including students, professors, and civil servants, were executed on the beach in Mogadishu in the presence of General Muslih, Siad Barre's son, who participated personally in the execution of innocent civilians. Contrary to what is being promoted by official propaganda, order has not been established in Mogadishu. It is likely that tense conditions in that city will become even more tense, just as they did in Hargeisa and Burao on the eve of the June 1989 events.

[AL-DUSTUR] The ongoing conflict in Somalia has been described by some observers as an ethnic, not a political conflict. What would you say to this charge?

[Ali] The people of Somalia are a cohesive people who speak the same language. The vast majority of Somalis are Sunni Muslims. Therefore, the reasons for the present crisis are not ethnic. As I mentioned earlier, this crisis has been caused by the people's growing anger with the repressive policies pursued by Siad Barre's regime and the massacres that were committed by his troops. The people are angry with a tribal system which allows the Marehan Tribe, Siad Barre's tribe, to monopolize key

positions in government. Barre appointed his son, Muslih, general, and recently he appointed him army commander. Ten years ago Barre appointed his brother, Abdurahman Jama Barre, minister of foreign affairs, and recently, he appointed Ahmed Suleyman Abdulle, his brother-in-law, who had served for years as head of the National Security Agency, minister of interior. These are a few examples of the favoritism practiced by this tribal regime.

[AL-DUSTUR] Official circles in Somalia accused clerics of provoking the disturbances which were seen in the capital, Mogadishu. Is there a religious movement behind these disturbances?

[Ali] Siad Barre's regime is trying to promote these charges for the purpose of reducing the popularity of the opposition in Somalia. Barre's regime is also trying to win the support of western countries by suggesting that those who oppose the government are religious fanatics. The fact is, there is no religious movement in Somalia. Fanaticism is alien to our people who are known for their tolerance. To prove the point, let me say that our movement, the SNM, is represented in Rome by a Christian. And yet, our Muslim people are extremely disturbed by the outcome of Siad Barre's policies. These policies caused a decline in values and spread bribery and corruption in the administration and in government offices. The uprising of our Muslim people in Hargeisa in 1982 and 1984, which was opposed with bullets and repression, may provide the best evidence that our people oppose a regime which scorns values.

[AL-DUSTUR] To what extent do the factions of the Somali opposition coordinate their activities with each other? What is your relationship with the recently established United Somali Congress?

[Ali] There is no doubt that the victories scored by the SNM indicate that, as far as its numbers and its condition are concerned, the SNM is the strongest opposition movement to Siad Barre's regime and that it enjoys broad popular support everywhere in the country. The movement's political and military organization is well-contrived and effective. Our movement, which is the largest and strongest movement in the country, has a central committee that consists of citizens from north, central, and south Somalia. Consequently, it took upon itself the responsibility of co-ordinating activities with other factions of the Somali opposition and communicating with those factions, including the United Somali Congress. In this regard, reference must be made to the fact that our movement welcomed the position taken by the new movement. That position, which was announced at the new movement's organizational conference, declared that the United Somali Congress was willing to work with the SNM.

[AL-DUSTUR] But why hasn't Siad Barre's regime been overthrown yet? Who is supporting him inside Somalia and abroad? What are the forces that have kept him in power for two decades?

[Ali] Siad Barre has been using fire and brimstone to rule the country. He has been using repressive institutions which he planted everywhere: in the military, in intelligence agencies, and in the military courts.

In addition to these repressive institutions, Siad Barre established an army that is made up of the Marehan Tribe and a number of refugees from Ethiopia. This army committed brutal acts recently against Somali citizens in the north and in Mogadishu. Last year, however, the SNM proved that it can penetrate that stronghold which has been protecting Siad Barre and his regime throughout the past years. We gave the Somali people evidence that the invincibility of that army was now doubtful. As a result of the SNM's victories, morale in this army declined; there was discontent and rebellion within its ranks; and a number of army officers joined the Somali opposition to continue the struggle against Siad Barre's regime.

So much for the domestic front. As far as foreign support is concerned, the United States offered Siad Barre's regime military and economic aid in return for the United States' use of the Berbera Military Base, the Mogadishu Airport, and the Kismayo Airport for military purposes. Washington's financial help to Siad Barre came in the form of loans to Somalia from the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] and the IMF. In addition, the United States sent food to Somalia. And yet, the U.S. position and the position of western countries underwent change during the past 3 months. The U.S. Congress asked President Bush to stop all aid to Siad Barre's regime because of recent human rights violations which occurred in Somalia. Confirmation of the change in the U.S. position toward Siad Barre's regime came in a statement made last July by Herman, assistant U.S. secretary of state for African affairs. In that statement Herman said that the situation in Somalia was critical, and he said that at the present time the country lacked a central administration that was capable of managing the country's affairs. Washington and western countries advised their citizens against traveling to Somalia unless it was absolutely necessary.

Some information indicates that a few European Community countries, including Italy, which used to offer assistance to Siad Barre's regime, decided to suspend or reduce their assistance to Barre's regime. Britain, however, assumed an unequivocal position toward conditions in Somalia. In this regard, reference must be made to the fact that Siad Barre's regime is working very hard to acquire weapons from South Africa, Romania, Chile, and the black market. On this occasion, we are asking the international community to prohibit the sale of weapons to Siad Barre's regime because selling weapons to that regime will prolong the tragedies of the Somali people.

[AL-DUSTUR] It seems that your movement adopted the military option to overthrow the regime. What about your political option?

[Ali] The SNM supports national reconciliation among the citizens of Somalia. Siad Barre's regime, however, has to go. Barre's regime is the regime which killed hundreds of innocent people and destroyed cities and villages in their entirety with their residents. We are convinced that the fall of this regime is imminent. We will not allow this regime, which carried out its coup on 21 October 1969, to celebrate the 20th anniversary of that coup.

[AL-DUSTUR] What is Ethiopia's position toward the opposition movements and toward recent events?

[Ali] Ethiopia is pursuing a policy that guarantees justice among ethnic groups as well as freedom of religion. Ethiopia's positions in support of the Arab cause have been honorable. Furthermore, Ethiopia embraced more than half a million Somali refugees, all of whom had fled from Siad Barre's purgatory. In the early eighties Somali liberation movements could be found in Ethiopia, that country which has been offering protection over the years to refugees fleeing from their country. In this regard, reference must be made to the fact that the first wave of Muslim refugees who fled from Mecca went to Ethiopia.

Ever since Somalia and Ethiopia concluded an agreement in February 1988, all the SNM's forces have been in Somalia, and they have nothing to do with Ethiopia. Let me conclude by taking this opportunity to speak on behalf of our movement and express our thanks to Ethiopia, which is embracing more than half a million Somali refugees. We are certain that the presence of those refugees in Ethiopia will have a positive effect on relations between the two countries in the future. The presence of Somali refugees in Ethiopia will strengthen the cooperation between Somalis and Ethiopians and will help the two peoples establish good neighborly relations between them.

[AL-DUSTUR] What is the position of Arab countries toward Siad Barre's regime?

[Ali] The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia refused to receive Siad Barre's envoy. Iraq and Egypt affirmed that they would not furnish Siad Barre's regime with weapons to use against its own people. We asked Colonel al-Qadhafi, who had previously offered military assistance to Siad Barre's regime, to change his policy. Regarding the Emirates, we sent His Highness al-Shaykh Zayid a letter asking him not to fulfill Siad Barre's requests. At the present time Somali envoys are traveling in Arab and western capitals for the purpose of getting assistance "to rebuild the northern cities which were destroyed by government troops." We are asking our Arab brothers to help find radical solutions to the problems of the Muslim people of Somalia.

Tanzania

* Dar's University Withdraws Defense for Hamad

34000032c Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER
in English 9 Sep 89 p 6

[Text]

Hamad Abandoned by University

Former chief minister of Zanzibar, Seif Shariff Hamad, who is to be tried for possession of secret documents, has just been let down by the University of Dar es-Salaam. The University Legal Aid Committee, which has a good reputation, recently withdrew its defence aid for the accused. Professor Issa Shivji, whose political works on Tanzania are considered a major reference, and who was defending the former leader of the Island's government on behalf of the university committee, announced this decision a few weeks ago, saying that such an attitude was as regrettable as it was exceptional. Nonetheless, he gave no explanation.

Seif Hamad is not without financial means, and some people are not at all surprised at the committee's response, as its vocation is to assist those who have no resources. The explanation seems summary however, and does nothing to dissuade observers that the withdrawal is the result of political pressure from the government. This is in fact the opinion of several university professors. In a letter addressed to the Dean of the Law Faculty, Dr Tambila, in his capacity as chairman of the UDASA (University of Dar es-Salaam Academic Staff Assembly), asks whether the committee's decision does not go contrary to its commitment to respect basic human rights. Pointing out that Seif Shariff Hamad's "problems" with the law, began just after he had been expelled from the party, he deduces that there is a possibility that the former Zanzibari leader is being made to pay the price for his dissenting opinions. The letter received a very curt and businesslike reply from the chairman of the committee, W. L. Kapinga, considering that the UDASA is not competent to make any appeal against the committee's decision.

* Hutu Leader, Dissidents From Burundi Jailed

34000835b London AFRICA ANALYSIS
in English 1 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] Kampala—The leader of the Hutu dissident movement, Palipehutu, is currently in prison in Dar es Salaam. Remy Gahutu and 14 other Palipehutu activists were imprisoned in April. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is understood to be searching for a new country of exile for them. Five Palipehutu activists are also to be expelled from Rwanda.

Palipehutu is a shadowy organisation—more in evidence outside than inside Burundi. It is often described as wanting the violent overthrow of Tutsi dominance.

It is not clear what pressure Burundi has brought to bear on Tanzania and Rwanda to make them crack down on Palipehutu members, who formerly operated fairly openly in their countries.

Tanzania, however, has reason to be grateful to Burundi's President Pierre Buyoya. After he seized power in September 1987, Buyoya stopped the illegal flow of Tanzanian ivory to Burundi.

Rwanda also has good reasons to want amicable relations with Burundi, which is home to almost 250,000 Rwandese Tutsi. The Rwandese government is adamant it does not want them back.

Uganda

* Rebels Move Into Northern Part of Country

34000706a Kampala THE NEW VISION
in English 8 Aug 89 pp 1, 12

[Article by Alfred Oyet]

[Text] The Secretary for Defence, RC [Resistance Committee] V of Kitgum District, Lt John Nokrach, has said it has been confirmed by his office that rebels have infiltrated into Kitgum District from Gulu District.

In a circular letter to all RC V councillors of the District, all chairmen RC III, all sub-county chiefs and all zonal LDU [Local Defense Unit] commanders, Lt Nokrach said the rebels have been in Aruu and Lamwo counties.

He said the rebels have looted shops in Atanga and Pajule trading centres where they killed three people and recently ambushed a vehicle going to Lira near Agago Bridge.

Nokrach further said his office has noted with great concern the sale of guns and ammunitions being carried out in areas of Padibe, Lokung, Orom and in markets bordering Kotido District.

He explained that when former rebels of UPDA [Uganda People's Democratic Army] and other groups reported to the NRA [National Resistance Army], very many of them left their guns at home. "The sale of guns is now being done by both members of the LDU and civilian relatives of those who have surrendered to Government," he added.

Nokrach said guns were being sold to rustlers and that a gun fetched about six or seven heads of cattle, which are in turn sold to cattle traders.

He wrote that there were strange people entering the District to carry out illegal trade in places like Kalongo, Paimol and Adilang "where there are heavy movements of cattle."

In order to deal with these problems, some immediate measures have been taken. They include:

- Recruitment of LDUs to be accomplished within the shortest possible time in order to deal with the rebels;
- All businessmen entering Kitgum District should possess valid trading documents. Cattle traders should have clearance from the chairman RC V, District Veterinary Officer and the 317th Brigade Intelligence Officer before leaving Kitgum.

Markets (auctions) at Akilok, Orom and Omiya Pacwa have been temporarily closed.

- All dancing activities have been suspended throughout the district until the security situation improves.
- All markets in the District should start by 8:00 a.m. and close by 5:00 p.m., and this is to be strictly observed by everybody.

"Your quick action to enforce the above measures as far as the security situation is concerned will be of great assistance to our District," he concluded. The letter was dated 10 July 1989.

Meanwhile, in another letter, dated 19 July 1989 to the chairman RC V Kitgum, the 317th Brigade Commander, Lt Col Badru Kiyingi, has said the public in Kitgum town have noted with great concern that there are no disco-dances in town.

"Therefore, I hereby inform and ask you to arrange to open up the disco places to operate promptly in order to fulfill the public interest in response to public petition," the letter said.

The letter was copied to the District Administrator and the District Security Officer, Kitgum.

* Local Militias To Patrol Zairian Border

*34000706b Kampala THE NEW VISION
in English 29 Jul 89 p 12*

[Article by John B.B. Nzinjah]

[Text] The local defence forces [LDF] in Kasese district have been instructed to participate in the war against smuggling along the border. They will work hand in hand with the NRA [National Resistance Army] and the RCs [Resistance Committees] in the detection of the numerous foot paths through which smugglers pass with Ugandan goods.

The Chairman RC 5 Kasese, Mr Jethro Mbayohi said this in Kasese town when reacting to a report in THE NEW VISION that the LDF had been told to keep away from anti-smuggling operations in the district.

The LDF in the district are also to be armed with better weapons to enable them to participate effectively in the anti-smuggling operations.

Early this month, the vigilant RCs of Bwera sub-county mounted an operation against smugglers of foodstuffs in

Bwera trading centre. A number of bags of beans were recovered from residences of self-employed women in the trading centre.

Since the operation, the consumer prices of beans in Bwera market have gone down from 100/- a mug full to 50/-. Food smugglers had also started exchanging fish and meat for beans.

Meanwhile an association for Uganda-Zaire Importers and Exporters Association (UZ - Impexas) has been formed at Bwera. The association is intended to organise the youth in Bwera trading centre and the nearby places to stop illegal trade with Zaire. The association will enable the youth, men and women to trade in items authorized by Uganda government.

The chairman of the association, Sheikh Hamuza Kisando who described the Zairean Kasindi Market as the port of exchange said that the association members will assist in identifying people who smuggle our food to the border market.

"We shall be able to know who takes what to that market and whether such a person passes through the customs post or through illegal foot paths," he said.

* Army Officer Claims South Secure

*34000707a Kampala THE NEW VISION
in English 20 Jul 89 pp 1, 12*

[Article by George Kawule]

[Text] Reports of alleged organized guerrilla in Buganda have been dismissed by the Commander of the First Division (Central), Col Fred Bamwesigye. He was speaking in an exclusive interview with THE NEW VISION from his office in Lubiri Barracks in Kampala yesterday.

The commander gave a detailed analysis of the situation in Mpigi District and other parts of the country. He said that available intelligence reports had not proved the existence of any guerrilla movement in the country aiming to fight the NRM/NRA [National Resistance Movement/National Resistance Army] government.

He explained: "Since we have not heard from any spokesman on their behalf, nor come into skirmishes with them, nor discovered any of their camps anywhere in the country, it is difficult to justify the existence of any guerrilla movement."

However, if there is any guerrilla movement operating in the country, then we have to wait for their spokesman to say something or an attack on our positions, Col Bamwesigye explained further.

"In any case, if there is one, then we are just ready to meet them and fight," the commander said emphatically.

Giving a critical analysis of the prevailing situation, Bamwesigye explained that the NRA as an army had recruited many soldiers particularly during the liberation struggle. However, some of those recruited had joined with some ulterior motives to look for an easy life and achieve their selfish objectives.

"But now we are in the process of assimilation or rejection; one is either assimilated or the situation rejects him," said the commanding officer.

"We are a disciplined army; but some of the soldiers who wanted to use our guns to go and steal from wananchi are the ones who later deserted the army and alleged poor conditions within the barracks," Bamwesigye pointed out.

Col Bamwesigye went on: "But frankly, our soldiers are far better off than even their brothers they left in the village. For instance, they are given free accommodation, free food and have a reasonable salary in addition to having been promised financial loans for their personal welfare.

"So for anyone who has known our political line, there is no need to desert the army except for those who have failed to cope with our discipline."

The commander explained that the second category of deserters comprised soldiers who served in the previous armies such as Uganda Army (UA), the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) and under the fighting groups such as FEDEMU [Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda], UFM [Uganda Freedom Movement] and FUNA [Former Uganda National Army]. All the fighting groups became defunct after they merged with the NRA, he said.

However, he added, after the fall of Kampala some fighters of the other groups joined the NRA while others stayed away for unexplained political reasons. Those who joined the NRA were formed into battalions like the 36th Battalion which later gave ammunitions to the enemy in the North and the NRA was forced to screen it and arrest some of its men, Col Bamwesigye charged.

He said this is how the rumor about guerrilla activity in some parts of the country like Mpigi District had originated, following such defections. Some of the deserters travelled from the countryside to Kampala to steal and return to their bases, he said.

Bamwesigye said an operation had been launched about a month ago to arrest all former soldiers of whatever description as a result of criminal activities by some of them.

He gave instances of those arrested from Mityana area and parts of Mpigi District who to date number about 400. At least another 200 have been arrested from Western Uganda and the operation will continue throughout the country.

Bamwesigye also dismissed suggestions that such arrests were only being carried out in Buganda, which implied that this was a Buganda-based conflict.

Asked whether some of those arrested might not have left the army with proper documents, the commander explained that from available records there has never been any official discharge of soldiers by any of the previous armies including the NRA.

"However, in case of anyone having proper discharge documents we don't disturb him. But where even those with proper papers are involved in criminal and anti-people activities, we do not hesitate to arrest them. And we know them because the information comes from the people."

Arrests have so far been made in Mpigi, Mityana, Western Uganda and West Nile region. And since such an operation began, there has been marked security improvement in those parts, he said. He singled out areas like Matugga in Mpigi District.

Bamwesigye also pointed out that deserters were previously being released after some politicisation following their arrests.

"But this had disappointed RC [Resistance Committee] officials, and so this time we shall keep them until we ascertain the situation," Bamwesigye said.

* Joint Military, Civilian Bodies Created

34000708a Kampala THE NEW VISION
in English 28 Jul 89 pp 1, 12

[Article by Charles Ocan]

[Text] Security committees for each county in Kumi and Soroti districts are to be formed under the chairmanship of the respective NRC [National Resistance Committees] representatives.

The committees will be responsible for the joint civilian and NRA [National Resistance Army] operations to eliminate vestiges of rebel activities in Teso.

The decision was a result of a meeting at State House between President Museveni and NRC members from Kumi and Soroti districts led by the Minister of Labour, Mr S. K. Okurut, the Minister of State in the Office of the President, Mr Ateker Ejalu and the Deputy Minister of Animal Industry, Dr Aporu Okol.

According to the President, the security committees will have three functions; to provide information, mobilise the masses and harmonise relations between the NRA and the public.

The meeting discussed also the recent incidents of rebel activities in Tubur and Dakabela in Soroti district and the ensuing battle between the rebels and the NRA.

The President noted also the killing of several civilians by indisciplined NRA soldiers in the operations.

They discussed also recent operations of the NRA mobile units in both districts and in particular the death of 69 people by suffocation in railway wagons at Mukura in Kumi district.

It was observed that the Mukura tragedy was caused by an apparent blatant indiscipline by NRA officers.

The President assured that investigations are continuing and stern measures will be taken against those responsible for the tragedy.

He, however, lamented that, "The bandits in Soroti and Kumi have no base except among the people which poses a problem during operations."

The President attributed two operational problems to these catastrophes. He said that rebels were cowardly and hiding among the population. Secondly, he blamed some civilians for keeping the rebels.

"The population should reject these rebels otherwise we see further mishap like this if we do not mobilise people around ourselves," President Museveni observed.

The meeting was briefed by the Commander of the 3rd Division, Col Mugume who said that a number of officers had been arrested in connection with the Kumi tragedy.

The military team to the meeting was led by the Minister of State for Defence, Maj Gen Elly Tunowine, and the Army Commander, Maj Gen Salim Saleh.

The President disclosed that employment opportunities were open to rebels who had surrendered. He said, some of them had been absorbed into the police, prisons and army. The kadogos had been absorbed into the NRA while others had been absorbed into the NRA production unit as salaried employees.

The President said that a section was to be created in the NRA to deal with employment opportunities for those who surrendered.

Mr Ateker Ejalu on behalf of the NRC representatives appreciated that the Commander of the Army had admitted the error committed by the soldiers and for apologising to the people of Uganda. He said, this was "a clear manifestation of openness and democracy by the NRM government."

He said, the fact that the President was discussing with the representatives of the people of Teso for the second time in a few weeks "is a clear vindication of the democratic system which has been established in the country."

Mr S. K. Okurut who was the leader of the delegation and had visited Ngora recently briefed the meeting about the discussions he held with the eyewitnesses of the Mukura tragedy. He demanded that certain military officers associated with the atrocities in Teso should be removed immediately to mollify the public.

* Official Reviews Constitutional Progress

*34000710b Kampala THE NEW VISION
in English 8 Aug 89 pp 6-7*

[Article by Mulinde-Musoke]

[Text] Work of the Constitutional Commission has got underway. Yesterday we ran a story on P6 on the overview of constitution making. In this sequel we interviewed the Secretary to the Constitutional Commission, Dr Phares Mutibwa, on probable aspects of the new Constitution which is being debated. Below we run the excerpts of the interview.

[THE NEW VISION] What exactly is a constitution and is it a necessity?

[Mutibwa] I think every country has always had a constitution. It may not necessarily be a written one, but an agreed kind of understanding; one that encompasses the basic ideas of those people constituting that country, of how they wanted to be governed.

You have some countries where you don't have a written constitution, as in the case of pre-literate societies, many of which were found here in Africa. However, even those countries where there was no written word, at least they had constitutions, meaning they had principles upon which they governed their societies.

A constitution is an agreed set of ideas written or unwritten which assist people to govern themselves as civilized communities.

[THE NEW VISION] Considering Uganda's violent past, do you think we have reached a stage where people will allow themselves to respect or be led by a piece of paper?

[Mutibwa] That is the problem which we are faced with.

But think of it like a plane crash. After helping the survivors, these same people will get onto other planes themselves. It is the natural cause of things.

It is true we have had a very unfortunate past, a very violent past, but this does not prevent us from getting a new constitution. Remember we had the 1966 violent crisis, which involved the abrogation of one constitution, but it was followed almost on the very day by another. In other words, constitutions have got to follow one another.

But one hopes, the kind of lessons we have learnt from the history of our country will make people hesitate and think twice, as to the real meaning of a constitution. A constitution is just not a question of papers on which some principles are written on. Constitutions must go beyond that. People must have confidence in the constitution.

Political education is required of any civilized community if they are going to live together, but even more if

they are to respect such documents as a constitution which is guiding them to be better citizens of their country.

[THE NEW VISION] What do you think will be the major problems that the Constitutional Commission will face in drafting the new constitution?

[Mutibwa] We are faced with many major problems. Uganda today consists of so many nationalities. We were brought together at the turn of the century by the British people out of a number of nationalities which were living sometimes in isolation of each other. Some of them were living in hostility with each other, but by the stroke of a pen and as a result of the Scramble for Africa, we were brought together.

So one of the major issues in those colonial days, was what I wish to call Pax Britannica. In other words, we were not allowed to get at each other's throats, because there was somebody protecting us at the top.

But even then, there were some nationalities that were prepared to get at each other, but because of this Pax Britannica, everything appeared to be calm. The moment they left, then things started to emerge which had been suppressed for a long time.

So, one of the major issues is how to reconcile the interests of so many nationalities in Uganda with each other so as to achieve something which is common. The idea developed by one English political thinker of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number." That really is the crux of the matter.

Secondly, we have had a violent past and anything that grows out of violent form is naturally difficult to hinge together. Like for example the French Revolution, which began in 1789 but did not stop until after thirty years or so. That is a point to note. Now of course, so many emerging issues which are burning to some societies have come up which we've got to take notice of when we are framing the constitution.

[THE NEW VISION] Could you comment on the supremacy of the president in the new constitution?

[Mutibwa] I don't want to enter into that kind of discussion, because I don't want to give my own views. But I think this is one of the issues we will need to sound out and get a consensus from the people. On such issues as this, our role (apart from writing the new constitution) is educating the people that this is something they should address themselves to. But I wouldn't like to come out and say this is how it should be.

It all depends on what the people decide and this is why we are here.

[THE NEW VISION] It follows then that you cannot comment on the recent shake-up in the Judiciary.

[Mutibwa] Yes. These are issues that affect the human rights of people; they affect the livelihood of so many

people and therefore we must look into it and we hope that those who are concerned, professionals like judges will definitely give evidence and best see how they can serve this country as judges.

On the other hand, even the Chief Justice would be able to come forward and express his view. The idea is not to suppress any or highlight the interests of one group, but for all people, all Ugandans to come together and achieve a consensus on a number of issues.

[THE NEW VISION] The sanctity of the new constitution—what will be there to stop anyone from tearing it up?

[Mutibwa] This is the problem of which we are concerned, not only as Commissioners. Ugandans have to be concerned about this. We have made a constitution and we have enacted it. What happens after that?

I think this takes us back to what I said earlier, namely that much depends on the political culture of the people in the country. You find that countries like the United States, for instance, their constitution has not been torn although it has been threatened several times in the mid-19th century, when they had the civil war. But they survived it, largely through their political culture, through their revolution and that they had been colonized by the English for a long time until the first 13 states decided to fight this colonization. In the process they came together little by little.

When one looks at the U.S. Constitution today, some people get the impression that all the 50 states sat together and made their constitution. No. It was a gradual process. Through the struggle and revolution they came to appreciate the importance of a document which brought them together to fight external forces.

This is something that becomes a part of the nation itself. It is an idea that is extremely difficult to explain: that this is our constitution and therefore we have got to abide by it and even defend it. This is something we want in this exercise.

We want the people to feel that for the first time they have an opportunity of writing their own constitution. No one is expecting every Ugandan to have their views incorporated. Far from it. But at least one would have the feeling that at long last, "I was also a participant of the enactment of our constitution."

Participation is the word. That is an added security to the document because it would be a product of the people.

[THE NEW VISION] The whole process of enacting the new constitution will take a considerably long period of time. During your tours, what has been the response of the young generation. Are they enthusiastic?

[Mutibwa] This is an interesting and important question. I hasten to add we haven't started touring the country as

we intend to do. Some of us have made a few trips here and there but these have not been really important tours.

My initial response to your question is that many people are definitely interested in the constitution, but as of now it appears to me that it is more the elderly sector of our population, who show the greater interest. I believe this because they have experienced more turmoil.

The younger people appear to me to be accepting the status quo. They haven't had so much shock as we have had. So for us we would want to go back to the good old days and the constitution can assist us to go back.

On the other hand, the younger generation of Ugandans has never seen better days. Consequently, to them the constitution does not reflect the kind of values in society that the older ones have seen in the past. I hope young Ugandans will become more interested in the constitution as we go along.

We have a long way to go. But we must face it that more than half the population of Uganda is under 30. The constitution we are making is for them and therefore they should be more active in contributing towards the document. They should show as much interest as the older generation.

[THE NEW VISION] There is widespread cynicism in young Ugandans that it was the older people who messed up, so they should clean things up. Could you comment on this?

[Mutibwa] Well, that is abrogating one's responsibility, really. I wouldn't like to say as a blanket-like accusation that the older generation is responsible for much of what we have gone through. Definitely, they were around when these things were happening, but this does not prevent the younger Ugandan from participation. We want to run away from this type of thing.

The time will come when people will say: "Yes this constitution was enacted over a period of two years. What was your contribution?"

Now, it would be very hopeless if we left it for the older generation to patch up the issues because they were the people responsible in the first instance for bringing about the turmoil. My appeal to the younger Ugandans is not to run away from their responsibilities but to come out with young ideas.

[THE NEW VISION] Are there any particular guidelines you are intending to follow in terms of an independent Judiciary and the related Executive and Legislature?

[Mutibwa] So far, we haven't gone very far beyond what we already issued out. We have produced some papers indicating the kind of constitution or rather the context one would expect to be in the constitution. We haven't tried to indicate exactly how they should relate to each other. That is something that will appear later on in our work.

In regard to separation of powers, which is what you are referring to, this is very basic. The extent of how one relates to the other, I think is basic to fundamental justice and rights for individuals. Therefore, we will have to consider the place of the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary and see that they can be reconciled in order to work in harmony.

[THE NEW VISION] Concerning the final report to the Minister and particularly the draft constitution, does the Minister have the prerogative to make amendments to the draft and return the draft to you?

[Mutibwa] That is an interesting question. We are required by the Statute to produce reports to the Minister and we intend to do that. After we have toured the country, all the 702 sub-counties, we also intend to give the Minister a progressive report as to how far we have gone in our work. At the end, according to the Statute, we are supposed to produce the draft constitution and a report to the Minister.

As far as we are concerned, that will be the end of our work. We don't know what he is going to do after that. It will be up to the Minister, government and cabinet.

We will have done our job, although we will be around for consultation if need be. But according to the Statute, our work stops as soon as we submit the draft constitution and final report.

[THE NEW VISION] Skeptics say that the constitution has already been written. What do you make of this?

[Mutibwa] This is out. There is no truth whatsoever in that statement. No constitution has already been made. As far as I know, the NRM [National Resistance Movement] have not come with any constitution, and in any case, as far as we are concerned there is no constitution before us. We are not working on any draft constitution that has been presented to us. We are working right from scratch.

[THE NEW VISION] Have your internal seminars helped in giving you a better understanding of your task ahead?

[Mutibwa] Yes, these seminars have been a part of the familiarization period. We come from different backgrounds and regions, so it is an opportunity for Commissioners to get together; to know each other and exchange views. All this helps towards completing the job we have been given to do. So far we have had nine on varying topical subjects, which have been of great benefit to all of us.

[THE NEW VISION] Do you feel that this process of framing the constitution should coincide with increased political education?

[Mutibwa] No, not necessarily. Constitution-making always occurred at a time of political need. In America it coincided with the revolution. In France, between 1789 and 1791 it was a major issue. It comes at a time when

there is need to make a new turn in political history. Here in Uganda there has been a political revolution and the NRM committed themselves, even before capturing state power, to enable Ugandans in making a constitution of their own. It is not a coincidence that we are here.

[THE NEW VISION] Are there any real controversial points that you foresee?

[Mutibwa] I don't want to identify any. As soon as I identify one, then you will ask what about this one? However we are faced with so many issues which we will have to resolve. That is good because it is the whole purpose of making the constitution, to bring out anything into the open.

We hope all those so-called controversial issues will come out for the first time. Indeed, some may be more political than constitutional, but those that are in the latter category, we will try to deal with.

[THE NEW VISION] What about the logistics? Do you for example expect more vehicles?

[Mutibwa] I wish I could be certain about this. As far as the Commission is concerned, we don't control finance according to the Statute. That is controlled by the accounting officer who is the permanent secretary Ministry of Constitutional Affairs. But we have been promised facilities.

[THE NEW VISION] What about the medium of communication; what language are you going to use?

[Mutibwa] That is going to be tricky, especially when we begin the seminars and district tours. It is difficult to say. We have many schools of thought. One says Commissioners should go to home areas. Others say that if people go to where they come from, they may prejudice ideas of the populace. We want to divide ourselves in such a way as to have a consensus so that people from central province can go to the west. Those from the west can then also go to the north, for example, and so forth. The important thing is to understand what the people want to tell us. As long as we get the essence, that is enough. However, we will also use translators and interpreters.

[THE NEW VISION] Picture this scenario of a widespread apathy in the people and eventually the Commission dies a slow death, because no one really has any interest. Could you comment on that?

[Mutibwa] I don't know about the future, but as for now, I consider we are in business. In fact, people have been more optimistic and encouraging in presenting their memorandum than I expected. The interest people have shown in our work is tremendous. I don't think there is a kind of situation where people are dragging their feet or that there is a lack of interest.

[THE NEW VISION] There have been a number of complaints in certain quarters of society that the Commission is seemingly dormant. You rarely hear of your activities. What is the problem?

[Mutibwa] Yes, we have been weak on publicity due to lack of facilities, essentially money. We have to pay for space in newspapers or for radio shows and so on. People have been expecting too much from us, so what we have already accomplished seems nothing. But publicly is very expensive. We are counting on Ugandans to help publicize our activities and it is a way of participating in the enactment of the new constitution.

[THE NEW VISION] What in your view is the kind of constitution Uganda should have?

[Mutibwa] The kind of constitution a Ugandan would like to have, is one which at least safeguards a number of basic issues. One in which full fundamental rights, rights to property, the kind that protects the children against parents and parents against children. A constitution that guarantees freedom of speech, freedom of association and so on. In Uganda's case, we are like people attempting to build a house. All of us must appreciate the views of others or we will never finish the house.

* President's New Strategy for Coffee Crop

34000711c Kampala THE NEW VISION
in English 17 Jul 89, pp 1, 12

[Article by George Kawule]

[Text] President Yoweri Museveni has proposed to the world coffee producing nations to form a producers' association similar to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), to counter the consumers' International Coffee Organisation (ICO) in negotiating stable prices.

Addressing a press conference last Saturday on his return from a four-day official visit to Europe, Mr Museveni revealed that he had advanced the proposal to the Brazilian President, Mr Jose Sarney in a private meeting in Paris where both attended the bicentenary of the French revolution.

Asked how the Brazilian leader had reacted to his proposal, Mr Museveni said his counterpart was interested in the idea.

"However, Mr Sarney did not have all his responsible people with him, so we agreed to follow it up," President Museveni added.

Mr Museveni pointed out that the producers association would help the exporters to control overproduction and therefore, enable to negotiate more stable coffee world market prices.

Commenting on Uganda's case where coffee is the single major export and foreign exchange earner, Mr Museveni said that the country's economy was not balanced, otherwise we would not be crying.

"Let us have an internally integrated economy where we produce most of our essential requirements. We should also try to move away from coffee and diversify our

agricultural production by including other popular crops and export products like fruits, cotton, beans, maize, leather and many others," Mr Museveni advised.

He added that alternative uses for coffee should be explored such as the making of charcoal briquettes from coffee husks as has been done at Namulesa coffee factory. He said Brazil had once used their surplus coffee in the place of coal to fire their steam train engines.

On his impression during the European visit about foreign attitudes towards Uganda, President Museveni said the country's image abroad was very, very good.

"Our only problem still remains that of the corrupt and bad government officers, civil servants and managers of government bodies who are letting down our efforts," Mr Museveni regretted.

He added: "If people don't implement decisions, that affects our projects. Our image abroad is very good, but corruption among public officers is still affecting us; we must have some house cleaning."

Mr Museveni dismissed suggestions that people were stealing public funds in order to survive. That is not true; why don't they work to implement projects which bring in more money? Most of them are simply corrupt," President Museveni said.

He added: "I am not convinced that people are corrupt because they want to survive. How would they improve their income if they did not work. If they worked, we would know they stole to survive. Let them work, then even if they stole, we would know how to categorise them."

The President said the government was moving to deal with corruption in public offices, mentioning that over 100 accounts officers had been fired while some Permanent Secretaries had been prosecuted and others dismissed.

Mr Museveni said that government had already initiated a policy to introduce a bill that requires public officers and leaders to declare their wealth and explain how they had amassed their properties.

"I have already filed my own declaration forms. I don't know why the law has not yet come out. May be I have been cheated," quipped President Museveni to the inquisitive journalists who had insisted that his government had condoned corruption at high level.

President Museveni explained that Uganda had a capitalist economy, saying: "I look at the acquisition of lots of property in a different way. I for one, I may not like to amass property. But how do I prevent others. Ours is a capitalist economy, so I don't have to be in conflict with them."

The property declaration legislation will require leaders and public officers to explain how they acquired their wealth, President Museveni stressed.

On the privatisation policy, Mr Museveni declared: "I support privatisation as a means of infusing efficiency in our management." Relating to the privatisation policy to the Asian Custodian Property Board, President Museveni regretted that government had spent so much money on that body. "I would rather be happy to sell off those buildings to their owners for better management," he pointed out.

Mr Museveni stressed that government will be seriously looking at the social consequences of the privatisation policy as they come along. He added: "Without committed cadres, I would rather have the management of enterprises in private hands."

On the International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programmes, Mr Museveni said, not all of them were bad, stressing that Uganda had selected only those which would benefit the country's economy.

Mr Museveni said that besides his talks in London, he had also held talks with the Indian Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Ghandi on the establishment of a Tata and bicycle assembly plants and the manufacture of machine spare parts in Uganda. But he held no special talks with the French leaders as they were busy with their bicentenary celebrations.

On the war situation in northern Uganda, President Museveni said the rebels in the north had been defeated and no longer constituted a political force.

"Rebel Odong Latek tried to surrender but our people did not move quickly enough and so he fled. The rebels can no longer leave Uganda, but have only to surrender or be killed," the President said.

He added: "We are now going to embark on higher production projects and the reconstruction of schools, health centres and road projects."

Commenting on reported rebel incidents in some parts of Mpigi district, President Museveni told the journalists: "If any of you feel that those opting for the bush in Mpigi areas are anything to standby, you can join them and we shall deal with you. All I know is that these are terrorist gangs who have killed and robbed innocent people. We have already captured some of them; and one, called Brain who had been on the murder charge of the late Andrew Lutakome Kayiira but had escaped from Luzira, was recently killed in an operation near Matugga."

President Museveni was welcomed on arrival by the Third Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Abu Mayanja, the Army Commander, Major General Salim Saleh, Ministers, army officers and diplomats. He inspected a guard of honour mounted by the NRA [National Resistance Army].

* New Counterinsurgency Strategy Urged

34000712c Kampala THE NEW VISION
in English 2¹ Aug 89 p 4

[Text] During his tour of Karamoja, President Museveni has warned Karimojong of the dangers of cattle rustling. The evil practice which has been the source of social and political strife in the area is as old as the Karimojong themselves.

But this is no excuse for past governments failure to stop it. Consequently, the area has lagged behind the rest of the country in all development spheres.

As the NRM [National Resistance Movement] has already demonstrated, no evil practice should be tolerated just because people have lived with it for centuries.

Just like the NRA [National Resistance Army] organized and uprooted institutionalized political violence that was characteristic of most parts of Uganda, the same level of organization should be channelled to Karamoja to uproot the practice of cattle rustling to liberate the people of the area and allow them to settle down like those in other parts.

Only then will the government be able to implement development projects and programmes in the area. For example, the area is known to be very rich in gold. It also has expansive grasslands which can be used for extensive cattle farming and dry land crop production.

Exploitation of these resources has not benefitted the people of the area because of the disruptive practice of cattle rustling.

As we have always urged in this column, the solution to Karamoja problems lies in the careful balance of 'carrot and stick' tactics by government in its operations in the region.

By strategically positioning the NRA and other security agencies in the area, the government should be able to combat and disarm the unruly elements who may wish to persist in disruptive activities.

After combating those activities, government should step up its presence by sponsoring development projects.

As President Museveni has always said, security and water will be the pace setters for any development that will take place in the area. All the others will follow automatically.

* Country Works To Adopt New Constitution

34000713b Kampala THE NEW VISION
in English 7 Aug 89 p 6

[Article by Mulinde-Musoke: "Commission Set To Formulate New Constitution"]

[Text] Over two hundred years ago, a group of 55 men achieved a small miracle. Inaugurated as a convention, it

took them two years to carry out the objective that had been assigned to them. Perhaps we will never know the whole story of the inevitable heated argument, the bickering over phrases or words and the need to accommodate the many special interests. However, the product of their passions and energies was a priceless document that ultimately became the Constitution of the United States of America. It was enacted on March 4th 1789, but ever since then that document has been an underlying strength of the nation.

Coincidentally, Ugandans are embarking on their own awesome task of drafting a new constitution. This is during the same year when Americans are celebrating the bicentenary of their own. One would like to hope there is a good omen in this.

Power is intoxicating. The two former leaders who have ruled Uganda for considerably long interludes, Milton Obote and Idi Amin prove the point. Power creates a situation that precluded participation of the majority and opens a pandora of problems.

For Obote, the Constitution of Uganda was merely a tool to entrench himself into what he later referred to as the "hot seat".

Amin unabashedly ignored the document altogether. Between them, they caused the predominant catalysts of Uganda's decline.

Even today, after years of civil strife and indescribable agonies, when most people would prefer to rebuild their lives, inconsistencies remain in the struggle to find that illusive peace. There remains those people who would rather solve our national misconceptions and misunderstandings by shooting with their guns, than with their mouths.

The drafting of a new constitution is a move towards confronting a major hindrance that has long eluded this country. This national unity.

In a briefing paper, a Uganda Supreme Court justice and the Chairman of the Uganda Constitution Commission, Justice B. J. Odoki expounds on the leading points of their task of spearheading the framing of the new constitution.

Under the Uganda Constitutional Commission Statute 1988 (No. 5 of 1988), which was enacted on 21st December 1988, the Uganda Constitutional Commission came into being. Twenty one commissioners make up the commission, including the chairman, a vice-chairman, a secretary and 16 other members.

The ex-officio members are the Director of Legal Affairs in the NRM [National Resistance Movement] Secretariat and the Chief Political Commissar in the NRA [National Resistance Army].

The President originally appointed 17 commissioners in consultation with the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Mr Sam Njuba. Together with the ex-officio members,

the present number of commissioners is twenty. The last vacancy will be filled in the near future.

Justice Odoki makes an important point on the composition of the Commission. Apart from special qualifications and unquestionable integrity, he notes, "The composition of the Commission reflects the national diversity and various disciplines including law, political science, history, agriculture, medicine, education and so on."

This point cannot be overstated, taking into account the negative repercussions that have developed in the past, when national issues become the exclusive preserve of certain regions and ethnic groups.

Then again, there will not be that inclination later on, to stand off from the final product and claim: "I was not there."

Justice Odoki emphasizes this by stating: "The NRM government recognises the need to involve the people in the determination and promulgation of a national constitution with a view to ushering a national consensus on the most suitable form of constitution that will be respected and upheld by the people."

The Commission's terms of reference involve two functions. First is to study and review the present constitution and secondly to formulate and structure a draft constitution that will form the basis of the country's new constitution.

However, there are certain fundamental objectives that the new constitution will attempt to attain. Justice Odoki highlights eight. But four are worth mentioning.

- To recognise and demarcate the division of responsibility among the state organs of the executive, the legislative and the judiciary and to create viable checks and balances between them.
- To establish and uphold the principle of public accountability by the holders of public offices and political posts.
- To highlight the independence of the judiciary.
- To create viable political institutions that will ensure maximum consensus and orderly succession to government.

For all the wide power that have been invested in the Commission, including the power to call any person to appear before it, commissioners are faced with heavy responsibilities. It will not be a mere matter of sitting about, twiddling thumbs and claiming allowances.

Commissioners must go out to the people and feel them out for their views through public meetings, debates and seminars. They must initiate discussion on the proposed constitution. In short, they must excite Ugandans into taking a strong interest in contributing possible guidelines that will safeguard the future of this country.

From March of this year, the Commission has 24 months to complete its work and submit a final report to the Minister of Constitutional Affairs.

On the other hand, the Minister has the power to extend this period. He also has the prerogative of requiring the Commission to provide him or her with progress reports.

Nevertheless, Justice Odoki adds, "although the Commission operates under the Ministerial responsibility of the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, it is an independent body and its members are required to discharge their duties impartially, without fear or favour."

Finances are provided under the Consolidated Fund. Currently, the commission's supportive staff or secretariat, with headquarters situated in the Post Office Building, Kitante Road, is small. In time, the secretariat will be beefed up with administrative and research officers, and more secretarial staff.

Prof Phares Mutibwa, the secretary to the commission, is also the head of the Secretariat.

Uganda abounds with singular problems and complications that cannot be resolved in a flash, as some people would like to think. Uganda was not only synonymous with suffering, both physical and mental, but also general infrastructural decay.

The commission is very conscious of these limitations. Ugandans have been repressed for too long and it might take time for many to learn to express their views without fear or intimidation.

Then too, there will be the inevitable logistical bottlenecks that may hinder the full potential of the Commission. The government has shown its desire of seeing that these bottlenecks are eased.

According to Justice Odoki, four new Land-Rover have been provided for the commission. This is a small beginning but great things have often emerged from small beginnings. What is important is that the country is overtaken by a gathering sense of mission, the mission of putting together a strong viable constitution.

During a number of prearranged seminars, commissioners are expected to exchange ideas amongst themselves. Besides this, there will also be district seminars organized at each district headquarters.

Participants are to be drawn from the NRC [National Resistance Council] members in the individual districts, District Administrators, RC [Resistance Committee] IVs, RC IIIIs, cadres and a wide cross-section of influential representatives.

It is the Commission that will set the topics and assign speakers. Through these participants, the Commission hopes to effect a faster dissemination of information relevant to the constitution.

Plans also include holding a national seminar in Kampala, involving delegates from all the districts, government officials, representatives from institutions of higher learning, representatives of workers, the youth, women, professionals and religious faiths. One can think of the whole process as a pyramid, with the initial stages being the base.

Finally, there are strong possibilities of holding an international seminar. This will give an opportunity for Ugandans to learn from non-Ugandans. It is becoming widely accepted that democracy is not an absolute term, but relative, depending on the individual developmental circumstances of different countries.

This however, is an imperfect world and there will always be those seemingly hypocritical queries on other people's quest for democracy.

There is no such thing as a perfect democracy. Instead, there is a continuing process of attaining it. Said Justice Odoki, on the point of the international seminars, "It will offer Ugandans an opportunity to benefit from the experience of other countries which have undergone similar constitutional processes in the recent pasts."

On the same lines, during their visits to other countries, commissioners will not only seek out the views from Ugandans living abroad, but also make comparative studies in those countries.

Nonetheless, the emphasis is still on devising a constitution with a strong aura of 'Made in Uganda', for it is Ugandans who will live under it. Consequently, the internal tours scheduled for the last stage of the first part of the programme, are described by Justice Odoki as the heart of the commission's work. This will involve visits to each of the 702 sub-counties in the country.

Chairman Odoki further adds: "It is this process of seeking the views of the people directly which marks a fundamental departure from the making of previous constitutions."

In a bid to speed up this phase of their work, the Commission is to divide itself into several groups. At the end of these tours, part two of the Commission's work will begin.

Justice Odoki referred to part two of their work as, "The analysis of data and information received, reviewing past and present constitutions, discussion and preparation of the final report and draft constitution. It is estimated that this exercise will take about one year."

The day Justice Odoki hands in the final product to the Minister, is the day the Commission fades into oblivion. This simple act by Justice Odoki will signify the end of the Commission's work.

From this point, it is the Minister of Constitutional Affairs who will decide the remaining stages through which the draft constitution will go before the much hoped for enactment.

These are critical times. There are bound to be the perennial sceptics and cynics who will say this is just an NRM government smoke screen; that the real constitution was drawn up long time ago in the bush. Why waste your words and time?

To give in to these pessimistic sentiments will show an unfortunate defeatism that would not do justice to the countless Ugandans who have died in the last 20 odd years.

Drafting of the new constitution, is about using your mouth and writing implements. Never before have Ugandans been given this chance to chart an important aspect of their future.

President Museveni has clearly told Ugandans in so many words: Here is a blank piece of paper—draw up the constitution you want.

It would be a terrible shame if people held back for any number of silly reasons. Justice Odoki underlines this point: "The Commission is committed to returning the verdict of the people."

* **Rebel Attacks Cause Insecurity in North**

34000714a Kampala *THE GUIDE* in English
26 Jul 89 p 3

[Text] Reports reaching "THE GUIDE" from Arua say insecurity there has heightened following the rebel attack on some parts of the District recently.

According to reports one NRA [National Resistance Army] officer capt Ayub Musa has been shot dead at his home by unknown gunmen. His brother is in critical condition in Yumbe hospital.

Three dead bodies were also found near Bando, and one was identified as that of one Suleiman Abulkia, a businessman in Arua. Recently Suleiman was in Kampala but when the Arua road reopened, he took some goods to Arua. Suleiman was called from a mosque where he had gone.

Meanwhile a Uganda News Agency correspondent has said the situation is gradually returning to normal, following a rebel attack which created confusion in some parts of Arua and Nebbi. The people they abducted are however still missing.

According to well informed sources, the rebels infiltrated from the Sudan.

The gang, some in military uniform and armed with guns and stones challenged the authority of the state by occupying and terrorizing parts of Terego county for 4 days from 29th June to 3rd July before retreating towards Lodonga in Aringa county and Rhino camp and Pawor in Madi county plundering on their way.

Field reports say the rebels addressed public rallies at which they were rejected by majority of people most of whom are returnees from exile.

The rebels broke into U.C.B. [Uganda Commercial Bank] Branches at Omugo, Rhino Camp and Obongi looting equipment and local administration offices but failed to get substantial quantities of money. They disarmed and tied up policemen at key points and abducted some of them. The nearest they came to Arua town itself was 15 miles away.

The armed roaming thugs were slowly and surely pursued by NRA who inflicted heavy casualties on them at various engagements, killing or wounding several of them, while villagers remained on alert and high state of preparedness to deal with the remnants.

Reports from RC [Resistance Committee]s and villagers said the rebels hoisted their white flags on Mt. Wati, the highest peak in Central Arua District and made rebel holy spirit movement signs giving political conation to themselves.

Eyewitnesses said the group comprised of assorted Ugandan Nationalities with natives of the areas they invaded forming the majority. Their two pronged destination was the Sudan border to the North through Aringa county and across the Nile to the East into Gulu District from where they presumably originated.

* Newspaper Defends Reporting on Rebels

*34000714b Kampala THE GUIDE in English
9 Aug 89 pp 3, 8*

[Text] Arua authorities both military and civil, are being haunted by a guilty conscience and have taken on THE GUIDE and traders of Arua as a scapegoat.

Addressing a public rally in the Arua market square, July 22 the district administrator Arua Mr Hilary Galiwango warned the people of Arua and travellers from elsewhere against giving false reports about the events that take place in the District.

He told the public that it was true that the rebels numbering about 200 entered Arua District from Midigo and moved very fast into Koboko, Lodonga and Nyadri in Maracha and Omogo in Terego counties. He said the NRA [National Resistance Army] quickly moved into action and the rebels suffered the heaviest casualties. Those few who managed to escape retreated into their garrison in Kiogu in Sudan and some ran into Zaire.

The D.A. accused some people in the Arua of being guerrilla sympathizers saying that even in his office, there are guerrilla supporters. He cited the example of capt. Gard who was killed during the invasion of Koboko, barracks. He also sighted Lt. Col. Baker who he said was in the Bush with guerrillas.

Mr Galiwango called upon everybody be it RC [Resistance Committee] Executive Councilors to be 24 hours alert from now on, against some strangers in their respective villages and report any that enters their area to the authorities.

About reports that appeared in "THE GUIDE" newspaper that has some three dead bodies were found around Bondo he said it has been proved beyond doubt the report was wrong and the two people who were involved in spreading that rumor have been arrested and are in military custody in Arua. They are army deserter Haruna Bwemwaka a Mutoro from Kabarole District and Ex soldier RSM Abdal a kakwa.

And the brigade and battalion commanders in Arua said "THE GUIDE" is bent on war mongering and should check for facts with the military command in Arua on security matters in the area instead of relying on their ill informed so called reliable sources who are not named.

They said one of the suspected agents of "THE GUIDE" called Haruna Byamaka, an NRA deserter from Fort Portal has been arrested in Arua for spreading misinformation including taking photographs for local newspapers distorting the true situation in Arua and West Nile and for alleging that three dead bodies were found near Bondo barracks including that of Suleiman Abilikia, a businessman, allegedly picked from a mosque and indirectly implicating NRA.

The brigade commander Major John Mugume, the brigade I.O Lt John Rusoke and the commanding officer 51 battalion Arua Capt. Tumusiime warned "THE GUIDE" to stop deliberate distortion of facts and behaving like agents of enemies.

They also took government reporters in Arua the alleged scene where the dead bodies were said to have been dumped and found no traces of the bodies at Bondo.

But what the D.A. and military authorities didn't talk about is the death of an NRM [National Resistance Movement] military officer, capt Ayub Musa who was gunned down at his home or the circumstances leading to his death.

They didn't even say how Sulaiman Abilikia snatched from the mosque met his death or whether he is still alive. They further misinformed the public that the bodies were dumped near Bondo barracks yet "THE GUIDE" reported that the bodies were dumped in Bondo area, which is a village of which the barracks occupies a small piece. Neither did "THE GUIDE" say that Sulaimani Abilikia was picked by the NRA as the Arua military authorities claimed at the rally. All these shows a sign of guilty conscience on the part of Arua authorities.

May be the D.A. and military authorities could clarify as to the whereabouts of one John who was very popular in Arua and is alleged to have been among the people who picked Abilikia from the mosque.

"THE GUIDE" does not use Army deserters or former soldiers as correspondents and our reporters in Arua are still intact. However reports say the two people were arrested because they were former soldiers and were heard talking about insecurity in Arua.

THE GUIDE sources in Arua are mainly local RCs and it is alleged by our RC sources that the recent invasion by rebels of several parts of Arua was reported to the authorities in Arua in advance and some authorities were seen moving their property hence creating fear among the people.

Meanwhile, the DA's accusations that people of Arua are sympathizers of rebels, sparked off a big demonstration last Friday July 28 denouncing war.

Almost all normal activities in Arua town came to a complete standstill as everybody took to the streets demonstrating for peace.

The demonstration called by the chairman Arua elders association; who is also chairman RC IV Arua municipality, Mr Jason Avutia, was the first of its kind in Arua town.

About 10,000 people including office workers students, and staff of institutions of learning religious organizations, NGO [Nongovernmental Organization?]'s, businessmen, women, children and even disabled persons wheelchairs participated in the well orchestrated peaceful demonstration.

The two hour peace march started from the DA's office but the D.A. despite knowing about the demonstration did not join the people even addressing them after the procession.

The one kilometer procession mailed through Arua main street led by Mr Avutia carrying a peace banner placards reading "Arua has had enough of wars, let us try peace", welfare not warfare." Arua needs cassava flour not "gunpowder" "Ak 47 fire 540 kg of an asset in seconds" "No peace no health", "Islam means peace" "peace costs so little does so much "Arua says yes to peace not to war", were seen on pick-ups tractors and on wheel barrows.

* Journalist Assesses Plight of Civil Servants

34000844c Kampala THE GUIDE in English
30 Aug 89 p 5

[Article by Bruhan Ssebayiga]

[Text] It is a characteristic of the majority of civil servants to be ignorant of how to protect themselves in the clinches. They are easily intimidated, overimpressed or overawed by the boss's power. Under pressure they usually give in without much struggle.

Most civil servants give more to the service than they will ever get in return. I can count on my fingers fellow workers of my generation who started out in the service when I did and who reserved their health, maintained a good family life, and came out with a bank roll and security.

But there are scores who devoted a large part of their lives to the civil service without even the assurance of a

decent retirement income. It is possible that one civil servant out of five makes the grade as a winner, though not necessarily a big winner, and get reasonable satisfaction out of life and achieving personal security. The rest stay in dead-end jobs and eat their hearts out and may be forced out before they reach retirement age and sometimes these losers are good capable men.

Some unusually gifted ones fail to make the grade, simply because they were trapped in jobs that never gave them a chance and didn't get out in time.

The average man is awake for about 6,000 hours a year. Out of these he may spend 2,000 or more hours in office and perhaps another thousand thinking about his work or studying to improve on his performance. Half of his conscious adult life up to the age of retirement, devoted to his job, the other half is distributed among, wife, children, home holidays, sports, hobbies entertainment and his cultural development. Unless he finds genuine satisfaction in his work he may not even be able to live a warm, interesting, and healthy emotional life when he is away from the office.

There are many an unhappy workers whose entire waking lives are corroded by frustrations of their work, and whose sleeping hours are haunted by dreams in which repressed hostility toward their colleagues at work reveals itself.

Men who permit themselves to work for years in jobs they resent are among the heaviest losers in civil service regardless of their earnings. Psychologically and biologically they are paying too high a price for their seat at the desk.

In civil service as in poker, a fast start can be a major advantage to an entire career. Poker players sometimes try to reassure a novice who has lost heavily in the first few deals of a game that it is unlucky to win at the start or "Early losers are final winners". That is of course sheer nonsense, the player who collects a substantial stack of chips early in the game and who does not let his quick success to go to his head is likely to wind up a winner. Another analogy was suggested by a top civil servant who once remarked "Ever climb a tree?" The hard part is getting up the trunk. The first ten seconds count most you leap up, you hold on to whatever little projections you can find, you cling with your legs as hard as you can keep reaching, once you are among the branches it is comparatively easy.

That is the way it is in work in the early years before you have got a secure foot hold, you need all your strength and ability just to hold on and pull yourself up. The sooner you reach the middle echelon the sooner you find good pay, tenure, security and opportunity.

If a man's first takes too much out him without opening up significant opportunities, he soon finds himself a loser. And the loss may be far heavier than he realizes at the time.

The majority of junior civil servants duties involves a certain amount of drudgery. It is inevitable, more than that, it can be available training. You can learn a lot from a routine job if you don't stay in it too long. It teaches patience and it helps a man grasp the details. Once a person has gone on to a more interesting work his personal experience of routine drudgery will give him a good deal of insight into the thinking of his subordinates. To overstay in a drudge job even if it is an executive is dangerous. It weakens the morale. It can make a man uncertain, is dangerous.

It is a rare civil servant who at onetime or another has not wanted to strangle his boss. He may like and admire the boss and still have an occasional spasm of resentment against him.

Any boss-subordinate relationship produces strain especially when there is ambition on both sides. A command even when courteous in form, is a sting to the human ego. It may not be consciously felt as a sting, it may be accepted with a smile, but deep down it reminds the recipient of his relative defenselessness.

Junior officers may repress the impulse to rebel so firmly that it never takes the form of a conscious thought, but unconsciously they often harbor resentment, sometimes their repressed rancor is so intense that it results in physical illness or psychological disturbances.

More than one canny employer who wanted to get rid of a man without firing him has combined orders and criticism in a pattern that quickly brought the seething victim to the point of an "I quit" explosion, the boss who senses animosity in subordinate may tolerate him so long as his work is satisfactory but usually has no hesitation in replacing him when an opportunity arises.

* Rebels in Western Region Conduct Operation

*34000845b Kampala THE NEW VISION
in English 23 Aug 89 p 1*

[Article by Mwine Mugisha in Kasese: "Rwenzururu Rebels Abduct Officials"]

[Text] Rwenzururu rebels operating in the Rwenzururu Mountains are abducting RC [Resistance Committee] members and wananchi to their camps.

The Secretary for Information, RC I Mulumba village, Mr Bosco Maseruka and Mass Mobilisation Secretary in the same village, Mr Philly Katanda, were last week abducted and taken to the rebels camps. Mr Maseruka, was tied kandoya and later died during the night of August 18, 1989 with several cut wounds on the head.

According to eye witnesses, a four-man armed gang invaded Mulaba village in Bugoye sub-county on August 17, 1989 around 10.00 a.m. dressed in NRA [National Resistance Army] uniforms. The gang alleged that they were looking for RC members to guide them to where rebels were hiding. And, according to the RC II

Chairman, Bugoye parish, Mr Lawrence Kiluwayaga the gang spoke both Kiswahili and Rukonjo, and were demanding food and boots from the wananchi.

Kiluwayaga said that in Kisamba village, some RC members were arrested, but later escaped with severe beatings. He said the rebels grabbed four goats from the vice-chairman of Bugoye Growers' Cooperative Union, one Mathe.

He said they were wearing combat trousers and civilian shirts, but most of the rebels did not have guns. They came from the direction of the mountains and escaped using the same route.

Meanwhile, the Commanding Officer of 75th Battalion, Capt Paddy Gitta, has appealed to the RC members to be vigilant and not relax in giving information to the relevant authorities. He was addressing RC officials of Kasese Town Council, Bugoye, Kilembe and Rukooko sub-counties on measures to improve and strengthen security in these areas.

Flanked by the Chairman of RC 5, Mr Jesero Mbavangi, the District Security Officer, Mr Olinga Rukaba, and the District Executive Secretary, Kasese, Mr Bwambale, the CO noted with concern the presence of many new faces in Kasese District, and wondered whether the RCs were registering them.

He cautioned RCs against collaborating with the enemy.

* President Urges Easterners To Stop Raiding

*34000845c Kampala THE NEW VISION
in English 23 Aug 89 pp 1, 12*

[Text] President Yoweri Museveni has warned the people of Karamoja to desist from cattle rustling or else they would thoroughly be punished. He was addressing the people of Kotido district at rallies held at Kabong and in Kotido town this week.

President Museveni cautioned the Karimojong that the NRA [National Resistance Army] had strategically placed its forces in neighbouring areas to beat off raiders.

He called upon the people of Karamoja to stop the habits of raiding but concentrate on multiplying the herds that they have.

President Museveni explained that cattle raiding by Karamojong has not helped to increase their herds, but on the contrary it has contributed to their depletion because the cattle brought in often have diseases which affect their herds.

He told the people that the government would help them to look after their cattle properly by providing water and training the youth in the area to vaccinate cows.

He asked those who own cows to ensure that they were treated against diseases. He also advised them to start modern methods of keeping cows so that they don't have to walk long distances daily.

Mr Museveni emphasised the necessity of stopping cattle raiding, saying that it was only when there was peace and security that government workers could carry out their work to improve people's methods of farming.

Commenting on the current famine in Karamoja, President Museveni said that in future the government will have to organise irrigation there. He said that in the meantime the Ministry of Agriculture will identify quick maturing crops that can be cultivated there to alleviate the problem of food shortage.

On the question of gold mining in Karamoja, Mr Museveni reminded the people that a gold buying centre had been set up in Moroto town, and asked those who want to deal in gold to get licences to mine it and take it to the buying centre in Moroto.

Responding to the people's memoranda, the President told them that the government will seriously look into the needs presented in the memoranda and where resources permit, the needs will be met.

The President who earlier toured Abim Hospital, was happy to see that the hospital had not been damaged and was functioning.

*** Holy Spirit Movement Attacks Truck Convoy**

34000847c Kampala *THE GUIDE* in English
23 Aug 89 pp 1, 8

[Text] Anti government rebels believed to be from the Holy Spirit Movement, have attacked a convoy carrying

relief food for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Gulu and stripped naked the drivers and all other people who were on a lift on the trucks.

The convoy was heading for Adjumani in East Moyo when it was stopped at Pabo ten miles from Gulu.

The convoy was taking relief food to over 30,000 Sudanese refugees who fled the civil strife in Southern Sudan and are now in camps in East Moyo. The incident took place on Tuesday August 15 and one of the trucks attacked was a Fiat belonging to one S. Kaka.

In a related incident two vehicles, one a petrol tanker and another an Isuzu were ambushed by rebels on Monday August 14. The incident took place ten miles from Atiak also on the Gulu Adjumani road.

Passengers and drivers were stripped naked and all their properties taken by the rebels. According to travellers, on the Gulu Adjumani road through Atiak has been a bit peaceful in the recent past with convoys moving without an armed escort.

The World Food Programme in the recent past used this route to take relief food to Southern Sudan in an operation which is now being halted.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

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17 October 1989

* Mandela Talks Seen as NP Gain for Peace

*34010043b Johannesburg BEELD
in Afrikaans 28 Jul 89 p 17*

[Article by G. N. du Plessis, Forumgebou, Strubenstraat, Pretoria: "Whites Won Much With Mandela"]

[Text] If a black leader who has long sought revolution and war turns around and commits himself to peace, then whites in South Africa have won an important victory.

That was the comment of Dr Gerrit Viljoen, minister of education and development aid, at a public meeting yesterday evening in Silverton in Roodeplaat voting district.

During the meeting, Viljoen, responding to questions about the recent conversation between President P. W. Botha and Nelson Mandela, said that in the past the National Party [NP] had often hesitated the moment its policy began bearing fruit.

The fact that Mandela has committed himself to a process of peaceful negotiation is a achievement that we must boldly build upon. All black leaders must be persuaded to give up revolution and opt for the path of peaceful negotiation. Viljoen said that, when he was administrator general in South West Africa, such an internal negotiation process got under way. It led to over 3,000 exiled SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] members giving up the armed struggle and returning to Namibia to take part in the settlement process.

That is the kind of ideal we must strive for in South Africa.

After the meeting, Viljoen told news reporters that he had not been thinking of a domestic wing of the ANC [African National Congress] when he made that point. It is, however, the government's policy to have the ANC participate in negotiations, if it renounces and ceases all violence, and comes to the negotiating table in peace.

In his speech Viljoen said that the Conservative Party's plans for South Africa would lead to massive population shifts on an order seen only in the Soviet Union. This is quite apart from the conflict, bloodletting, and unprecedented foreign pressure that would ensue.

He analysed the Conservative Party's recently published election manifesto and said that it is a "total illusion" to think that blacks would be persuaded by negotiation to move voluntarily in the way the Conservative Party has in mind.

The Conservative Party's plans to strip blacks of their citizenship, reintroduce influx controls, abolish trade union rights, and suspend their property rights would plunge South Africa into tension and even bloodletting.

Viljoen said that economically South Africa could not afford the population transfer, even if the impossible occurred and blacks were persuaded to voluntarily move to their own areas.

Viljoen also analysed the Democratic Party's election manifesto and said that the party's proposal for a geographic federation with proportional representation does not do enough to protect minorities in South Africa.

In each of the putative provinces whites would be in the minority. That is why the Democratic Party's policy constitutes nothing other than black majority rule.

* Development Aid Could Be Tied to Reforms

*34010043a Johannesburg FINANSIES & TEGNIEK
in Afrikaans 4 Aug 89 p 7*

[Text] The Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] government's decision to turn its back on Marxism-Leninism and build a mixed economy, which grants the individual greater economic freedom, once again underlines the fact that there is no better way to create prosperity than to give the individual free rein.

But this good news from Mozambique confirms another truth as well—that the proverbial carrot is very persuasive.

For some time now institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have been offering African governments the carrot of financial aid in exchange for economic reform.

This week that carrot was replaced with a whole bunch of carrots when the World Bank set an example for other government institutions (and even international banks) by offering debt forgiveness in exchange for certain economic reforms.

The role that "carrots" played in Mozambique's decision to become more market oriented must not be underestimated.

Therein lies the lesson for the outside world. Promising a reward for implementing difficult reform measures clearly increases the chances that such steps will be taken.

Compare that with the nobody-wins approach of sanctions, boycotts, and disinvestment which promises to mete out punishment until the necessary reform has been carried out.

Nor must we disparage the carrot's potential because the Frelimo government "only had to decide about economic reform," while what is at stake in South Africa is political reform.

It must in fact have been a tough political decision. When economy and politics are as interwoven as in Mozambique, it is not easy to "give the economy back" to the people.

Maybe the time is ripe for the outside world to test the "carrot approach" in South Africa as well.

The South African Government is aware that the sanctions and disinvestment campaign is hurting the economy (see the report on page 22 [not published]) and that the man in the street feels it in his wallet. Leading economists argue that in the past 4 years this approach has lowered the living standards of South Africa's inhabitants.

If all remains the same, we will be saying the same thing in 4 years' time. Everyone in South Africa realizes that.

In such circumstances might it not strike the right note—and so speed up the pace of reform—if a carrot were offered, promising to end the sanctions campaign and to restore South Africa's position in the international financial community, along with certain sums for development aid and new foreign investment, in exchange for certain reforms by certain dates?

* Journalists Launch 'Democratic' Union

34000836a Johannesburg *THE NEW NATION*
in English 18-24 Aug 89 p 5

[Text] Journalists now have a new home after last weekend's national launch of the Association of Democratic Journalists (ADJ).

Already representing some 400 journalists and media workers, the ADJ placed itself firmly within the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) by electing as its patrons ANC [African National Congress] leader Govan Mbeki, *NEW NATION* editor Zwelakhe Sisulu and exiled former editor of the Communist Party of SA [South Africa] journal, Edwin Mofutsanyana.

Officially opened by SA Youth Congress (Sayco) president Peter Mokaba and SA Council of Churches director of communications Saki Macozoma, the launching congress committed the ADJ to fighting for a free press in a free, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa.

A key aspect of the weekend launch was the decision to constitute the ADJ as a trade union.

"We are moving into a period of transition and in this period, more than ever before, the media has a vital role to play," said the newly-elected ADJ president and veteran journalist, Mono Badela.

"In this period of transition, all democratic forces are combining to debate the nature of the society we seek in South Africa," he added.

"The major print media are owned and controlled by a tiny handful of individuals. The radio and television stations are owned by precisely the apartheid regime we are against and fighting.

"It is the task of journalists and their allies in the struggle for press freedom to ensure that the national debate on

our country's future is not distorted by this monopoly control of access to information."

Other office-bearers are: first vice-president Sbu Mngadi from "City Press"; second vice-president Ryland Fisher from "South"; national secretary Cecil Sols from Dynamic Images; assistant-secretary Phila Ngumba from Veritas News Agency and treasurer Paul Maseko from the *WEEKLY MAIL*.

The executive also includes regional representatives from Natal, the Transvaal, Western Cape, Border and the Eastern Cape.

The congress pledged ADJ's support for the MDM's Defiance Campaign and endorsed the preconditions laid down by the democratic forces for any negotiations with the state.

It noted that, if any democratic negotiations were to take place, they had to do so in a climate of free, open and public debate which required the fullest possible flow of information.

Other resolutions tabled committed ADJ members to helping the Namibian people's struggle by improving news coverage of events in that country; establishing a national media training committee to help develop media skills in all sectors and starting to engage all interested people in debate on the kind the media needed by SA.

* Auto Strikers Win Key Concessions

34000836b Johannesburg *THE NEW NATION*
in English 18-24 Aug 89 p 20

[Text] The costliest and biggest living wage strike this year, involving an estimated 12,000 workers, began drawing to an end this week.

The strikes were seen as a culmination of militant battles auto workers have fought in various motor vehicle factories around the country.

Bosses were forced to make significant concessions, including an improved minimum wage and the right to uniform national bargaining.

These concessions follow months of campaigning by the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa).

Having recognised the need for centralised industry-level bargaining, workers submitted a uniform set of demands to members of the Automobile Manufacturing Employers Organisation (AMEO) in April this year.

In the past, Numsa negotiated separately with each of the major companies in East London, Pretoria and Durban. These included BMW, Nissan, Samcor, Mercedes Benz and Toyota. Delta and Samcor in Port Elizabeth and Volkswagen in Uitenhage negotiated through the industrial council for the PE-Uitenhage region.

Fragmented and plant-level negotiations resulted in very different conditions of employment and also varying rates of pay for workers in the industry.

Samcor workers in Pretoria, for example, were being paid a minimum of R4.50 an hour while their comrades in the same company in PE were earning a minimum of R5 an hour.

Delegates at Numsa's launching congress in 1987 committed themselves to wiping out this wage gap. They also decided to implement Cosatu's national living wage campaign but stressed that a base for powerful mass action was necessary to support the campaign. Centralised bargaining, the union pointed out at the congress, was important in building this base.

But bosses were not ready to accept national bargaining and resisted union attempts to establish a centralised bargaining forum. Nissan and Toyota, for example, refused to attend a meeting between employers and the union.

This sparked off demonstrations at Toyota and Nissan factories and the battle was on. Nissan fired the first salvo and locked out 4,000 workers, but was forced to re-open the factory when worker pressure increased.

Worker demonstrations also forced Toyota to reconsider its earlier decision not to participate in the centralised bargaining forum.

But the battle was by no means over. Delta walked out of the forum and threatened legal action to stop national negotiations.

This, however, did not present an insurmountable problem for the union, although Nissan reportedly distributed pamphlets claiming that talks had broken down because Delta had pulled out.

Numsa dismissed these claims as part of a disinformation campaign and advised its members that talks would continue.

It pointed out that an agreement reached between the other bosses and the union would be submitted to the industrial council for ratification. This would bind Delta, a member of the industrial council, to implement the same wage increases agreed on by the national bargaining forum.

All companies, except Delta, formerly General Motors, finally agreed to bargain at national level.

The first stage of the battle was won and workers tabled their demands which included a minimum wage of R6.58 an hour and a general increase of R2 an hour.

Workers also demanded the right to strike and picket. These are severely curtailed or restricted altogether by the new labour laws.

Numsa's demands were aimed at closing the gap in the minimum wage rates in different regions and establishing uniform conditions of employment.

While bosses had agreed to bargain at national level, they were by no means prepared to meet workers' demand for a R2 across-the-board (ATB) increase.

But action taken by workers at various plants forced bosses to re-consider and they revised their offer. Numsa was offered a minimum of R5.50 and a R1 ATB increase.

By this time, three major manufacturers—Samcor, Volkswagen and Toyota—shut down their plants as the number of workers on strike increased to around 13,000. This amounted to more than half of Numsa's total membership of around 25,000 in the auto industry.

The shut down of Samcor, Volkswagen and Toyota were preceded by days of tension at Nissan where workers intensified action against the bosses in support of the living wage demand.

Workers decided to withdraw all co-operation with bosses at Nissan when accusations of planned violence were made against the Numsa members.

Nissan, one of the biggest in the auto companies, employs a workforce of around 5,000 of whom 4,500 are Numsa members.

Numsa demonstrated its resilience when Nissan bosses locked workers out following the demonstrations and demanded that the union agree not to continue with industrial action. Bosses also tried to ban union T-shirts and force workers into accepting overtime as compulsory.

Workers were unanimous that they would not talk to bosses unless they returned to the national bargaining table.

Nissan finally returned and, after nearly 13 days of action, the union managed to narrow the gap between workers' demands and bosses' offers.

Notwithstanding the wage increases, workers had taken a major step forward in the struggle for a national living wage by forcing bosses into a centralised bargaining structure.

* KwaZulu Revives Controversial Law

34000839a Johannesburg *THE WEEKLY MAIL*
in English 1-7 Sep 89 p 13

[Article by Carmel Rickard]

[Text] One of the most controversial laws ever on the South African statute books, recently scrapped after decades of protest, has been re-enacted by KwaZulu, and now forms part of Ulundi's own legislation.

Section 5(1)(b) of the Black Administration Act of 1927, was used by Pretoria to banish individuals and groups of people to any part of the country on the say-so of the state president referred to in the legislation as the Supreme Chief.

"Black spot" removals and the banishment of troublesome individuals were both carried out under this Act, which sparked strong opposition from 1927 when it was introduced until 1986 when it was scrapped.

The act provided that the Supreme Chief could if he "deemed it expedient in the public interest", order any tribe, portion of a tribe, black community or black to "withdraw from any place to any other place". The order lasted indefinitely and could be implemented "without prior notice to any person concerned".

This section, scrapped along with the Influx Control Act three years ago, has now been re-enacted by kwaZulu. The minister of justice, in consultation with the chief minister and the cabinet, has been given those banishment powers vested in the "supreme chief" of Pretoria's legislation.

The new kwaZulu law has the additional proviso that it is effective from March 27, 1987.

In a paper written over 20 years ago, David Welsh, then senior lecturer, now professor of law at the University of Cape Town, traced the history of this much hated section.

At the time the Act was introduced the then South African Minister of Justice, Tielman Roos, spoke openly about how useful the law would be, "The Supreme chief gets the power in the fullest sense of the word that a chief would have if there was one chief for the whole of the natives. I regard it as of the very greatest importance that those powers should be conferred upon the governor-general, not only in respect of natives who are living under the tribal system, but also over detribalised and exempted natives...who, in many cases, are the principal agitators in South Africa today. If you have the power to remove them from one place where they do mischief to a place where they do not do mischief, what a useful provision that would be."

He gave a clue as to the circumstance under which the law would be used when he urged MP [Member of Parliament]'s not to be "too squeamish" in approving the wide powers of the bill. These powers, said Roos, would be used in a quasi-punitive way in "cases that verge on sedition, but which cannot be proved in a court of law".

Commenting on its re-introduction onto the KwaZulu statute books, Welsh said this week it was "disgraceful" that it should be resurrected.

"How does this square with (Kwazulu's) support for the Indaba bill of rights? It is a glaring inconsistency."

KwaZulu's Justice Department was asked for comment on the reintroduction of the law, but had not replied at the time of going to press.

* **Afrikaner 'Fourth Political Force' Emerges**

34000839b Durban *THE DAILY NEWS*
in English 17 Aug 89 p 17

[Article by Professor of Sociology Nina Overton, of the Department of Communications, Rand Afrikaans University]

[Text] Research I conducted in 1987 strongly indicated the emergence of a segment of Afrikaners which I called the "Twyfelaars" (roughly translated as "waverers" or "doubters").

Traditional Nationalist supporters, their attitudes toward the NP [National Party], in a nutshell, could be described as a questioning of the effectiveness of NP policy, scepticism about the NP's sincerity, anxiety about the NP's vision of powersharing and doubt whether the NP is capable of finding the solutions.

"Twyfelaars" could be described in the following marketing terms:

- Demographically, they are "young"; primarily in the age group 25-40, although a sufficient number of the interviewees were older than that to constitute a secondary target group.

They were Afrikaans-speaking male and female, with higher educational qualifications.

Respondents themselves described this market primarily as higher-middleclass Afrikaners including the "intelligentsia", representative of the academic, business and professional vocations and to a certain degree also the public sector and administrative levels.

Psychographically, the Twyfelaars fell mainly within the "self-motivated me" and "yumpie" categories.

Twyfelaars' basic political attitudes are:

- Power sharing is the only solution for South Africa. But real power sharing, not a "demonstration" or a "one-horse-one-rabbit" kind of model.
- Power sharing must lead to one Parliament or one Government.

An openness to various federative solutions was also indicated, although there was a strong feeling that the agenda must remain open-ended and that the immediate priority is rather to create the necessary structures for the negotiation of power sharing.

Negotiation must include all representative grouping, including extra-parliamentary factions.

The ANC [African National Congress] was widely regarded as one of the most important negotiating parties, although the relevance of other black groups such as

Inkatha and even national state leaders who have built up their own "legitimate" followings, was also insisted upon.

The Twyfelaars displayed a willingness to extensive compromise; indeed regarded compromise from all sides as the key to successful negotiation.

The Twyfelaars feared that the tempo of "gradual", "evolutionary" reform was too slow, and felt that a few decisive "leaps" should be made in the reform process.

The Twyfelaars do not condone any form of "camouflaged" apartheid.

They are in favour of the abolishment of all forms of discriminatory laws and the principle of free association.

Other than their English counterparts, the Twyfelaars were not as sharply outspoken against the state of emergency.

They wanted change, but change in a climate of law and order.

Similarly, they felt aggressive against foreign prescriptive interference, although they were at the same time concerned about the consequence of sanction and isolation, especially the businessmen among them. Quite a few "solid", respected Afrikaans business-leaders among the Twyfelaars, blamed the NP for the sad state of the economy.

Perhaps the most important distinguishing characteristic of the Twyfelaars was their movement away from the NP's definition of groups in terms of race, which constitute the foundations of its policies and solutions.

They feared that the notion of (threatened) "own" affairs and (safer) "common" affairs would not succeed, because it does not address the aspirations of the majority of blacks. At the same time however, the Twyfelaars had not quite arrived at the territorial solution of the (then) PFP [Progressive Federal Party], or the unqualified transition into a nonracial democracy (as now perhaps best espoused by the DP [Democratic Party]).

The reasons for this will be explicated in the next two points.

- The one aspect that appeared "non-negotiable" for the Twyfelaars, was (also) security for the whites against complete domination.

They were prepared to share, but not to surrender. They seemed to have belief in constitutional safeguards such as the Lancaster-convention in old Rhodesia, and felt that protection must be entrenched through the negotiated structures of powersharing.

Although groups defined in term of race are becoming unacceptable to the Twyfelaars, they strongly believe in the right of groups to define themselves in terms of language, culture, religion, interest, etc. The Afrikaner

especially, according to the Twyfelaars, hold these rights dear since his own "struggle" for his identity and language is still fresh in his memory. (This is also one of the reasons why many Twyfelaars could not bring themselves to support the PFP, which was borne out by the results of the 1987 election).

The newly formed Democratic Party which endeavours to shed itself of the old Prog image and which upholds many of the Twyfelaars' political values, may attract a number of Twyfelaars.

In the short term, however, one should not be over-optimistic about this.

While the Twyfelaars realise that pressure must be put on government, it is still an open question whether they believe that they should exert this pressure from inside or outside the NP. Matters are further complicated by renewed hope in, and perhaps inflated expectations of, the leadership of Mr F. W. de Klerk.

Perhaps the one thing that must be remembered, is that the Afrikaner tends to be pragmatic.

He may take a long time to see the light, but when he does, he usually tries to do something about it, and mobilise his people.

His tendency to be a group person, rather than a true liberal, may perhaps in the end be more to his advantage than his disadvantage.

Perhaps he has many values in common with the black people with whom he ultimately will have to share power, which are nationalism, Africa and for the greatest part—Christianity.

* State Still Financing Township Councils

*34000839c Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL
in English 1-7 Sep 89 p 16*

[Article by Elaine Cosser, research officer at the South African Institute of Race Relations: "RSC Won't Alleviate State Spending on Township Authorities"]

[Text] Direct state and parastatal support for black local authorities appears set to increase in the foreseeable future, despite the creation of Regional Services Council [RSC]s which were designed to be the fiscal helpmate of the township authorities and shift the burden from the state.

Every local authority in the country relies substantially on financial assistance to meet the costs of running and upgrading its township.

The problem is the RSCs cannot, in terms of their constitutions, pick up operational losses incurred by black local authorities. And since the township authorities inevitably run up such losses, state or parastatal bodies have to continue supporting them if they are to keep functioning.

Even in township upgrading the RSCs' role has so far been limited—despite rhetoric to the contrary. While most experts argue the rate of spending will increase rapidly in the coming year, RSCs' contribution thus far is around a 10th of that of the major state and parastatal agencies.

RSCs contributed R92-million to upgrading last year, according to Central Statistical Services, most of which went to black areas.

But the contribution of those bodies who are able, unlike the RSCs, to assist with both operational and upgrading costs is growing.

Last year the joint contribution of the Development Bank of Southern Africa and National Housing Fund for black people (under the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning) amounted to about R611-million—which went to upgrading township infrastructure. The figure is expected to reach R820-million in the current financial year.

As yet, neither of these two bodies has disclosed any contribution to the township authorities operational expenses. But Olaus van Zyl, MEC [Member of the Executive Council?] in the Transvaal provincial administration in charge of local authorities, and Fanie Ferreira, Transvaal MEC for RSCs, have pointed to the Development Bank as a source to be further relied on in place of the provinces' contribution to the local authorities in the form of bridging finance.

Bridging finance (low interest loans) provided by the provincial administration has been an important source of funds for black local authorities. But the provinces are attempting to reduce and eventually end their bridging finance commitments, except in special cases, says Van Zyl.

In 1987/88 bridging finance accounted for 35 percent of black local authorities' total budgeted expenditure in the Transvaal. Last year it made up 29 percent of the total.

In the Transvaal the officials' salaries and payments for bulk services (such as electricity) are priorities in the spending of bridging finance.

Officials acknowledge that local authorities cannot balance their books partly because they are unable to collect revenue from property taxes or assessment rates.

White local authorities derive more than 50 percent of their income from taxing or providing services to commerce and industry. But most townships have few shops, offices or factories to provide such income.

The result is African residents must support the local authority through site rents and service charges.

Black local authorities do have a few possible channels open to them to increase their revenue. They can raise tariffs—local provincial officials advocate that they do

this because current tariffs are uneconomic. And they can try and increase their revenue base.

Both these options are problematic—the first because of community resistance and basic affordability levels, the second largely because of the dearth of industrial land in black township.

Thus the likelihood of the state being able to retreat from funding township authorities—either directly through the provinces or the Development Bank—is minimal. Rather its contribution will continue to increase at least as long as black townships function as units separate from the white towns. The RSCs may in time channel more of their rands—rather than their promises—to black local authorities, but their role is limited by definition.

Expenditure on Upgrading Township Infrastructure

	1988/89	1989/90
RCSs—for mostly black areas	R92-mn	—
National Housing Fund—for Africans	R270-mn	R337-mn
Development Bank of Southern Africa—for upgrading in black areas	R341-mn	R483-mn
Provinces' bridging finance—for African local authorities	R348-mn	R329-mn

* Personalities, Organizations in MDM Listed

34000840a Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY
in English 30 Aug 89 p 10

[Text] The mass democratic movement (MDM) has wrested dominance of the election campaign from the parliamentary political parties, capturing the headlines and steering the course of debate, and its identity remains shrouded in uncertainty.

Outwardly, the MDM is a loose alliance of organisations based on a core of two bodies—the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of SA [South Africa] Trade Unions (Cosatu)—but many people claim to speak for it, and control lies hidden deep in the network of anti-apartheid structures.

This attempt to define the MDM has identified two sets of organisations: those within the UDF-Cosatu alliance that are active in the defiance campaign, and organisations outside the MDM that merely align themselves with it.

In the first group are:

- Cosatu. Formed in 1985, it has 16 affiliates and more than a million members. More than 1,800 delegates attended its third two-yearly congress in July. Executives are Elijah Barayi (president), Chris Dlamini, Joe Gomo, Rodney Mofokeng, Jay Naidoo (general secretary) and Sydney Mufamadi.

Active affiliates include the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU), National Union of Mineworkers

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(NUM), Posts and Telecommunications Workers Association (Potwa) and National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union.

UDF. Restricted in February last year, claims more than 600 affiliates. Membership uncertain. Affiliates active in the defiance campaign include:

SA Youth Congress (Sayco). Also restricted, it has declared itself "unrestricted". Launched at a national congress in 1987, when Peter Makaba was elected president, it has 10 regions.

Active Transvaal branches include Joyco, Soycos, Mohlakeng and Ayco. Cape Youth Congress branches include the Gardens, Mowbray, Athlone, Mitchell's Plain and Bonteheuwel youth congresses. Local executives are elected annually.

Western Cape Students Congress (Weesco). Restricted, it consists of more than 20 SRC [Students Representative Council] from black schools. Formed in 1987 after the banning of the Congress of SA students (Cosas). Has taken part in the beaches campaign and has held school rallies. Its executive was elected at the end of last year.

Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee (Jodac). This white UDF affiliate has 10 elected executive members. It was present at the launch of the campaign to defy restrictions.

Cape Democrats. Also a white UDF affiliate, formed in 1987. Active on the beach issue. President Amy Thornton is restricted.

SA National Students Congress (Sansco). An umbrella body for black student organisations. The last president elected at a national congress was UCT [University of Cape Town] student Bongani More in 1987. It is not known who is currently on the national executive.

National Union of SA Students (Nusas). The executive consists of all the SRC presidents from affiliated campuses. Office bearers and four regional organisers are elected each year. It has taken part in the planning and execution of the defiance campaign.

Transvaal Indian Congress [TIC]. Has held anti-election rallies in line with the MDM position. Revived in 1983. Executive elected last year at an AGM—the second in five years. The TIC convened The Role of Business in a Changing SA conference, attended by Nafcoc and the Consultative Business Movement. The conference agreed to form a committee to investigate setting up an organisation to work closely with the MDM and Nafcoc.

Federation of Transvaal Women (Fedraw). Formed in 1983, it is the umbrella body for various women's movements. Sister Bernard Ncube was elected president at a congress last year. Took part in campaign planning meeting.

Federation of SA Women (Fedsaw). Umbrella organisation for western Cape women's organisations launched in

1987. At a rally ending its three-day conference this month, more than 2,000 women joined the defiance campaign. President is Mama Zihlangu.

Organisations outside the UDF-Cosatu alliance that have taken part are:

- **Five Freedoms Forum [FFF].** Chairman Mike Olivier said the FFF interacted with the MDM and took part in planning meetings with the UDF and Cosatu around the defiance campaign. FFF was formed in November 1986 in opposition to the state of emergency.

Organisations that subscribe to its manifesto include the Black Sash, ECC [End Conscription Campaign], Women for Peace, Conscientious Objector Support Group, Jews for Social Justice, Young Christian Students, Jodac, Lawyers for Human Rights, Namda, Nusas and others.

Olivier said the FFF was part of a generalised mass democratic movement and supported campaigns where these coincided with FFF objective. It differs with the MDM position on the elections and with support certain DP candidates.

SA Health Workers Congress. General secretary Rafik Bismilla said it was "part of the MDM". Formed in a merger in March between UDF-affiliated health workers' associations in the Transvaal, Free State and western Cape, and non-affiliate in Natal. Has adopted the Freedom Charter. Annual congress scheduled for next year.

National Medical and Dental Association (Namda). Spokesman Max Price said Manda was not part of the MDM. However, it has made statements on behalf of the MDM when requested to do so by UDF affiliates. Price said Namda aligned itself with the MDM. It would take cognisance of MDM views on certain issues and in turn would attempt to influence the UDF on its stand on the academic boycott.

Organisation for Appropriate Social Services in SA (Oasssa). Executive member Ilana Edelstein said it identified itself with the MDM, although it had its own programme. Five regional affiliates send two representatives to an executive meeting three times a year.

Actstop. Spokesman Cassim Saloojee said Actstop, which fights evictions of black residents in "white" areas, was part of the MDM.

End Conscription Campaign. Restricted, it has "unbanned itself". No decision taken on status regarding the MDM, but spokesman Gavin Evens said it supported the MDM's broad aims.

Black Sash. Has stated it is not part of the MDM. However, it supported the hospital campaign with a placard demonstration, and has released statements supporting the defiance campaign. President Mary Burton said Black Sash would consider itself part of a "small letter mass democratic movement".

Detainees Aid Centre. Filled vacuum left by restrictions on Detainees' Parents Support Committee. No decisions taken on "membership" of the MDM.

National Association of Democratic Lawyers (Nadel). Regards itself as part of "the broad mass democratic movement", said president Pius Langa. Operates by consulting a wide range of organisations. Nine-member executive elected in July.

Human Rights Commission. Formed last year by six organisations—SA Council of Churches, SA Catholic Bishops Conference, Nadel, Namda, FFF and Black Sash. Monitors and reports on human rights violations. Has monitored arrests, detentions and police action during defiance campaign and announced its findings. No formal decisions taken on relationship with the MDM.

SA Council of Churches. SACC and other church organisations remain separate from the MDM, according to MDM statements. The SA Catholic Bishops Conference is not part of the MDM, said general secretary Brother Jude Pieterse, but would support many of the MDM's aims.

Church leaders have participated as individuals in campaigns, and the SACC has issued statements supporting them.

On August 15, several churches announced the National Standing for the Truth Campaign. This includes defying segregated facilities, hospitals and schools, and holding services.

National Co-ordinating Committee of Teachers (NCCT). Formed in Cape Town and said to represent 150,000 teachers countrywide. An MDM statement said the NCCT would take part in its "all schools for all people" campaign.

Education Front. Cape-based, it was formed this year apparently to replace the restricted National Education Crisis Committee. Executive elected by organisations like the Western Cape Teachers Union, Department of Education and Training Teachers Union, Nusas, Sanco, Weesco and Cape Town Teachers Association.

Voices and Face

Prominent spokesmen for the MDM, or for its campaigns, have included:

- Murphy Morobe, UDF acting publicity secretary;
- Mohammed Valli Moosa, UDF, now in detention;
- Azar Cachalia, UDF treasurer;
- Titus Mafolo, UDF executive member;
- Curnick Ndlovu, UDF national chairman and former Robben Island prisoner;
- Jay Naidoo, Cosatu general secretary;
- Cyril Ramaphosa, National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) president;
- Sydney Mufamadi, Cosatu assistant general secretary;

- Moses Mayekiso, National Union of Metalworkers (Numsa) general secretary and Alexandra Action Committee Chairman;
- Chris Dlamini, Cosatu first vice president;
- Wilhelm Liebenberg, Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee (Jodac) publicity secretary;
- Aslam Dasoo, SA Health Workers Congress member;
- Cassim Saloojee, Transvaal Indian Congress President; and
- Farouk Meer, Natal Indian Congress general secretary.

Others who have appeared on MDM platforms or taken part in the defiance campaign but who do not belong to organisations claiming to be part of the MDM:

- Max Coleman, trustee of the Kagiso Trust and former Detainees' Parents Support Committee founder member;
- Beyers Naude, member of the convening committee for the Conference for a Democratic SA and a Kagiso trustee;
- Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu;
- Alan Boesak, recently re-elected president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches;
- Rev Frank Chikane, SA Council of Churches general secretary, who has released statements supporting the defiance campaign; and
- Max Price, National Medical and Dental Association (Namda) publicity secretary.

What They Say About Themselves

The MDM does not have a constitution or even a list of members. It was never formally launched and has no office bearers.

The idea of the MDM originated at Cosatu's congress in 1987. The UDF and Cosatu, it was decided, would co-operate more closely, and UDF affiliates, mainly regional, would be converted into broader, more powerful national organisations representing youth, civic and women's associations.

The idea was confirmed at the cosatu congress in July.

How does the MDM work? This is how some spokesmen see the movement.

- UDF acting general secretary Mohammed Valli Moosa: "In a situation of extreme repression, the most effective strategy is to create a broad-based movement that serves to strengthen the forces opposing the regime and maximise its isolation."

In this form, the movement could not be restricted. "Where do they put the plug?"

He said MDM organisations recognised the ANC is playing a leading role for the struggle for liberation.

The UDF and Cosatu were the core of the MDM. They took the leadership role and aimed to encourage other organisations to engage in its campaigns. The MDM had

no mechanism of enforcing decisions, so it had to operate in a manner to ensure consensus.

UDF acting publicity secretary Murphy Morobe said the MDM structure was very flexible. The anti-apartheid conference planned for October would establish broad ideals for the MDM and its minimum objectives. These, it was hoped, would draw support from organisations not directly part of the MDM. For instance, the conference would have representatives of Azapo sitting on the co-ordinating committee when church leaders, the UDF and Cosatu.

The MDM concept had emerged when the UDF and its allies had been restricted, Morobe said. It was a reflection of the growing tendency "on the ground" to isolate government and unite people opposing it.

The concept enabled anti-apartheid organisations to operate without fear of restrictions or banning. "You cannot ban a concept."

UDF education secretary Titus Mafolo said the MDM organised around a programme of securing the transfer of political and economic power to the majority. It was committed to the leadership of the working class in the struggle for liberation.

"It is a movement guided by a collective rather than individual style of leadership. There are many groupings responsive to MDM programme that are not necessarily within its fold."

The unifying force was a desire for a non-racial, democratic and united SA.

Transvaal Indian Congress publicity secretary Yunus Currim said the term "mass democratic movement" was one applied to anti-apartheid organisations "in the Freedom Charter tradition". They were "mass-based, democratic and non-racial".

Jodac publicity secretary Wilhelm Liebenberg said MDM strategy was to extend a political and moral influence over anti-apartheid organisations that were not part of the UDF-Cosatu alliance.

Organisations would take cognisance of the MDM position, but it was a two-way process. Policies of "outside" organisations would be influenced by the dominant MDM position, and these organisations would in turn influence general policy.

Liebenberg said consultation took place with a whole range of organisations before campaigns were embarked on.

* Police Respond to Recent SACC Criticism

34000840b Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL
in English 1 Sep 89 p 10

[Text] Solving political crimes is difficult the world over, but they are trying their best, say the SA [South Africa]

Police (SAP), in response to criticism from the recently formed Independent Board of Investigation into Informal Repression.

The board, set up by the SA Council of Churches (SACC), recently criticised the SAP for its "extremely unhappy record" in solving violent crimes against anti-apartheid activists (CURRENT AFFAIRS August 11).

The police say there are about 400 unsolved cases of terrorism and murder in the UK, indicating the difficulties experienced internationally.

In addition, the police believe they are the focus of propagandist organisations and individuals who go "out of their way" to create a negative perception—both of SA and the SAP.

Suspicion

As soon as a leftwing or anti-apartheid activist is killed or attacked, suspicion is immediately cast on pro-government organisations or supporters. "Factors such as internal strife (within the particular organisation) and personal motives (for example, revenge or jealousy) are not even mentioned."

At its launch last month, the board claimed that only the case of murdered Idasa representative Eric Mntonga had been solved. (Six Ciskei policemen were jailed, among them two generals.)

But the police counter this: "There have been recent cases where we have prosecuted some of our members, at the risk of unfavourable publicity. However, this is a minor issue—nobody is above the law. The SA Police are able to take action against any person who breaks the law and is discovered, without fear or favour."

Their critics, say the SAP, conveniently forget cases that have been solved—such as the burning of the house of the Natal Indian Congress's Fatima Meer; the burning of PFP offices in 1981 (admitted to by ANC [African National Progressive Federal Party Congress] member Damian de Lange); and a more recent incident in which a woman trade unionist, Jabu Ndlovu, was killed near Maritzburg. Four men are charged with her murder.

The police say it would be more positive for people to give information to them, rather than to level "undue criticism...often through ignorance." They accept, however, that their role has inevitably been blurred by the "many perceptions" arising from the SA situation—but state that the force remains strictly apolitical.

In their response, the SACC says the SAP acts "on behalf of a clique," while the UK police act for all UK citizens (except in Northern Ireland).

The council says the police would exploit to the full any crimes arising out of internal strife in anticipated organisations—if they had evidence.

* **Union Mergers To Give GAWU More Power**

34000841a Johannesburg *THE NEW NATION*
in English 8-14 Sep 89 p 20

[Text] The Garment and Allied Workers' Union (Gawu) is a hive of activity at the moment, with the merger between itself and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Union of SA [South Africa] (Actwusa) only a week away.

The merger, to take place next weekend in Cape Town, will unite 105,500 Gawu workers and 72,408 Actwusa members in the clothing, textile and leather sector.

It will be the third largest union in Cosatu, following closely behind the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the National Union of Metalworkers' of SAS (Numsa).

Gawu is also in the middle of wage negotiations with the Cape Clothing Manufacturers' Association (CCMA), which started in mid-August.

This is the first time that Gawu has negotiated wages two years in a row. It follows the union's victory last year, when it forced employers to agree to negotiate every year instead of every two years.

At the moment, the bosses' offer is a weekly increase of R19,35 to Grade B machinists who make up the bulk of Gawu's membership and a 15 percent increase for all other workers.

Gawu is demanding a R45 weekly increase from the CCMA.

It is also demanding that a National Industrial Council is established for the clothing industry.

This would then set standards for the industry as a whole as, at the moment, workers in different regions are paid different wages and have different working conditions. For example, a qualified machinist in the Cape earns R129 a week, while the same worker in Natal earns R4 less.

Once the merger has taken place, garment workers will have a much stronger voice nationally, and will be in a stronger position to push for a National Industrial Council.

Other demands that Gawu has put to the CCMA are:

- a 40 hour working week,
- maternity and paternity leave,
- May Day as a paid public holiday,
- an extra week's annual leave,
- an end to the victimisation of shop stewards.

Last year's wage negotiations were a major victory for Gawu, when it won the highest increases ever negotiated in the history of the industry.

In a period of six months, Gawu had won a 57 percent increase in the minimum wage for Cape workers and a 39.1 percent increase for its Natal members.

Increases for qualified machinists ranged from 37.2 percent in the Cape to 31.5 percent in Natal.

* **Government Outlines New Plan for Economy**

34000841b Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY*
in English 14 Sep 89 p 1

[Article by Mike Robertson: "Government Outlines New Plan for SA Economy"]

[Excerpt] Cape Town—Government's new economic plan would be unveiled by January, Finance Minister Barend Du Plessis said yesterday.

The plan was a bid to direct state resources towards the same end as those of the private sector and would also take into account programmes to give incentives to export.

In a wide ranging interview with BUSINESS DAY, Du Plessis said the aim of the new programme would be to ensure the optimum utilisation of scarce resources and the highest possible growth rate and maximum employment in circumstances of price stability. But this did not imply a controlled economy, he added.

In spite of reports that the introduction of value added tax (VAT) could be delayed, Du Plessis said: "VAT will come in during the course of the next financial year."

He also said the Cabinet would meet to decide what to do with the more than R3bn privatisation receipts which were expected, but he preferred that they be used to pay off existing state debts.

"Our first priority is to pay off existing state debts. By the time the proceeds of privatisation reach the Treasury, we will have satisfied our loan requirements for the year."

Although government revenue was subject to seasonal fluctuations, he said, at the moment it looked as if it would be substantially higher than he had predicted in the Budget.

He said government had a contractual obligation not to increase personal income tax, company tax and the deficit before borrowing.

The NP [National Party], by promising to reduce all three in its election manifesto, had placed a contractual ceiling on them.

Du Plessis said he was not in a position to give a commitment that personal taxation would be reduced in the next Budget.

He added, however, that: "The taxpayers can be assured that we regard our tax commitments as a contract which we will honour."

"Within the next five years there will definitely be a lowering of income tax."

Du Plessis said there was every indication that SA [South Africa] would achieve the 2 percent growth rate he had predicted in his Budget speech.

He believed the deficit before borrowing could be lower than the 4.1 percent of GDP [gross domestic product] he predicted in the Budget.

In addition, government did not need a single cent of privatisation receipts to meet its borrowing requirements.

Du Plessis had said in his Budget speech that without new capital inflow, foreign debt repayments could be as high as R4.2bn this year. [passage omitted]

* Afrikaner Support for NP Below 50 Percent

*34000841c Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL
in English 15-21 Sep 89 p 13*

[Article by Gavin Evans: "Less Than Half of Afrikaners Voted for Nats"]

[Text] Afrikaner support for the National Party [NP] last week dropped well below the 50 percent mark for the first time since 1948.

But, according to NP sources, they still retain the support of half of the English-speaking voters.

Preliminary figures from the three parties suggest that just under 46 percent of Afrikaans speakers voted for the NP, 45 percent voted for the Conservative Party [CP] and 9 percent for the Democratic Party [DP].

Around 50 percent of the English vote went to the NP, 7.5 percent to the CP and 42.5 percent to the DP.

According to National Party information director Con Botha the breakdown by language of the NP vote did not show a substantial change when compared with the last elections in 1987—suggesting they lost votes in almost equal proportions to English and Afrikaans voters.

He said current estimates indicated that 61.16 percent of the total NP vote came from Afrikaans voters and 38.84 from English voters, compared with a 60:40 ratio two years ago.

These figures tally with the estimates of Richard Humphries, researcher at Wits University's Centre for Policy Studies, who said that just over 60 percent of NP support came from Afrikaans-speaking voters.

Botha said the DP did well in the urban areas but not as well as they had hoped in southern Natal and the Border area.

"At the most we lost 55,000 English votes to the DP and probably less. This works out to about one English voter for every nine," he said.

DP national information director James Sefse said about 30 percent of their vote came from Afrikaners. This would amount to about 130,000 votes—or more than three times the Progressive Federal Party [PFP]'s 1987 Afrikaner vote.

Sefse said that in 1981 and 1987 the PFP had received about four percent of the total Afrikaner vote.

"The increase in the DP's share of the vote of Afrikaans speakers was very significant and indicates a clear shift," he said.

NP figures also show a major growth in DP Afrikaner support.

"You must not underestimate the number of yuppie Afrikaners who shifted to the DP," said Botha. "Their Afrikaans vote could have been as high as 30 percent although it was probably closer to 25 percent."

The only seats with an Afrikaans majority which the DP won were North Rand, where they increased the PFP's 1987 vote by 4,789, and Randburg—a 241 vote increase.

They also made substantial inroads into several other Afrikaans seats.

Among the seats with an Afrikaner majority where they topped the PFP or New Republic Party [NRP]'s performance by more than 450 votes were: Germiston (549), Johannesburg West (485), Meyerton (779), Mofortfontein (1,601), Nelspruit (490), Turffontein (1,628), Pretoria East (2,302), Rosettenville (485), Verwoerdburg (1,005), Waterkloof (773), Westdene (1,149), Belville (456), De Kuilen (861), Durbanville (3,638), Maitland (1,521), Malmesbury (1,998), Paarl (759), Parow (752), Swellendam (2,001), Tygervallei (842) and Wellington (487).

While the DP expressed disappointment in its performance in the Cape constituencies of Helderberg and Stellenbosch, it managed to increase its vote in both these areas—though by margins of only 92 and 42 votes.

The DP's hopes in these seats did not sufficiently count for the importance of the "independent factor" and the strength of Denis Warrall and Esther Lategan in the last election.

The CP's share of the English-speaking vote did not increase in percentage terms over the 1987 figure, although the total number of English votes did rise because of the higher poll.

CP press officer Arthur Kemp said their share remained constant in the Cape, Transvaal and Free State and rose in Natal.

"Our total vote in Natal went up by about 10,000 votes, and most of these were English speakers."

Figures from the three parties suggest that the CP gained less than 50,000 English votes—between 38 and 46 percent of the DP's Afrikaner vote.

Natal seats where the right-wing vote increased by more than 400 include Klip River (a 661 vote increase), Newcastle (444), Pietermaritzburg North (607), Pietermaritzburg South (805), Port Natal (435), Umsfolozi (1,465), Umlazi (1,266) and Vryheid (553).

The CP's Natal total was 32,809—13 percent of the total vote in the province.

According to Botha, a total of just over 2.1 million people voted last week—about 125,000 more than in 1987. The poll was 69.7 percent, compared with 67.4 percent in the last election.

More than the combined PFP, NRP and independent vote of 1987, the CP's was 81,111 more than the combined CP and HNP [Reformed National Party] 1987 vote and the NP's was 35,000 less than their vote in the last election.

The NP received 48 percent of the vote, the CP 31 percent, the DP 20 percent.

Two DP seats, Sandton and Yeoville, were uncontested. Based on projections on the party's performances in these seats in the last election their total share of the vote would have gone up to more than 21 percent had these seats been up for grabs.

* COSATU Outlines Plans for Unemployed

34000842a Johannesburg *THE NEW NATION*
in English 1-7 Sep 89 p 19

[Text] After a long battle to make inroads into organising South Africa's growing unemployed population, COSATU's (Congress of South African Trade Unions) National Unemployed Workers' Co-ordinating Committee (NUWCC) recently convened a national conference and worked out concrete objectives in organising the unemployed.

The conference attracted 90 delegates from nine regions—Wits, Western and Northern Transvaal, Orange Free State, Highveld, Southern Natal, Eastern and Western Cape and Border.

Coming out of the conference, the NUWCC has identified four areas to concentrate on to draw unemployed workers into COSATU's fold.

These are campaigns around:

- jobs and unemployment benefits,
- anti-scabbing,
- the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), and
- building co-operatives into a national co-operative movement.

"Education is key to the campaign around jobs. We need to conscientise the unemployed about their problems and the causes of the unemployment," said NUWCC secretary Dan Mohapi.

"We also need to explain why unemployed workers shouldn't scab, so we need to involve them in strikes," he added.

January 1990 has been set aside for the launch of a campaign around UIF.

At present, workers get paid 45 percent of their wages for six months after they are dismissed.

"We are saying that unemployed workers need to get this money for as long as they are unemployed," said Mohapi.

The NUWCC plans to involve COSATU affiliates in the UIF campaign as well, as it has implications for the social security of all workers.

"Most workers are only aware of the problems around UIF after they have been dismissed. We need COSATU's support for our campaign for better UIF benefits from the start," added Mohapi.

The NUWCC has also met with COSATU affiliates to exchange ideas about co-operatives and to devise a common programme of action around co-operatives.

COSATU's National Education Committee (Nedcom) is coordinating meetings on co-operatives.

"The idea is to unite all co-ops and build a national COSATU co-op movement. Community structures must also be involved," said Mohapi.

At present the NUWCC has a number of sewing projects which make women's dresses.

Their main problem is that they lack funds and skills.

The NUWCC is also working towards launching itself as a full affiliate of COSATU.

However, it is to assess its launch next year as its main priority at present is to build local, regional and national structures of unemployed workers. [as published]

At present it has an estimated membership of 20,000 unemployed workers, mainly centred in township-based structures.

NUWCC members also participate in COSATU locals and in all COSATU structures.

"But this fluctuates, as one day a person is unemployed; the next day he has a job," said Mohapi.

However, the committee is presently discussing what organisational form it should take in order to fit into COSATU's structures.

Subscriptions are also being discussed, as the NUWCC would need a paid-up membership to be part of COSATU.

The NUWCC has also appealed to all COSATU affiliates and the mass democratic movement to help it to become the "national voice of the unemployed".

"Moral and material support from the MDM (Mass Democratic Movement) would really help us."

"We appeal to the MDM to refer all its unemployed members to us," added Mohapi.

He also appealed to all COSATU affiliates to refer their dismissed and retrenched members to NUWCC.

"We need the expertise of organised workers in the NUWCC. These dismissed workers could help a lot," said Mohapi.

* Student Organization Marks 10th Year

*34000842b Johannesburg THE NEW NATION
in English 1-7 Sep 89 pp 22-23*

[Article: "Each One Teach One"]

[Text] The slogan "Each one teach one" is reverberating across the country once again.

Coined at the launch of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) in 1979, it had become the rallying cry of millions of students.

Last week, 10 years after COSAS was launched, and exactly four years after it was banned under the Internal Security Act, the biggest student organisation in South Africa [SA]'s history declared that it considered itself unbanned. And the COSAS emblem and slogan, which had become a familiar sight in the mid-eighties, reappeared at Defiance Campaign rallies and in schools across the country.

COSAS was formed to organise black school students and followed the tradition of militant resistance of its forerunners, the SA Students' Organisation and SA Students' Movement, which had been banned in October 1977.

But COSAS was a qualitatively different formation and it was an earlier tradition that characterised the organisation.

Speaking about the period leading to the formation of COSAS, the organisation's first president, Ephraim Mogale, said that, after the 1976 uprisings, many students had left the country.

"At the time," he said, "the people wanted organisation. One reason why that organisation came from students was that students are the most active contingent of the youth. They were in a good position to organise themselves because they are, like workers in the factories, grouped together in the schools every day."

At the time, only local and regional student organisations existed, but student leaders, including some who had

spent long periods in detention, identified the need for a national organisation of students, said Mogale.

According to Mogale, a protest meeting on April 6, 1979 against the handing of ANC (African National Congress) guerrilla Solomon Mahlangu was a key trigger to the formation of COSAS.

Organised by the Soweto Students' League (SSL), the gathering laid a firm foundation for the political position COSAS was to take.

Students at the meeting identified strongly with Mahlangu because he had been one of the many students who had left the country after the 1976 student uprisings.

That same day, said Mogale, the call was made to form a national students' organisation. A meeting was set for the end of April attended by student representatives from the Western and Eastern Cape, Southern and Northern Transvaal.

A draft constitution was drawn up and a launching date for the new organisation was proposed. Activists then travelled around the country to consult other student activists in preparation for the launch.

On May 30, 1979, about 200 delegates and many observers met at Wilgerspruit for the historic conference to launch COSAS.

"We met under conditions of secrecy," said Mogale. "We were very cautious in the beginning as we did not want to be disturbed without having made any gains."

"We avoided publicity and even the press was not informed until after the launch."

"We only released the names of some of the executive members to the press, and we had a shadow committee in case the executive got arrested."

The launch included guest speakers; reports from different areas; debates on the new constitution, policy and programme; resolutions; election of office-bearers and cultural performances.

While the original suggestion for a name had been the South African Students' League, the launch decided on the name, Congress of South African Students.

One of the cultural performances, "Victory at Isandlwana", commemorated the centenary of this historic battle, and featured the then little known Mzwakhe Mbali.

This commemoration became an important part of COSAS' programme of action.

"People didn't know much about our history and struggles of the past," said Mogale. "Our cultural wing helped to awaken an awareness about the link between the struggles of the past and the present."

The congress resolved to build relationships with trade unions, to work towards the formation of a national youth organisation and a national university student movement.

And when striking Fattis and Monis workers called for a consumer boycott later that year, COSAS added its support.

Following the launch, fully-constituted COSAS branches were set up in areas such as Soweto, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Durban, East London, Warmbaths, Seshego, Nylstroom, Potgietersrus, Sibasa, Greenside, and in the Free State. Many other areas had COSAS committees, working towards setting up branches.

Mogale pointed out that, at the time, no other progressive, national organisations existed. COSAS therefore had to be a voice, not only for students and the youth, but for the people as a whole.

From the outset the organisation identified itself with the principles of non-racialism and democracy.

COSAS also differed from previous student organisations, said Mogale, in that it recognised the need for different forms of struggle in order to destroy apartheid.

It also took up the task of populatising the Freedom Charter, and adopted a class analysis, recognising the leading role of the working class.

COSAS thereby took up the banner of the resistance movement of the fifties, which had been seriously undermined by the banning of organisations in 1960 and the widespread repression that followed.

In the years after its launch, COSAS played a key role in laying a firm basis for the dramatic reemergence of the mass democratic movement [MDM] in the eighties.

But from the outset, the organisation suffered relentless repression.

Before COSAS had celebrated its first birthday, almost the entire national leadership and many members had been detained. Mogale was imprisoned on Robben Island for furthering the aims of the ANC [African National Congress] and SACP (South African Communist Party).

Repression was to become a permanent feature of the conditions under which COSAS was forced to organise. But it could never crush the determination of students who were suffering under apartheid education.

By 1980 anger and frustration caused by poor facilities, lack of textbooks, badly trained teachers, overcrowded classrooms, corporal punishment and lack of SRCs [Students Representative Council] could no longer be contained.

School boycotts erupted in the Western Cape and soon spread to the Northern and Eastern Cape, Transvaal, Free State and Natal.

COSAS' role in organising the students varied from area to area, but the lessons learnt in this period, and the demands that students articulated, became permanent features of the organisation. Among the issues raised by the 1980 boycotts were:

- the difference between short, medium and long-term goals;
- boycott as a tactic not a principle;
- that the destruction of the apartheid system was essential to ensure a future democratic education system;
- that the foundations for a future democratic education system should be laid in the struggle against Bantu education;
- the importance of mass-based democratic organisation and firm alliances between student and other progressive organisations; and
- non-racialism and democracy as both long-term goals and as working principles.

As a student organisation, COSAS' stated aim was to strive for free, compulsory, dynamic education in a non-racial and democratic South Africa.

It set about mobilising students around their day to day grievances in the schools and began to take up the demand for democratic student representation in the schools.

But the organisation's campaigns went beyond education issues. In 1981, along with AZASO (Azanian Student Organization) and NUSAS (National Union of South African Students), COSAS spearheaded the Anti-Republic Day campaign under the slogan, "Forward to a People's Republic", helping to forge a non-racial student alliance in the process.

That year saw a nationwide boycott of Wilson Rowntree products following the company's dismissal of union members in East London. COSAS threw its full weight behind the consumer boycott.

This newly-forged alliance was reflected at the organisation's second national congress in 1982, attended by 200 delegates representing 28 branches nationwide.

Held under the theme, "Student Worker Action", the congress addressed the issues of "education for liberation", "students and workers in the struggle" and a critique of Black Consciousness.

The congress was, in a sense, a turning point for COSAS. Until then, the organisation had taken responsibility for campaigning beyond educational issues. The growth of a range of other organisations meant that COSAS could now devote more attention to its central tasks in education and basing itself more firmly in the schools.

Identifying the need for COSAS membership to be drawn from the ranks of school-going youth, the congress recognised that this would leave non-student youth without a political home.

It therefore took the historic decision to set up a national commission to look into setting up youth structures. Within a year, youth congresses began to emerge across the country.

It was the organised youth which were to play a central role in changing the face of political resistance in the years that followed and which formed the basis for the launch of the giant SA Youth Congress (SAYCO) in 1987.

The following year saw the consolidation of COSAS' base in the schools with an emphasis on developing local, regional and national structures and leadership, and the education and training of its members in order to equip them to more effectively take up their demands.

While educational workshops were seen as an important aspect of COSAS' political work, these alone could not solve students' problems in the schools.

Students all over the country began to voice their demands.

But the authorities refused to listen. And in the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and Transvaal, students resorted to boycott action and in many cases came under fire from the police for their efforts.

When the UDF (United Democratic Front) was launched in August 1983, COSAS was one of its first affiliates, and played a key part in exposing the government's attempts to give apartheid a new face.

While COSAS never neglected its broader political role, its emphasis on building its student base clearly delivered results.

Its congress at the end of 1983 was the strongest since its launch. With branch, regional and national structures firmly in place, the organisation was beginning to reap the benefits of being a national organisation of students and to chart a national programme of action.

Its theme for the year ahead was "United Action for Democratic Education" and among the priorities for the year ahead were:

- The campaign for democratic SRCs.
- Strengthening the relationship between students, parents and teachers.
- Campaigns around the age limit law, corporal punishment, sexual harassment, lack of proper teachers and textbooks, overcrowded classrooms, high failure rates, high school fees, SADF (South African Defense Force) teachers and other students grievances in the schools.
- -The Education Charter Campaign to draw up a blue-print for a democratic education.
- To improve women students' participation in COSAS and to form women's committees in COSAS branches.

At the end of 1983, education authorities announced that 50 percent of black school students had failed. This was but one indication of the appalling state of black education and students responded angrily.

But educationalists' warnings of explosive conditions in the schools went unheeded.

The 1984 school year was hardly a few months old and already township classrooms in Pretoria, the East Rand, Eastern Cape and Orange Free State stood empty as students boycotted classes in support of their demands.

The authorities blamed the boycotts on "agitators" and sent police into schools.

In Atteridgeville, 15-year-old Emma Sathekge became the first victim of police action against boycotting students.

The authorities' intransigence meant that students continued their protest action. Common demands emerged nationally:

- the abolition of the prefect system and recognition of democratically elected SRCs,
- scrapping of the age-limit law,
- an end to corporal punishment and sexual harassment, and
- free textbooks and qualified teachers.

The government responded to students' demands for SRCs by attempting to persuade students to accept Pupils' Representative Councils. But students rejected these and restated their central demand.

But the authorities' main response to student action was to send in police in an attempt to crush boycotts and student organisation.

But students would not be intimidated. COSAS, along with AZASO and NUSAS, staged a National Day of Protest and Solidarity marked by widespread class boycotts and demonstrations.

By mid-year more than 30,000 students were on boycott, but the authorities still refused to heed the students' call and preferred instead to stop schooling altogether. By July, at least 23 schools had been closed or suspended.

Added to students' grievances in the schools were protests against the tricameral parliament elections. In this period, numbers of boycotting students peaked at around 250,000.

Repression intensified and battles between unarmed students and armed police spread from the school grounds into the townships.

Township residents had already been angered by rent increases introduced by unpopular councillors, and police attacks only added fuel to the flames.

By November 1984, more than 100 people had been killed in the resulting clashes.

In the Transvaal, COSAS initiated a meeting of trade unions and community and other organisations affiliated to the UDF to discuss the growing crisis.

This resulted in the two-day November stayaway in support of student, worker and residents' demands, an historic show of unity in action.

In an attempt to quell growing resistance, the SADF was sent into the townships to support the police. The list of fatalities grew and mass funerals and stayaways, supported by entire townships, became the order of the day.

While the early days of student action had often met with reluctance from parents, this had now changed dramatically.

In many areas parents' committees were formed to back students' demands and the following year an ad-hoc National Co-ordinating Committee of Parents was set up.

After consultation with teachers, students and parents' organisations, this committee drew up a draft SRC constitution which they presented to the DET (Department of Education and Training).

The DET agreed to study the document, but still refused to agree to its implementation.

The heightened mass mobilisation of students and dramatically intensified repression presented new challenges to COSAS.

As the campaign for SRCs mounted, COSAS called for the withdrawal of the police and SADF from the townships.

While the organisations' leadership was constantly being harassed, detained and killed, massive numbers of new members had to be consolidated into branch structures. The organisation had grown to 150 branches, and regional and national co-ordination and communication had to be maintained.

At the same time, the collapse of Bantu education in many areas and growing support from teachers and parents presented new possibilities for popularising the idea and practice of people's education.

In March 1985 the government banned calls for school boycotts, but hundreds of schools across the country remained empty.

When the 1985 state of emergency was introduced, COSAS was a prime target, and hundreds of its members who were still out of jail were detained. Curfews were imposed and students were forced to go to school at gunpoint.

Five weeks later, COSAS was declared an illegal organisation.

Last week, as part of the MDM's [defiance campaign, COSAS declared that it considered itself unbanned.

* NECC Launches Mass Education Movement

34000843a Johannesburg *THE WEEKLY MAIL*
in English 15-21 Sep 89 p 3

[Article by Thandeka Gqubule]

[Text] The restricted National Education Crisis Committee [NECC] decided at a meeting held at a secret venue earlier this month to launch a national front to be called the Mass Democratic Education Movement.

Former NECC national executive member Iaron Rensburg told the *WEEKLY MAIL* this week "conditions that prompted students to take to the streets nationwide in 1984/85 are today not only prevalent but glaring."

Former NECC members, students and teachers from the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Natal and the Transvaal decided at the clandestine meeting to hold regional conferences over the next six weeks to launch the "broad mass-based educational movement".

The possibility of launching the mass Democratic Education Movement as the educational wing of the Mass Democratic Movement was one of the major issues debated at the secret conference.

According to an interim committee elected to prepare for the launch of the movement, "students, parents and teachers are rebuilding their organisations to offer a dynamic challenge to apartheid education".

Some startling proposal for protests were also suggested, including having parents register their children at white schools.

The conference discussed the possibility of introducing a single school uniform for all pupils who supported a "democratic and non-racial education system".

In line with the call for open schools, the uniform would be chosen after consultations between pupils, teachers and parents but not with the various education departments.

The conference also decided that a top priority was the creation of a national students' organisation and pledged to provide the resources needed for building unity among high school pupils.

Students from around the country told the conference of corporal punishment, racism in schools, the lack of toilet facilities and school books and over-crowding.

Students also reported that troops and security officers continued to monitor their schools.

Another concern was the shortage of teachers, particularly for subjects such as maths and physics, as a result of DET [Department of Education and Training] policy to freeze the number of teaching posts.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

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Other issues discussed were the high failure rate among matriculants and the fact that detainees were not being re-admitted to schools.

The conference also noted that the Western Cape was in the forefront of resistance in education.

Rensburg said the crisis in the classrooms throughout the country had manifested itself in frightening ways.

"We have noted the breakdown in relations between parents, teachers and students. The conflict between students has manifested itself in gangsterism and rape," he said.

There were encouraging developments in the Western Cape, particularly where parents had become involved in the search for a solution to the crisis, he said.

He cited an incident in the Cape where parents crowded outside Mondale High School in Mitchells Plain during a raid by police who wanted to arrest pupils for public violence.

The NECC's secret conference was preceded by one held in Mazimbu in Tanzania on August 19 by the African National Congress, the South African National Students' Congress, the South African Youth Congress and representatives of various teachers' organisations in South Africa.

The Mazimbu conference examined ways in which the community could become involved in creating alternatives for schoolchildren's education.

The Mazimbu conference coincided with a day-long anti-crime conference held in Soweto by the South African Council of Churches [SACC]. The conference was attended by SACC general-secretary Frank Chikane, representatives of the Congress of South African Trade Unions, Progressive Teachers' Committee, various parents' committees, the Soweto Civic Association and the Soweto Cultural Committee, Azanian Youth Organisation and the Azanian Students' Movement.

Discussions focused on crime in schools, in particular the recent spate of rapes, abductions and kidnappings of Soweto schoolchildren.

The conference blamed the breakdown in Soweto schools on "an education system which does not prepare young people to become responsible members of the community".

Dissatisfaction with the state of education in South Africa was highlighted over the past few weeks with protests throughout the country.

* 'Secret' Education Talks With ANC Held

*34000843b Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL
 in English 15-21 Sep 89 p 3*

[Text] The South African Youth Congress [SAYCO], the South African [National] Students' Congress [SANSCO]

and teachers from various parts of the country held secret meetings with the African National Congress [ANC] in Tanzania and Zambia last month.

Sayco and Sansco are both restricted in terms of the Emergency.

The previously unreported conference coincided with the 10th anniversary of the ANC's Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College in Mazimbu, Tanzania. Sayco president Peter Mokaba shared a platform with Julius Nyerere, former Tanzanian president, as a celebration rally at the college.

The conference explored ways in which people's education could be implemented in South Africa and looked at the experience of the ANC college.

Sayco then went on to Zambia for a congress attended by a high powered delegation of the ANC, including Alfred Nzo, general secretary of the ANC, and Thabo Mbeki, director of international affairs.

The four-day congress discussed the current Mass Democratic Movement defiance campaign.

A statement released by Sayco in Johannesburg this week said: "Our discussions with the ANC ranged from understanding the present balance of forces in South Africa to very topical issues like repression."

"Negotiations and sanctions and youth problems were discussed. The ANC and Sayco delegations also concurred in their understanding of negotiations."

* NSC Calls for End To Boycott of Mixed Sports

*34010046a Johannesburg BEELD
 in Afrikaans 2 Aug 89 p 2*

[Text] Sport leaders of antiapartheid groups in South Africa are beginning to question the effectiveness of the UN's international sport boycott of South Africa—particularly in light of rebel tours like that of a British cricket team announced yesterday.

Some of those antiapartheid organizations now argue that supporters of sport isolation must change their policy and use visits by top international teams as a reward for sports where the color barrier has been eliminated, reports SAPA [SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION]-Reuter.

This proposal has caused disagreement among organizations claiming to be the voice of black South African sports and aroused sport-lovers' hopes that top players will soon be able to play in South Africa again without the international community's causing a ruckus.

"The time has come to reconsider the whole question of the moratorium on international tours," said Prof Jakes Gerwel, rector of the University of West Cape Province.

"Our goal in isolating South African sports was never to cut our people off from the outside world," he said at a recent conference of the National Sports Council (NSC).

Cynical observers believe the failure of the UN ban on foreign athletes in South Africa has contributed to this viewpoint in the NSC. Foreign rugby and cricket teams, tennis and golf players, and athletes have already been able to play in South Africa despite the sports boycott.

Gerwel said that, in order to bring international competition to South Africa, the sports boycott should not be neglected, and sports like soccer, which are already completely multiracial, should be rewarded.

But other antiapartheid sport bodies in South Africa disagree with the NSC position. The South African Council of Sport (SACOS), the largest antiapartheid sport organization, does not agree with the NSC's conciliatory words.

"It is entirely too soon to talk about lifting the boycott now," said SACOS spokesman Joe Ebrahim.

Nonetheless, an important group within the South African Nonracial Olympic Committee (SANROC), which has its headquarters in London, also would like to "pardon" South African sports that have eliminated apartheid.

* Metal Workers Trade Unions Set Two Holidays

34010046b Johannesburg FINANSIES & TEGNIEK
in Afrikaans 28 Jul 89 p 37

[Article by Francois Ebersohn]

[Text] For workers in the metal industry May will be the month with the most holidays next year. The agreement between the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA) and 15 trade unions granting Workers Day and 1 May as public holidays to their 350,000 workers will bring the number of holidays in that month to four.

The metal industry agreement just announced provides for a raise of 15.2 to 18.5 percent and is the first agreement in almost a decade accepted by all the unions.

SEIFSA views this as yet another victory for collective bargaining at the industry level.

Elsewhere in the manufacturing sector, unions and all but one of the automobile companies are discussing expanding the jurisdiction of the industry council for that sector in East Cape Province. That would mean that almost all the automobile manufacturers in South Africa would negotiate in a single forum.

The agreement with SEIFSA follows on the heels of the agreement between the Chamber of Mines and the National Union of Mineworkers. This is the first time since 1983 that neither of these two sectors saw the annual pay negotiations marred by industrial action.

The only point of disagreement between the unions and SEIFSA—which, with more than 3,500 engineering firms belonging to it, is the largest employers organization in industry—was May Day.

SEIFSA's original holiday offer (in addition to the other 10 public holidays) was to make 1 May a holiday to replace Workers Day.

In addition, SEIFSA offered workers an additional holiday in place of an earlier attendance bonus system. This offer, however, was dependent on workers' taking it on 16 June. Next year—when 16 June falls on a weekend—workers would have had to take the additional holiday on Workers Day.

The agreement, however, now stipulates that 1 May, Workers Day, and 16 June will all be considered public holidays. This is the result of a joint legal agreement negotiated in light of the Minister of Manpower's unwillingness to accept 1 May and 16 June as public holidays in an industry council agreement.

Thus the STAATSKOERANT [State Gazette] will not publish this agreement. Opposition to SEIFSA's original offer came from within the ranks of the Confederation of Metal and Building Unions (CMBU), one of the four trade union groupings that SEIFSA negotiates with. Many people in that group were disturbed that May Day would assume a more prominent place in the calendar than Workers Day.

The National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA), the largest union in the industry council, also wanted 21 March as a public holiday originally.

* Doctors, Accountants, Academics Emigrate

34010046c Johannesburg FINANSIES & TEGNIEK
in Afrikaans 4 Aug 89 p 22

[Article: "South Africa Gains Professional People, but Academics, Accountants Continually Seeking Greener Fields"]

[Text] Although in the first 5 months of this year South Africa had a net gain of professional people, there are certain professions whose already thinned ranks grew even thinner.

This is particularly the case with academia and the accounting profession, which in this period experienced a continuing net loss of trained people.

The medical profession was less badly hit. While 19 doctors emigrated, 17 moved to South Africa.

This is not a good sign because, as economic prospects worsen in coming months, the loss of professionals will in all probability increase and migration into South Africa will decline (FINANSIES & TEGNIEK, 16 June 1989).

The small net gain could be converted into a net loss again.

In that case, the migration pattern for academics and accountants might become even more unfavorable.

According to the most recent figures from the Central Statistical Service, in the 5 months from January to May of this year (the latest available figures), 55 more professional people immigrated to South Africa than left (see the table).

But, as always, this news must be put into perspective. In the same period last year, South Africa had a net loss of 75 professionals.

Migration...some professions are continually losing people

	Immigration, Jan-May 1989	Emigration, Jan-May 1989	Net migration
Professions (total)	499	444	+55
Engineers	129	102	+27
Medical doctors	17	19	-2
Medical specialists	5	3	+2
Dentists	4	2	+2
Academics	38	53	-15
Accountants	26	53	-27

Source: Central Statistical Service

* Value of Financial Rand Debated

34010046d Johannesburg FINANSIES & TEGNIEK
in Afrikaans 4 Aug 89 p 11

[Article by Johan Coetze: "Finrand for Property Reexamined, and Real Estate Agents Begin To Complain"]

[Text] The government's reexamination of the use of the financial rand in the purchase of real estate in South Africa is politically motivated and eliminating it could do South Africa considerable harm, according to real estate agents.

"The property is sold to influential foreigners who defend South Africa abroad and invest significant amounts of foreign exchange in South Africa to refurbish and build up that property," says Cecil Golding, managing director of Pam Golding-Eiendomme.

Pam Golding's London office receives as many as 50 inquiries a week about South African real estate. Tourism also benefits, according to Golding, because many Britons and West Germans visit South Africa to view properties.

"Financial rand transactions do not bring foreign exchange into South Africa and property transactions are a drop in the bucket of foreign investment in South

Africa. But because half of the purchase price for property is paid in commercial rands, these transaction do bring some foreign exchange into the country. Almost 90 percent of the transactions occur on a 50-50 basis, where half is paid in commercial rands and the other half in financial rands," says Golding.

Lawrence Seeff, managing director of Seeff-Eiendomme, which has also opened a London office, is strongly against elimination and is considering making urgent representations to the government to prevent it.

These comments follow Finance Minister Barend Du Plessis's statement after a National Party meeting in Welgemoed, Bellville. He said that the use of the financial rand in real estate purchases is being reexamined.

According to Prof Jan Lombard, vice president of the Reserve Bank, the economic significance of foreign investment in residential property and farms via the financial rand is small compared with the social and political problems such investments cause in South Africa.

It is not that necessary to the South African economy to secure foreign investment in farms and residential property. In any case, the size of financial rand real estate transactions is small compared with the total supply of, and demand for, the financial rand.

"Of some 6 billion [financial] rands that foreigners invested last year in South African assets of all kinds (including the stock market), farms and residential real estate attracted only about 200 million rands," says Lombard.

On the other hand, farm property in particular is an emotionally-charged cultural question, and the idea that foreigners are snapping up that property dirt cheap has, justly or not, rankled South Africans for some time, he said.

However, he pointed out that, although permitting transactions only in the commercial rand would make it more expensive for foreigners to purchase property in South Africa, the commercial rand is still cheaper for them today than 8 years ago. At the start of the 1980's, for instance, \$1 would buy less than 1 rand, while today \$1 will buy 2.65 rands.

The basic problem with the entire financial rand system, Lombard says, is the large discount of about 36 percent. The system itself is a necessary evil as long as we cannot allow foreign investors to repatriate their investments via commercial rand channels because we do not have the gold and foreign currency reserves to permit that.

However, the evils of the system increase as the discount increases. Any discount over, say, 10 percent will create problems in the long run, according to Lombard.

Today, foreigners can pay 50 percent of the price of a farm or residence in financial rands. If they make improvements to improve production or prepare the property for use, those costs can be paid in full in financial rands.

Lombard denies that the change is being considered for political reasons. Whether and when the system is to be changed is a decision that rests with Minister Du Plessis but the problem was recognized long ago.

According to Neville Berkowitz, managing director of THE PROPERTY ECONOMIST, there should be controls

on financial rand transactions in vineyards, but they are not necessary in the residential market.

"The wine industry is a strategic industry in West Cape Province and should not fall into the hands of foreigners. For instance, pressure from foreign governments to disinvest could cause large numbers of workers to lose their jobs," says Berkowitz.

Residential transactions most often involve sums over 500,000 rands and thus do not affect the ordinary person's house. Thus it serves no purpose to eliminate the financial rand for residential property.

Angola

* Cuban Pilots Said To Return to Luanda

*34420137 Lishon EXPRESSO in Portuguese
9 Sep 89 p 1*

[Text] Forty-seven Cuban helicopter and fighter-bomber pilots who had previously participated in the war in Angola returned at the end of August to Luanda to again take part in FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] operations, an African diplomatic source has revealed.

The same source asserted that the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola has recently been suspended; only the embarkation of some soldiers who are not part of operational units is proceeding. These events were connected with the intensification of clashes between government troops and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] rebels. Three weeks ago, following the death of six Cuban soldiers caught in a rebel ambush, Fidel Castro threatened to suspend the withdrawal of his troops.

Moreover, in recent days FAPLA has launched an offensive with the aim of cutting the logistics corridors UNITA has in northern Angola. However, the situation is more difficult in Bie and Huambo Provinces, where reportedly Savimbi's men have recently brought in anti-aircraft artillery of South African origin through their bases in Zambia.

Madagascar

* Objectives, Goals of AKFM-Renouveau Party

*34190383 Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 9 Sep 89 p 4*

[Interview with Dr Richard Andriamanjato, founder of AKFM-Renouveau, by Jean-Clement Cangy, date and place not specified: "Our Current Problem Is a Problem of Sovereignty"]

[Text] [LE MAURICIEN] The schism in your political party, the AKFM-KDRSM [Congress Party for Malagasy Independence-Democratic Committee To Support the Malagasy Socialist Revolution], doesn't seem to have slowed you down. Now you are creating a new party, the AKFM-Renouveau. What makes Richard Andriamanjato run?

[Andriamanjato] The problem is I didn't think the working methods of the previous AKFM (the AKFM-Renouveau) (sic), did what they should to prepare the leaders of the future. In creating the AKFM-Renouveau, I was chiefly thinking of the young generation who will take over in a few years. My goal is to pass on to them the fruits of 30 years of political experience, what you might call the vision and wisdom forged by 30 years of struggle. I would have liked young people to be able to avoid the mistakes we may have made during those 30 years. An

analysis of the situation in Madagascar forces any politician to take another look at the principles underlying both objectives and working methods. In 1975, we adopted the ideal of creating a socialist society. We established the constitution. We tried to pass laws based on this new constitution and I think what was lacking was advance preparation of the people to really understand and accept all the constraints, which should be seen as they really are, in building a socialist society. We may have underrated the opposition, which was chiefly supported by the traditional reactionary element whose only aim was to regain center stage on the political scene. But even members of parties involved in the "National Front to Defend the Revolution" did not know how to define what this defense of the revolution should have been. As for me, after the different elections and especially after this year's presidential elections, I thought the people as a whole needed to be reoriented and it is to that end that I am now working.

This reorientation of the people as a whole obviously assumes that we'll have to engage in many political and even physical exercises, because, for the next 7 years, that is, during the present 7-year term of President Ratsiraka, we will have to explain all the factors involved in the current situation. It is not always easy, and it is obvious that it takes a lot of courage and a certain detachment from the daily round of political life, and, above all, much self-denial and sacrifice on the part of leaders.

[LE MAURICIEN] But, foreign observer that I am, I find it difficult to pin down the political and ideological orientation of your political party.

[Andriamanjato] The goal remains the creation of a socialist society, but one adapted to Malagasy conditions. The problem is that with our present constraints, namely those applied through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Western economic and political powers have managed in practice to impose on us a framework making it very difficult to progress and create socialist structures. We are forced to accept a certain form of liberalism and it is within this transitory liberalism that we are trying to salvage what can still be salvaged of a socialistic perspective. My problem, then, is to gauge the potential of the people. Its political as well as economic potential. In other words, after 30 years of experience and struggle, I am now forced to move beyond the classic sets of problems involved in creating a socialist society to simply mobilizing national potential. Our current problem is a problem of both political and economic sovereignty, and when I say sovereignty I mean that decisionmaking powers should remain in the hands of nationals. Obviously, to defend this sovereignty we are forced to use everything as grist, so to speak, to our mill. Mobilizing all the potential in the country means that we have already approached the entire national business community which, compared to the big multinational trusts and all the international capital now trying to invest in developing countries in order to achieve a sort of economic domination—well, all the

national bourgeois and capitalists are just babes in the woods compared to that whole group in the world today. In order to mobilize, therefore, we need the capabilities and potential for economic struggle that this segment of the population—which we think is, nevertheless, still very nationalistic in its opposition to any attempt at an economic recolonization of our country—may still possess. In addition, and at the same time, we are trying to remobilize the people by making them aware of the true dimensions of the struggle today. In other words, we do not want to create internal factions that could hinder people from correctly grasping the situation. On the contrary, we want to mobilize all potential in order to create a new attitude that is able to understand why it is necessary to ideologically take the famous step backward enabling us to make a better leap in the future. They must also understand that this step backward will last 7 years or even a decade, depending on the people's potential for mobilization.

The objective of the AKFM-Renouveau party I have just created is to establish a ongoing dialogue with the people. There is a Malagasy proverb that says "Better a quarrel with the king than with the people." For now, we are trying to get back in touch with the people, because they fell away from the AKFM-KDRSM [because] its slavish following of AREMA's [Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution] lead was now longer acceptable given the country's present crises and problems. And in just 2 or 3 months, we have visibly regained contact with the people and felt a popular support like that in the past when we formed our previous AKFM.

[LE MAURICIEN] You talk about sovereignty. The other political opposition parties talk more about democracy.

[Andriamanjato] Yes, we talk about sovereignty because the history and practice of democracy are centered primarily around constitutional and legal reforms that may obscure the reality of our current problems, especially the economic problem. This economic problem, whatever forms of democracy are practiced, may not be properly solved if, when we talk about democracy, we create types in which there is more opportunity to discuss than to build. So, as far as we're concerned, the type of democracy needed here is one that can adapt to the community-based sociological context that is still traditional in many places in Madagascar, but also to all the needs for technological and economic-productive innovations. We must create a whole system of production, bearing in mind not only international difficulties but also national potential: taking into consideration, in a sense, the solidarity I believe fortunately still exists among the people. But we must be very clear about goals. Currently the goals for the people are still very simple. They can be fairly easily summarized: ending the current economic stagnation, hence trying to find ways of boosting the people's living standard. Methods may differ, but I think—and I insist on this point—we will never be able to turn this stagnation around without mobilizing fully, that is, without using all the potential in

the country. The problem of democracy, if we focus solely on discussing the problem of electing the president and electing members of the National Assembly, is not what will solve the economic problems here. We must educate the people and create economic structures that can change rapidly so that this national economic sovereignty can be exercised. As far as my party is concerned, and we have said so simply, [the goal] is to avoid large-scale projects. Our mistake in 1975 and in 1977 was in conceiving a few big industrial plants that had to be created in the country and being unable to handle either the financing or the administration of these companies, so that we are now forced to liquidate them. What we wanted is to set up a large program of small projects that we could manage ourselves, and if one or two of these projects falters, it will not threaten to create problems for the whole economy of the country. And we are going to use these small projects to mobilize a whole generation of young people now unemployed. We are also going to create collective activities, and to decentralize to try to overcome unemployment in the country. Obviously, we are also going to research all the possibilities for relations abroad to boost exports, and to try to encourage different potential resources, both agricultural and underground. We think it possible to a great extent to conceive a rational and democratic evolution of the economy, whatever the country's superstructure, that is, system. And pernicious battles simply to gain seats either in the Assembly, the government, or elsewhere are exactly what we want to avoid. We are going to direct our action much more toward economic problems. That is the great difference in methods between the party I have created and the old party I led.

[LE MAURICIEN] And how do you see Madagascar's future, both economic and political, in the medium term?

[Andriamanjato] For now, we are making an effort to educate and mobilize the people. We will concentrate especially on mobilizing our youth organization, which has already gotten off the ground and even has a few projects to do. We are going to try to demystify a bit this idea that times are tough, that nothing more can be done, that in spite of trying we are unsuccessful. I think that with the appropriate methods and techniques it is very possible to improve the living standard of the Malagasy people fairly quickly, because there is a lot of potential. It is surely the way it was gone about that was not right. Five to 7 years from now, then, I see a sharp drop in unemployment among young people and an appreciable rise in the living standard of the people and in production, if we set about restructuring the whole economy on a small, manageable scale. These small manageable projects must be integrated into a community-based vision of an economy oriented first and foremost toward satisfying the needs of the people before meeting export needs for the foreign economy. Next, with respect to future responsibilities, our goal is to change certain aspects of the law to truly allow greater participation of

the people and the people's representatives in decision-making bodies. What do I mean by that? It is true that certain criticisms can be made of the current constitution and electoral system; but we think a few small touchups are enough to adapt the constitution and electoral laws to the changing Malagasy situation and to bring about a better representation of all levels of the population. We will submit several bills to the National Assembly with the few deputies we have, but we will not wait for the results of this proposal in the National Assembly. We are going to campaign systematically among the people to make known what we want and to educate people about their rights and their opportunities to change things if they want. And I think that in 5 years we will have gotten concrete results in changing what I will call the image of democracy in Madagascar.

Mauritius

* Delegation Seeks Future Markets With Iraq

*34190320a Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 23 Jul 89 pp 1, 4*

[Article by Jacques David: "Mauritian Offensive in Iraq"]

[Text] The first ministerial mission to Iraq has resulted in attractive prospects for our textile, sugar, and tea industries, not to mention other areas of cooperation between Mauritian industries and large Iraqi investors. This represents millions of dinars and petrodollars for Mauritius, in addition to possible investments in new petrochemical industries in Mauritius. The mission to Iraq just conducted by the minister of industry and industrial technology, Joseph Clarel Malherbe, from 14 to 22 August will be immediately followed by another mission by the private sector, government, and media to Iraq in the second week of September. This important tripartite delegation will take advantage of the trip to stop off in Kuwait, since the government is interested in renewing trade links with some of the Gulf countries.

Mr Malherbe, who was accompanied by Deputy Alain Laridon, was able to meet with President Saddam Husayn during his visit to Iraq, and talks were held between the Mauritian minister and Taha Yasin Ramadan, Iraqi deputy minister who is acting as prime minister, 'Aziz Saleh Al-Numan, minister of agriculture, Abdula Bader Danuk, minister of commerce, and Tariq Mikhayal 'Aziz, minister of foreign affairs. They discussed the following topics: textiles, agriculture, the agrochemical industry, and the agrofood industry, as well as the establishment of air connections between Mauritius and Iraq. Minister Malherbe made it clear that the question of a Mauritian-Iraqi airline was the prerogative of the Mauritian prime minister.

Initially, Iraq offered to purchase 20,000 tons of refined sugar from Mauritius, and the market for selling our tea

could start out at 3,000 to 4,000 tons a year. The Iraqis showed the greatest interest in textiles, office machinery, and the paper industry.

Outlining the prospects for Mauritius, Minister Malherbe said that despite Iraq's years of war to defend its borders and the interests of its bordering regions, it has managed to maintain an enormous potential for development, since its structures have withstood the ravages of the war. The country, which is now ready to resume its development, especially now that the peace agreement of last 22 October has been signed, has a wealth of resources. As far as trade is concerned, several possibilities are available for the textile industry and Mauritian investors. The Iraqis were particularly interested in undergarments and quality wearing apparel, primarily for women and children, but they indicated that the goods must be delivered on time, since traditional sources are currently unable to meet the deadlines required by Iraqi demand.

As for the agrofood industry, Iraq may ask Mauritius to supply it with lentils, corn, and high-quality rice, as well as a whole line of products we may be interested in, at preferential prices. Iraqi investors who have to pay high prices for some light engineering products are proposing the possibility of forming joint ventures with Mauritians to manufacture certain items, such as pipes, for instance.

In these efforts to develop other markets outside Europe and the United States, the government regards Iraq as a third partner in the Persian Gulf and stresses that these efforts stem from a desire to diversify both the market and the products we manufacture in the country, and "provide a golden opportunity for Mauritius to initiate its third industrial revolution."

"A vast market, in addition to other future prospects, are opening up to Mauritius. In pursuing this, the government is opening the way for diversification, while at the same time demanding quality goods from our production sectors. This represents a challenge to Mauritians and an unprecedented opportunity. We are now waiting for the reaction of our industrialists. The great challenge is to produce quality goods and to meet our delivery dates. Iraq represents a market of 70 million inhabitants," Mr Malherbe said.

Iraqi investors are waiting to see what the Mauritians will propose during their September mission and they will then be coming to Mauritius to evaluate possible sectors to invest in.

* Book Reveals 1963 Attempt on PM's Life

*34190320b Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 23 Jul 89 pp 1, 4*

[Article by Vishwa Mootoochurpen: "Three Attacks on the PM;" passages in slantlines published in English]

[Text] In an historic document, the prime minister [PM], Sir Anerood Jugnauth, has for the first time recounted a

third attempt on his life since entering the political arena. It was at the very start of his political career in 1963, when he confronted members of the Labor Party at Riviere-du-Rempart under the banner of the IFB [Independent Forward Bloc].

The document in question is made up of a series of accounts of the life and work of Sir Anerood Jugnauth during the 25 years of his career. The book, which is entitled "Un homme d'Etat; 25 ans d'engagement" ["A Statesman; 25 Years of Commitment"], has been published by a committee of citizens of Riviere-du-Rempart for the 25th anniversary of Sir Anerood Jugnauth's entry into politics. The publication was introduced to the press this morning by Mahen Utchanah, a political colleague of the prime minister from the Riviere-du-Rempart district and honorary president of the committee.

The book also contains several stories of great historical value, especially the account of an interview with former governor general Sir Dayendranath Burrenchobay that relates some important events in the governmental break in 1983. Sir Anerood Jugnauth himself has contributed some new information, for instance, on the negotiations for an election alliance with the IFB in 1976. If they had succeeded, they would have given another victory to the MMM [Mauritian Militant Movement]. Sookdeo Bissoondoyal wanted too much: 50-50, and then he did not trust Berenger. He also tells how in 1963 he managed to run in Riviere-du-Rempart under the banner of the IFB, while the ticket had already been given to Ajum Dahl.

Speaking of the first attempt on his life, Sir Anerood Jugnauth explained that it was a serious event that left its mark on his life and took place on the eve of the 1963 elections. He does not go into the circumstances. But according to witnesses, a car travelling at high speeds tried to run him down, but he dodged it in extremis. "It was a first major act of fate," he said. We know that Sir Anerood Jugnauth surprised people when he defeated the Labor candidate Aunauth Beejadur, close to Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, thereby gaining the reputation as the "giant killer."

As for Sir Dayendranath Burrenchobay, he recounted the circumstances in which he stepped in in 1982, when he was governor general, and he also responded to a comment made recently by Sir Gaetan Duval to the effect that there had been an arrangement between himself and the PM. He has the following to say: "...Before going to the MBC [Mauritius Broadcasting Corporation] in October 1982 to announce the break with the PSM [Mauritian Socialist Party], he went to Reduit. I was upstairs when a policeman came to tell me that the prime minister was there. He looked very upset. It was evident that he had been mistreated somewhat in his party. He explained the situation and his decision to me."

Then the interviewer said to him: "There are several versions of your role." And he answered: "I am going to tell you the truth. I asked him a series of questions. Did

he have a majority behind him? I immediately felt that he did not within the Alliance, that he could not have a majority. I told him that the Constitution gave him 10 days to prove that he held a majority. I asked him why he wanted to break with Harish Boodhoo, since he was not assured of having a majority in his party, the MMM. He told me that he had already made up his mind and that he was going to make an announcement to the country."

Another interesting question: "People have often mentioned the possibility that at that time Paul Berenger could have come and told you that he was the one who held the majority in the Chamber?" Sir Dayendranath Burrenchobay answered: "He (Paul Berenger) never did that. He could have. That would have put me in an embarrassing situation. But I still had to give the prime minister 10 days to prove that he had a majority."

He denies that there was a deal of any kind.

Besides the accounts of several companions in arms of Sir Anerood Jugnauth in the district, an interview with the prime minister's wife sheds new light on the political events. Lady Sarojni Jugnauth speaks first of the alliance concluded between the MSM [Mauritius Socialist Movement] and the Labor Party in 1983 in these terms: "It was something I approved of. /You felt more secure with Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam./ Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam had experience, a past, history behind him. However, and this may surprise you, but I did not want him to go with Boodhoo, he is not a politician. He does not know how a country runs. He is an operator above all."

We will come back to this.

* Finance Minister Defends Offshore Banking

34190320c Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 1 Aug 89 p 1

[Article by Leon Baya: "The Mauritian Offshore Facility Will Not Be a Haven for South African Capital;" passages in slantlines published in English]

[Text] This morning Finance Minister Vishnu Lutchmeenaraidoo denounced a defamation campaign "conducted by some countries that are jealous of Mauritius' economic progress" and are saying that the Mauritian offshore center could become a haven for South African capital.

Mr Lutchmeenaraidoo, who returned yesterday from London where he headed a large delegation, addressed the city's top bankers and categorically rejected the criticism to the effect that South African investors would basically use Mauritius' offshore center to invest their funds abroad. "I do not see why the South Africans would have to go through Mauritius to invest their capital abroad, when there are other offshore centers. Our center does not offer any more advantages than the others," he pointed out.

The minister is of the opinion that Mauritius should not let itself be embarrassed by this denigration campaign. "The offshore center will play a responsible role in developing the region, while ensuring the country's economic advancement," he added.

First African Offshore Center

The use of the Mauritian center by South African financiers was the subject of a question at the seminar organized by the Bank of Mauritius in the "City." Commenting on the first African offshore center, Gordon Cramb had the following to say in the 26 July edition of the FINANCIAL TIMES: /"Bankers regarded the terms on offer as broadly in line with those of established offshore centres in the Gulf and elsewhere. However, they said Mauritius could become a significant haven for private deposits from South Africa, already the source of a large volume of tourist traffic to the Indian Ocean island."/

The British newspaper even refers to a statement by Ian Knapman, area manager of Barclays Bank in Mauritius—Barclays was the first bank to receive an offshore permit—to the effect that it is possible that his institution will attract the /"affluent South Africans seeking to place funds abroad in the face of Pretoria's strict exchange control legislation."/

According to Gordon Cramb, the finance minister explained, however, that less than 1 percent of foreign investments come from South Africa and that Mauritius is /"open to all banks and institutions that are credit worthy."/

Mr Lutchmeenaraidoo is satisfied with the results obtained by the seminar. The massive presence of bankers (about 80 international bankers attended) is, according to him, an indication of the interest they have in the Mauritian offshore center. "The success of this seminar has exceeded our expectations," he added.

* Changes in SMF Hierarchy Announced

*34190320d Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 9 Aug 89 pp 1, 4*

[Article by Harish Chundunsi: "Promotion of Commander Raj Dayal of the SMF"]

[Text] An important change has occurred in the ranks of the police force. Commander Raj Dayal of the Special Mobile Force (SMF) is now the number-two officer.

This change in the hierarchy appeared in the latest Establishment Order issued by the Establishment Division of the prime minister's office. The government has, in fact, created the post of commander at the head of the SMF, retroactive to 1 July 1987.

Commander Dayal will earn a salary of about 15,000 rupees, or 750 rupees more than the two deputies to the chief of police.

The man appointed to the new post becomes de facto the second in command of the police force.

It is obvious that it is Commander Raj Dayal who will take over for the current police chief, Bhimsen Kowiesur, in December 1991. He will be the youngest police chief that Mauritius has ever had.

It should be noted that although the press has referred to Raj Dayal as the commander of the SMF up to now, he was, in fact, only the commanding officer of the garrison, equivalent to the rank of assistant chief of police.

* Jugnauth Criticized for Response to Firinga

*34190320e Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 1 Aug 89 p 4*

[Article by Jacques David: "Shocking!"]

[Text] Shocking! This is the least one can say of the indifference of the government authorities who claim to want to modernize Mauritius and who are thinking in terms of the year 2000 when the refugees of cyclone Firinga are still facing housing problems and are still being lodged in elementary schools like the one in Grand-Riviere-Nord-Ouest [GRNO]. Two ministers are passing the ball on this problem that has been going on now for over 7 months and...11 years away from the year 2000.

Fourteen children, 6 men, and 7 women (one of whom has even had time to give birth)—a total of 27 adults and one baby—are living in deplorable conditions at the GRNO school, at the same time that the largest exhibition ever on the environment is being held at Sir Harilall Vaghjee Hall. Despite the many steps taken by the Parent Teachers Association [PTA], which has written to the Ministry of Education to draw its attention to this state of affairs on several occasions, nothing has been done. The Ministry of Education has sent the ball back to the Ministry of Social Security, and vice versa.

Try to imagine a workplace like this for teachers, and especially for the student who must take the CPE exams in a few months. Trash and cigarette butts everywhere, the grounds roamed by dogs and loose goats, a radiocassette player constantly blaring forth throughout the day, the children's toilets used by the refugees with no care for sanitation, laundry hanging out on clotheslines. A state of affairs that does not shock the minister in the least, it would seem. And they dare to speak of the year of the environment!... To top things off, the poor students have to sit in classrooms that are too small for their numbers.

PTA launched new appeals for assistance to the social security minister last 4 May, but in a reply dated 14 July, the ministry says that it has referred the case to the Ministry of Education, and since then...nothing more has been heard. The Ministry of Education gives the impression that it is too busy changing regulations to ensure that the merit system prevails in the education sector for it to have the time to look into the problem of

refugees at the GRNO school, a human problem that deserves all its attention and consideration.

*** Inspection Requirements for Customs Relaxed**

*34190344a Port Louis L'EXPRESS in French
12 Aug 89 p 7*

[Article: "75 Percent of Containers Delivered Without Inspection; Decision Not Unanimous Among Customs Officials"]

[Text] The Customs Administration has decided to authorize the delivery of 75 percent of all containers to warehouses without any physical verification of their contents, but this decision has not been favorably received in the ranks of customs officials.

A decision, if we are to believe the customs officials, that may interfere with the effective operation of the service while, however, laudable efforts are being made to combat fraud and smuggling. Importers, businessmen, and forwarding agents are delighted with the Customs Administration decision since containers are being delivered to them more quickly.

It is very possible that this percentage will be increased to 90 percent, but L'EXPRESS could not obtain confirmation of this report. Thus, at the present time 75 percent of all containers shipped from Singapore, Malaysia, Bangkok, and Thailand and other Far Eastern countries are delivered without any physical inspection.

Customs officials feel that this administrative decision might open the way to easier fraud and smuggling and deliver a severe blow to the effective control that has, up to now, been exercised.

Far Eastern, Asian, and Southeast Asian countries, from which a large percentage of Mauritian imports come, are pivot points of the international drug traffic. They hope that the Customs Administration decision does not lend a helping hand to the free entry of products dangerous to people's health and the country's security.

Questioned by L'EXPRESS, Mr S. Cooposamy, the PRO [not further identified] of the "Union of Customs and Excise Officers" (UCEO), stated that the union vigorously opposes this decision.

'Proposals'

"To avoid these risks, we propose," he said, "that only the following merchandise should be delivered without any physical inspection on the basis of the documents that are presented, such as goods that arrive for the government and parastatal corps, bulk goods (rice, cement, corn, and petroleum products), livestock, livestock feed, refrigerated products, and goods coming from Rodrigues."

'Contrary to the Spirit of Customs Laws'

"We maintain," Mr Cooposamy added, "that goods imported from the Far East should be subject to full inspection to avoid any possibility of fraud and smuggling, and to keep dangerous products or 'prohibited or restricted' products from being brought into Mauritius. Delivery of goods without any inspection would be contrary to the spirit of our customs laws, the purpose of which is to protect revenue, public health, and national security. We feel that the Customs Administration should avoid granting them special status."

'Not Yet Ready'

Mr Cooposamy also said that the system for delivering containers without any inspection, as is the case in Europe, cannot be blindly applied in Mauritius. "It would be most ill-advised. We aren't ready for that yet, even if the customs service is modernized and computerized," he added.

Dangerous Course

Free-zone containers have benefited from this practice, but many cases of fraud and under billing have been uncovered by customs. Extending this practice to all individuals would be engaging on a dangerous course. "But that's not all. With delivery without inspection, the staff of the 'Examining' Section will now be underemployed," Mr Cooposamy said.

*** Dual Citizenship Considered To Attract Cadre**

*34190344b Port Louis L'EXPRESS in French
8 Aug 89 p 1*

[Article: "JEC Suggests Mauritian Citizenship To Attract Professionals"; first paragraph is L'EXPRESS introduction]

[Text] The Joint Economic Committee (JEC) has proposed that 1,600 professionals and businessmen a year be imported over the next 5 years.

To attract these professionals to Mauritius, the coordinator of the JEC, Mr Maurice Paturau, maintained that permanent citizenship would constitute an irresistible attraction.

"Many countries accept the principle of dual citizenship and we can't understand why Mauritius couldn't accept it, especially for a limited number of professionals," Mr Paturau explained. Nevertheless, the coordinator of the private sector acknowledged that it would not be easy to get people to accept the suggestion that these foreigners be granted Mauritian citizenship.

"We're convinced that we're going to be opposed by a number of arguments to demonstrate the difficulties this proposal poses: national security, selection of age group, family status, native language, actual level of training or specialization, and who knows what else."

In his article entitled "Selective Immigration," published in PROSI, Mr Paturau maintains that these professionals are available in Europe, specifically, Mauritians in Great Britain, France, Australia, Canada, and South Africa, but also foreigners in the Far East.

According to Mr Paturau's analysis, Mauritius will need 8,000 professionals during the next 5 years. The sectors involved are very diverse. The private-sector coordinator maintains that "the melange of ideas that this immigration of professionals produces is going to provide Mauritian development with a positive impetus and assure us of more solid and more productive organizations than those that now exist in Mauritius."

This issue of importing manpower is currently central to the debate in some sectors, such as the construction industry. This problem was also mentioned in the latest discussion of the budget by Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Finance V. Lutchmeenaraidoo.

The government does not appear to be opposed to the idea of importing foreign professionals to alleviate economic difficulties. But the government is trying to get people to realize that it does not intend to yield in regards to the importing of manual laborers.

We must admit that the novelty of Mr Paturau's suggestion, to wit, permanent Mauritian citizenship and dual citizenship for Mauritians residing abroad, will again raise a major debate that will stir up the Mauritian community abroad, in particular.

Let us bear in mind that, following the traffic in Mauritian citizenship that began in Taiwan late last year, the government has put an end to the granting of Mauritian citizenship to foreign investors.

Coming from the private sector, this proposal to resort to the importing of foreign professionals can be explained by the fact that, "no matter what sort of training is involved, a certain amount of idle time will be lost between the start of the course of instruction, the attainment of certificates or degrees, and the practical application of the skills acquired."

* MMM Leader on Party Role, Current Issues

*34190379a Port Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 4 Sep 89 p 1*

[Interview with Dr Prem Nababsing, leader of the MMM [Mauritian Militant Movement], by Jacques David: "SAJ [Sir Anerood Jugnauth] Uses the MMM as Bargaining Power Against the Labor Party, But Not for Much Longer"; date and place not given; passages within slantlines published in English]

[Text] In the first part of Dr Nababsing's interview, published in last Saturday's LE MAURICIEN, the opposition leader pointed out how much the MMM approach changed between 1970 and 1989, and he emphasized the militants' many efforts at different levels throughout the

country, especially in the townships administered by the "mauvies." Dr Nababsing emphasized that the MMM was not in the least complacent...

[LE MAURICIEN] ...then, you tell yourself that everything is all right and everybody is happy...

[Nababsing] ...in this respect, it is certainly true that the economic boom created an atmosphere in the country in which each showed that he had enough to be happy. On the other hand, we also know that people wanted wage compensation, for instance; and in this respect, the MMM was always in the forefront, ahead of the people in demanding a compensation. In Parliament, at party meetings or at other meetings with the people, the MMM led the fight. We kept alive the dialogue with the live [as translated] forces of the country, and we kept making the same claims. Now, as far as action is concerned, we did not remain idle. And what do we see now? We are still saying what we were saying months, years ago, and economic realities are proving us right. The PRB and other Chesworth wage increases have been cancelled by price increases and inflation. We assess the government's efforts and, based on meetings with the people, I can say that they are hurting. Until Parliament reopens, the government will be /on the defensive/. We should not forget that, whether in two years or in a few months, the government will have to hold general elections. We are going to move into the attack. The people are rather well aware of all we have said about the economic boom, social issues, national unity and democracy, and about the environment which, as we know, has been neglected. All the government has done is talk about development; they did not take care of the environment and it is deteriorating. This is one issue that we are going to emphasize.

[LE MAURICIEN] You say you will move again into the attack; does that mean that you are going to change your strategy?

[Nababsing] There is no change. Until now, our strategy has been to give the government enough time to implement its policy, that is, since the 1987 elections. We warned the people often enough. We told the Mauritians more than once—and in this respect I want to draw your attention to the last campaign, before the La Caverne-Phoenix by-elections, during which we denounced the government's actual intentions, as national unity and democracy are at stake. The eyes of the Mauritian people have been opened often enough during the past two years...

[LE MAURICIEN] In the meanwhile, Dr Nababsing, the government, too, has had the time to prove to the opposition that it would not remain idle; you just mentioned the La Caverne-Phoenix by-elections: as we know, the result was that the prime minister [PM] regained a district in which you already had a representative...

[Nababsing] ...Since you are coming back to the question of the by-elections, it is a well-known fact that the

350-vote difference between the MMM-MTD [Democratic Labor Movement] Union team and the government team came as a surprise to us; we were surprised that, despite all the resources it could muster, the government could not win this seat by a larger majority. I say that the union was facing the MSM [Mauritius Socialist Movement]/Labor Party, but that included the entire state apparatus, its information service, large financial resources, semipublic bodies, and the private sector, to name a few. All these focusing on a single district. Things would be different in a general election.

[LE MAURICIEN] But what could be different in the future? What trump cards will you have?

[Nababsing] I can already outline certain aspects: at the end of the period 1983-87, what had the government really achieved? There has been much talk about jobs being created. In the free zone, there were as many as 90,000 jobs; but, since last year, a lot of jobs have been eliminated. Tourism: only 400 jobs were created last year. The government did not do anything as far as training is concerned, and it waited too long to prepare workers for the jobs; it was unable to attract enough investments; it was unable to diversify toward the free zone. For exports and imports, just look at the figures and statistics. Our trade balance is worse than negative. The government talks about development. Let's ask them who benefited from the development of Mauritius. There is a total lack of vision at all levels: economy, health, education, environment. Where is their planning? Everything in the country is deteriorating. Everything is getting worse.

[LE MAURICIEN] Until now, the MMM had practically a monopoly on the opposition; don't you think other parties outside the government might be in a position to harness the discontent you mention and take over the same themes?

[Nababsing] The only party in the opposition, apart from the MMM, is the PMSD [Mauritian Social Democratic Party]. But remember that the PMSD is just as guilty as the government and that it associated itself with the MSM; it condoned all that is now taking place in the country. Since 1983—this is something we should not forget—the partners in the government have systematically undermined national unity, democracy. Do not forget also that, until 1988, the PMSD helped squander the economic boom. The PMSD controlled, among others, the Ministries of Tourism and Employment and Housing. Then, all the government promises, in every respect, including housing, proved to be vain. They should not assume that they can go on deluding workers. Let's not talk about the situation of disadvantaged families, from the point of view of housing. I need only one example to say that the middle class is no better off, either: middle-class families cannot find a house, let alone build one. Neither the previous head of the Ministry of Housing, nor the government now have anything solid to offer to the people. The government has nothing to propose. And the private sector still less.

[LE MAURICIEN] Aren't you underestimating the impact of the PMSD, whose dialectic may hamper you in the field, and don't you think that Sir Gaetan Duval, who knows how to find the words to say where the shoe really pinches, might cut into your electorate?

[Nababsing] Even if the PMSD speaks with one voice and highlights certain situations where, as you say, the shoe pinches—for instance police or other recruiting—and which the PMSD uses as a battle horse, it will not work because SGD [Sir Gaetan Duval] is not credible. Do we have to point out that these are issues that the MMM has raised again and again? The MMM has consistently denounced this kind of situation, even when the PMSD was the ruling party. It is not a recent problem. I will say it again: the MSM and the PMSD have had a hand in what is happening and have condoned it. Since 1983, there has been some talk about "mountain protection," both in the administration and in semipublic bodies. Certainly, this is not something that materialized after the PMSD left the government. Since 1983, the PMSD has never spoken in defense of national unity; today, they use it as a slogan. The PMSD has no credibility; its campaign may attract public attention here and there, no more. True, Duval is a speaker with some charisma, but his meetings turn into /shows,/ fairs that attract people only here and there, as the Mauritians know perfectly well that the PMSD did nothing while it was in power.

[LE MAURICIEN] Therefore, according to MMM analyses, you maintain that Sir Gaetan Duval does not represent a threat for you or the government?

[Nababsing] He is certainly no threat for the opposition. We know full well that this is not the first time Duval presents his /show/; we, at the MMM, know very well how he stages them. I say that he still retains a /hard core/ of his electorate but that, as time goes by, their number is shrinking. I do not believe that, out of power and out of the government, Duval can be stronger in the opposition. This /hard core/ will vanish, unless the PMSD finds a new image and get a new leadership. The Mauritius of 1989 is not looking for a man like Duval to lead the fight. If Duval makes way for someone else or for his son, I believe that the PMSD could have a political future.

[LE MAURICIEN] The latest public pronouncement of the Labor Party, concerning certain national-level issues, also gave the prime minister an opportunity to tell what he really thinks; how would you assess the situation?

[Nababsing] I am convinced that the two partners in the government have a problem. Even at the Labor Party, some are beginning to talk; there are those who say where they stand, those who want to be in the government and those who want to dabble in opposition from inside the government—those, as they say, who want to have /the cake and eat it/—they want to project an image, that they

will always be there to fight for the people. And there are those at the Labor Party who absolutely want to follow Jugnauth blindly.

For the MMM, it is important to note that we do have a government and that it is taking serious action against national unity; and, in that case, the Labor Party is supporting it. The most striking example is that of the guarantee of 10,000 rupees for the general elections, which was proposed by the government and approved. Sir Satcam Booell was strongly in favor when SAJ [Sir Anerood Jugnauth] introduced his motion in Parliament.

Nevertheless, we wish good luck to those who, from inside the Labor Party—like Razack Peeroo—want to give the Labor Party a chance to rally. Some may be conscience stricken and now want to distance themselves from the MSM.

[LE MAURICIEN] Dr Nababsing, some maintain that the PM can tell the Labor Party: "We don't need you; the MMM is waiting at the door." Is that really so? And how do you interpret the message of the PM, that the MSM can face the elections alone?

[Nababsing] First, the MSM will never be able to face an election alone. The only party that ever did that was the MMM, in 1976 and in 1983. The MSM as a whole and the PM know full well that this is something they will never be able to do.

Second, A. Jugnauth should not think that all political parties in this country are /at his beck and call./ Maybe today he will, and he can, call the Labor Party with a mere snap of his fingers, and maybe he can do the same with the PMSD: keep them or expel them as he wishes, and as he has done in the past, but he should realize that not all political parties are like that; with the MMM, everything is different.

The MMM is much larger than the MSM, and its militants are not at Anerood Jugnauth's /beck and call./ The MMM has a platform; it is not there just to come to power and be in the government at any price.

Things are very clear, and we have said it again and again: the MMM will not be part of the government, especially not the present government, not with the MSM. I would add that, as far as the next elections are concerned, it will be up to the MMM to choose its orientation.

For the moment, we have a government and an opposition that includes the MMM and the MTD. We have the administration of the five townships and the two partners meet as often as possible to discuss the political situation. The MMM support is not a sure thing for anyone, especially not for Anerood Jugnauth's MSM that has harmed the country so much and in every respect. That party certainly cannot be an ally of the MMM in the general elections.

We also know that Anerood Jugnauth is playing this little game to use the MMM as /bargaining power/ against the Labor Party, just as he uses the Labor Party.

His game is clear. And certainly we see that clearly, and it is also certain that the young in the Labor Party, just like us in the MMM, know very well that Jugnauth will not be able to continue this little game much longer. That is a strategy that we shall not just ignore.

[LE MAURICIEN] You sound as if the MMM knew exactly with what party it will ally itself in the future. Who are those currently on the political scene with which the MMM could work?

[Nababsing] Let the others ask themselves who can work with the MMM. We have a platform. We have a precise idea of what Mauritius shall be tomorrow; we are not going to give up at that to work with someone else, whoever that may be. Therefore, it is up to the others to think about it.

Let's take an example: from time to time—for instance at its last congress—the Labor Party wants to present a different image and talks about national unity, democracy, workers and unions rights, etc. Thus, from time to time, it takes a different stance, then it is with the parties which adopt the same stance as the MMM, which could work with the MMM. But it is certainly not possible to work with the MSM as it is today.

[LE MAURICIEN] If we follow you, therefore, if tomorrow the MSM takes a different stance, adopts a different platform and the attitude you wish, it would then be possible for you to work with it?

[Nababsing] We are bound neither to the Labor Party nor to the MSM. I will say it again: if some think they can work with the MMM, we might talk...

[LE MAURICIEN] Already, you are setting your conditions: anyone who wants an alliance must make the first move?

[Nababsing] If the MMM is to enter into an alliance, it must be as /senior partner/ as main partner. It is up to the others to decide whether or not they can work with the MMM...and to follow us.

[LE MAURICIEN] The MMM feels strong enough today to take such a position?

[Nababsing] Why "today"? We have always been the largest party and we have proved—in municipal and in general elections, in 1983 and in 1987—that the MMM is the largest party in Mauritius. I don't think any other party could seriously come and tell us they are stronger than the MMM.

Mozambique

* Chissano Meets Arab Leaders, Muslims

34420135a Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese
9 Sep 89 p 15

[Article by Fernando Lima]

[Excerpt] While the Mozambican Catholic Church was talking with the Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] rebels last week in Nairobi, President Joaquim Chissano, who was in Tripoli to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Libyan revolution, was taking the opportunity to consult with Arab leaders.

Some Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia, have made important contributions to the Renamo, which has made it difficult for the Mozambican Government to win support in this area of the world. To turn this situation around, while he was in Tripoli President Chissano made a series of contacts with leaders of the Islamic world.

Before he left for Libya, the Mozambican president consulted with 30 Muslim leaders, to discuss, in particular, the peace process in Mozambique. A Muslim source told EXPRESSO in Maputo that at that meeting, at which no member of the government was present, the possibility was left open for more direct and active involvement by Islamic organizations in the current phase of the dialogue.

The source did not rule out the possibility that leaders of the Islamic community would take part in the Nairobi meetings or develop parallel initiatives "to bring an end to the war in Mozambique."

Joaquim Chissano stated that, on his return from Libya and the summit meeting of the Nonaligned Movement, he would meet with the Hindu community, a minority group in Mozambican society but one which, like the Muslims from India and Pakistan, is extremely influential in the country's commercial sector.

The president's meeting with the 30 Muslim leaders was an indirect reminder to the ecclesiastical sector involved in the Nairobi process that the Islamic community is by far the largest religious group in the country. This Mozambican community holds political positions which Maputo identifies as "patriotic," a synonym for agreement with the government's views. [passage omitted]

* Prisoners Freed Under Amnesty Total 583

34420132a Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
18 Aug 89 p 1

[Text] Five foreign nationals and eight Mozambican citizens who were serving various prison sentences after being convicted for crimes against the people and the People's State by the now abolished Revolutionary Military Tribunal were freed yesterday morning under the amnesty granted by Law 3/89 of 19 July to persons

convicted of common crimes. Three foreign nationals were handed over to the embassy of Great Britain in Maputo through the instrumentality of the Mozambican Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that the embassy might take steps to have the amnesty recipients leave the national territory within 48 hours. Meanwhile, information from the Ministry of Justice states that 583 Mozambican citizens and residents have to date already been freed in the nation as a whole.

The release of the 13 amnesty recipients took place at two separate ceremonies held in the offices of the attorney general of the Republic. The first ceremony was attended by diplomatic representatives of the countries of the foreign nationals, and the second by relatives and friends of the Mozambican citizens.

These amnesty recipients had been given prison sentences of from 8 to 30 years—by the now abolished Revolutionary Tribunal—for violations set forth in Law 2/79 concerning crimes committed against the security of the people and the People's State, namely espionage, terrorism, sabotage, collaboration with clandestine organizations, agitation, and so forth, with the ultimate intention of destabilizing and destroying our country.

The foreign nationals who under the terms of Article 4 of Law 3/89 were granted remission of the balance of their sentences are as follows:

Carlos Gambora Lopes Valerio, a Sao Tome and Principe national, sentenced in December 1979 to 30 years' imprisonment; Finlay Dion Hamilton, a British national, sentenced in February 1983 to 20 years' imprisonment; Peter Nguila Che aka Joseph Ochieng Odawa, a Kenyan national, sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment in May 1986; and Ian Douglas Grey, an Australian national, who received a prison sentence of 14 years in March 1988.

Dr Antonio Afonso Antunes, public prosecutor of the city of Maputo, presided at the formal ceremony for the release of these foreign nationals, which was also attended by Felisberto Lukanga, director of the Europe-America division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and by representatives of the National Service of People's Security, as well as by the abovementioned diplomatic representatives of the countries of the foreign nationals who were freed.

The embassy of Great Britain took responsibility for the Australian, Kenyan, and British citizens. Carlos Valerio, whose situation is regarded as special, was handed over to his family inasmuch as he did not face the penalty of expulsion from the national territory.

Those Mozambicans who were also sentenced for the same crimes and freed yesterday include Fahamo Gulamo, who was serving a 14-year sentence handed down in September 1980; Zacarias Ibraimo Chitara, sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment in April 1984; Jose Matabissane Wilson Parruque, sentenced to 18 years in April 1986; Gilberto Armando Naiene, 15 years in May

1986; Carlos Alberto Patrício Stank, 25 years in May 1986; Francisco Manuel Timane, 8 years in May 1986; Lourenço Mapenze Maione, 12 years in May of the same year; and Pedro José Gonçalves, the length of whose sentence we were unable to ascertain.

These citizens—who were handed over to the relatives who were present—are taking with them documents of introduction to the political structures of their respective places of residence.

Dr Antonio Antunes explained that extension of the Amnesty Law to foreign nationals is just one more action toward establishing peace in the nation and also demonstrates the strength of a people, which should not be based solely on its armed might but also on its great capacity for forgiveness.

In the opinion of Dr Antunes—which was seconded by the director of the Europe-America Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—this decision was in accord with the requests of the respective governments of these foreign nationals, with which our country maintains good relations.

For his part, the charge d'affaires of the embassy of Great Britain said that there are times when people are obliged to rise above the legal aspect and act in accordance with humanitarian principles. "I want to acknowledge publicly the humanitarianism displayed by the Mozambican Government," he emphasized.

Others Freed

Meanwhile, reports reaching our newsroom from the Ministry of Justice tell of the release of 583 additional citizens who had been convicted of common crimes and were also included in the amnesty.

These reports state that 122 have already been freed in the city of Beira; 121 in Tete; 85 in Quelimane; 72 in Nampula; 63 in Maputo; 51 in Pemba; 48 in Xai-Xai; and 21 in Chimoio. These citizens regained their freedom in compliance with the release warrants issued by the various courts.

*** 'Bandits' Force Closure of Maputo Schools**

34420132b Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
18 Aug 89 p 3

[Text] More than 200 educational establishments have already been destroyed or closed as a consequence of attacks perpetrated by the armed bandits in Maputo Province, according to data disclosed yesterday at the opening session of the 14th Provincial Coordinating Council on Education and Culture. The meeting—which is being held at the National Center for the Training of Cadres of the Organization of Mozambican Women—is being directed by Eduardo Oliveira Nhamirre, provincial director for education and culture in Maputo Province, and is scheduled to last 3 days, according to the published agenda.

The council is being attended by district directors of the ministries of Education and Culture, educational technicians, teachers, and other invited guests. The agenda highlights—as principal items to be raised at the meeting—the balance sheet of the activities carried out by the educational sector last year in Maputo Province; an analysis of educational utilization in the first half of the current year; the impact of the war of aggression on the education sector; school organization; and planning for the 1989 revenues and budget.

Speaking at the opening session, the director for education and culture in Maputo Province said that enemy activities in this province have already resulted in the closing of 236 schools, the destruction of infrastructures, and the murder and kidnapping of teachers, students, and other workers in the education sector.

The provincial director of education went on to say that these activities have increasingly curtailed the operation of the school system in the area, depriving thousands of children he said, what is needed is moral and material support both for the teachers who have lost their family members and possessions and for the war-displaced and abandoned children.

"We'll give the teachers and the children the care they need," Nhamirre added.

Yesterday's session also included presentation of the report issued by the Provincial Department of Education on the educational activities carried out last year and in the first half of this year. Concerning this year, the report states that there was a satisfactory number of students and teachers in the educational establishments in the period scheduled shortly before the beginning of classes to carry out small tasks involving cleaning, decoration, scheduling, the division of classes into sections, and so forth.

The same report notes, however, that the original enrollment plan was not completely fulfilled: The first grade recorded the highest level, 90 percent; the fifth grade the lowest, 75 percent.

Various reasons were cited for the nonfulfillment of the original plans, including the situation brought about by the armed bandits, who are the principal cause of the problem.

The report states that this is because teachers, students, and the general population are moving from one place to another to seek refuge, thereby causing a sharp drop in school attendance as well as the closing of schools, which as we have said has left thousands of children without a place to study. It was disclosed at the opening session, for example, that in EP-2 (Second Level of Elementary Education) the existing school system does not meet the demand, inasmuch as most of the schools are located at the site of the administrative offices or even the district offices.

Moreover, because of the situation with respect to safety some parents and others responsible for education are not allowing their children to travel—to the assigned schools, thereby also jeopardizing the educational plans.

The report also states that in the first half of this year the figures for educational utilization were in general positive, varying between 51 and 74 percent. In EP-1—that is to say, the first through fourth grades—educational utilization was 70 percent, with the second and fourth grades achieving a minimum rate of 65 percent and a maximum rate of 70 percent.

The students of the second level recorded a 52 percent educational utilization rate in the first half of this year, with the seventh grade achieving 54 percent.

Other matters were taken up at yesterday's session, however, and the report of the Provincial Department of Education was also discussed. Today, the Coordinating Council will discuss the impact of the war on the education sector, the organization of nursery-school centers, and other items.

* Gaza Fails To Meet 1988-89 Agricultural Goals

34420132c Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
18 Aug 89 p 3

[Text] The irregular rainfall and consequent insufficiency of water in the Limpopo River; inefficiency of the equipment because it is obsolete; and financial and managerial difficulties that are still obvious in the state enterprises were some of the factors cited as being the principal contributory causes of the failure to fulfill the production and marketing goals for the 1988-89 crop year. This information was contained in the report issued by the Gaza Provincial Planning Commission and read at the most recent regular meeting of the provincial cabinet headed by Governor Francisco Pateguana.

For example, it was possible to obtain a total production of only 16,541 tons of rice, which was approximately 39 percent of the target established. The corn crop was similarly affected, with only a little more than 4,000 tons produced of the more than 24,000 tons projected. The report of the Gaza Provincial Planning Commission states, however, that the corn production situation can be viewed much more optimistically if you take into account the promising outlook for the corn crop in the cool-weather season, provided of course that adverse weather conditions do not hamper production during that season.

With respect to the rice crop, the report goes on to state that an area of more than 2,700 hectares belonging to the private, mixed cooperative, and state sectors recorded a production of slightly more than 14,000 tons, which was 18 percent of the target. More than 2,000 tons of rice was produced by the family sector.

Whereas the results with respect to rice and corn can be regarded as disastrous, the same cannot be said of cotton

production, which was quite satisfactory in view of the fact that the goal of 2,250 tons was exceeded by approximately 800 tons. This overfulfillment of the production goal is attributable to the mixed sector, which produced 3,000 tons—98 percent of the total production of cotton. The private sector contributed only 50 tons from a total area more than 800 hectares.

The Gaza Planning report states that the result obtained so far with respect to beans, onions, and tomatoes are insignificant if you consider that production of these three crops fulfilled 3 percent, 12 percent, and 15 percent of their respective quotas.

However, the more than 4,600 hectares of cassava planted—mainly by growers in the family sector—produced a total crop of more than 8,000 tons. The report adds that the cassava crop has in recent times been attacked by the cochineal insect, a plague that has spread through the districts of Mandhakazi, Chibuto, Xai-Xai, Bilene, and Guija.

The report—which was presented at the meeting of the Gaza Provincial government—states that efforts are being made to prevent and combat this plague.

Marketing of Cotton and Mafura Successful

The process of agricultural marketing—conditioned in part by the low levels of production recorded—can generally be regarded as negative.

This situation, however, can no longer be said to exist with respect to the cotton and mafura sectors, which overfulfilled their target quotas by 33 percent and 256 percent of their respective goals of 2,250 tons and 1,000 tons. A total of 3,562 tons of mafura and approximately 3,000 tons of cotton were marketed.

Slightly more than 3,000 tons of cashew nuts were marketed. The report states that only 38 percent of the cashew nut quota was fulfilled, due in part to climatic factors but also to the fact that the districts which are potential producers of this strategic export product—namely the districts of Mandhakazi and Chibuto—were unable to participate with greater resolve because of the recrudescence of the terrorist activity by the armed bandits in those areas of the country.

During the first half of this year, activities in the livestock sector primarily involved cattle production, animal health, and veterinary care. Meat production accordingly achieved a total of 192 tons, which was approximately 80 percent of the quota established and 47 percent above the figure for the corresponding period in 1988.

The figure for the production of pork, however, was quite insignificant, representing approximately 4 percent of the target of 35 tons established for the current year.

*** Survey of Southern Forest Resources Launched**

*34420132d Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
18 Aug 89 p 8*

[Text] The National Directorate for Forests and Wildlife, in coordination with the National Directorate for Geography and the Census, began last week to conduct an aerial photogrammetric survey of forest resources in the southern region of Mozambique between the Limpopo River and the Ponta do Ouro. This activity will be carried out in seven stages until January of next year, at an estimated cost of around \$400,000 (\$1 equals 756 MT [metricals]). NOTICIAS has learned from Engineer Abdul Adamo, national director of the National Directorate for Forests and Wildlife.

The survey includes, among other activities, the obtaining of aerial photographs and their interpretation; the construction of maps; the training of Mozambican personnel; and the compilation of data to be refined as the work goes forward.

According to Engineer Adamo, the work of obtaining the aerial photographs—which has now begun—will be concluded next week, inasmuch as 50 percent of the work scheduled has already been accomplished.

Adamo went on to say that Mozambican personnel are currently being trained to participate in the interpretation of the aerial photographs, and plans call for them to travel to South Africa at the end of this month for the same purpose.

"In addition to the six Mozambican technicians who are being trained," Adamo said, "the work will be supported by eight consultants of British, Australian, and South African nationality."

He said that the objective of the survey of the forest area now in progress is to evaluate the existing resources in the southern region of the country, where the situation has proved to be the most critical.

Adamo further stated that this action will make it possible to obtain detailed information concerning the availability of existing resources for energy purposes. "Based on this information and the data already at hand concerning all the levels of consumption," he said, "a medium- and long-term program will be developed to end the deforestation that has occurred around the urban centers."

He emphasized that during this phase the survey will be supplemented by studies designed to determine the technologies that are suitable for the development and utilization of these forest resources as well as for the effort to obtain greater efficiency in the process of converting wood into charcoal.

"It will also have a research component," he said, "whose objective is to find ways of generating biomass in

the agricultural regions now undergoing development, by involving the public in the solution of its own problems."

The national director of Forests and Wildlife announced that stabilization of the existing plantings—and preservation of a moderate level of reforestation until a more precise idea is obtained of the course to pursue—are other goals to be attained.

"In the rural areas," he continued, "we want to carry on agriculture in a more integrated fashion. It's not a question of planting trees for firewood; it's a question of including forest activities within the agricultural system in order that we may solve problems such as erosion control, soil enrichment, the introduction of plant species for the production of cattle forage, and the production of building materials." Engineer Abdul Adamo stated in this connection that there are two important areas to be taken into consideration, namely the training and retraining of the rural extension technicians and an investigation of the species recommended for each climatic and ecological situation existing in the nation.

In What Context Is the Survey Being Made?

This aerial photogrammetric survey in the southern region of the country is one aspect of the Mozambican Government's effort to reduce by 50 percent, over the next 5 years, the consumption of wood fuels in the urban centers.

This effort is part of the Domestic Energy Program for Urban Centers prepared by the Ministry of Industry and Power and financed by the World Bank and other international organizations in the amount of \$65 million. The purpose of the program is to provide a supply of gas, illuminating oil, and charcoal for domestic use, and to carry out a program of activities with respect to energy infrastructures and direct assistance to consumers.

In addition to the aerial survey, the National Directorate for Forests and Wildlife has the responsibility—within the framework of the aforementioned program—for creating an energy biomass unit; providing resources for the forestry projects of Marracuene, Dondo, and Nampula; conducting studies to find the best methods for producing charcoal; and developing forestry extension programs, among other things.

The sum of \$3.5 million has been made available to the Directorate to carry out this program of activities.

*** Report on Maputo International Trade Fair***** Portugal Well Represented**

*34420134 Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese
8 Sep 89 pp 10-11*

[Article by Jaime Cuambe]

[Text] With the theme "Promotion of Foreign Investment and Exportation of Nontraditional Products," the 25th edition of the Maputo International Trade fair-FACIM [Agricultural, Commercial, and Industrial Fair of Mozambique] was held in Maputo, capital of Mozambique. This year marks the fair's silver anniversary.

The event took place in the third year of radical changes resulting from the Economic Readjustment Program in progress in Mozambique; thus the theme of this fair expresses the two great economic policy objectives of the Maputo government.

The fair was characterized by a real marathon of business transactions. The Mozambican business class demonstrated the results of the changes brought about to date and the prospects glimmering for the economic future of Mozambique.

Mozambican businessmen have begun to look more seriously at the fundamentals of good business practice and are now struggling to improve the quality of their products, to win markets outside the country.

This is a challenge that necessarily involves not only an improvement in the quality of the products but also a reduction in production costs.

In the current edition of the Maputo International Fair, which was inaugurated on 24 August and closed on 3 September, there was a significant increase in exhibitors, which observers in Maputo see as a vote of confidence, not only in the development of the Mozambican economy, but in the success of the peace efforts of President Joaquim Chissano's government.

At this year's fair there were exhibitors from Angola, the GDR, the FRG, Denmark, the United States, France, India, Malawi, Portugal, Tanzania, Zambia and Brazil.

Conspicuous Absence

A strange aspect of the foreign representation was the absence of two traditional exhibitors in the FACIM, an absence which, according to both parties, had no connection with politics.

Regarding Italy's absence, the counselor of the Italian Embassy in Maputo reported that the nonappearance was related to the closing of the office of the Italian Foreign Trade Institute in Maputo, a decision made last winter by the Foreign Trade Ministry.

Pierluigi Velardi made a point of stressing that the absence of Italy, one of the assiduous participants in the FACIM, "has absolutely nothing to do with politics or any lack of interest" in Mozambique. He noted the volume of Italian cooperation as one indication of the interest which his country takes in Mozambique.

It is estimated that, last year alone, cooperation between the two countries amounted to \$400 million. Regarding the absence of the USSR, another traditional participant in the Maputo International Fair, a source in the Soviet

Union's trade mission in Maputo reported that the 5-year plan of his country's Chamber of Commerce and Industry did not include attendance at this year's fair. The plan expires this year.

Alexander Mukhin explained that the 5-year plan called for biennial participation in the FACIM and that the Soviet Union had taken part in the 1987 fair at the urging of the Maputo authorities, because that year marked the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. The diplomat assured, however, that participation in all editions of the FACIM is guaranteed in the next 5-year plan.

Portuguese Participation

In this 25th edition of the Maputo Fair, Portugal's representation was one of the strongest ever: 40 companies, as against 33 in the previous fair. Of the 40 sectors exhibiting at the fair, 9 belonged to the IPE group (State Investments and Participation), some of which have broad service experience in Mozambique and thus sought to occupy a privileged place.

Sources from the Portuguese Foreign Trade Institute (ICEP) in Maputo reported that the Portuguese companies exhibiting in this fair represented such sectors as textiles, food and beverages, chemical products and pharmaceuticals, engineering and public works, electric and electronic equipment, sports equipment, shoes and clothing, books and educational materials. The Portugal-Mozambique Chamber of Commerce and the General Directorate of Cooperation were also represented.

The traditional Portuguese wines excited curiosity at the Portuguese pavilion, which covered an area of 432 square meters. Also attracting particular attention was a display of photographs depicting the construction and renovation of the Mozambique Railways and the rehabilitation of the Beira and Nacala corridors, in which Portuguese technicians participated.

These two rail lines are of strategic importance to the landlocked countries and are included in the projects of the SADCC [Southern African Development Coordination Conference].

On the fifth day of the fair, the emphasis was undoubtedly on the exhibit of the firm Teledata de Mocambique, a product of the association between the Mozambique National Telecommunications Company-TDM and the Portuguese Marconi Radio Company (CPRM). The purpose of this new enterprise is to introduce new services in the area of data communication and information processing. It will also permit the use and exploitation of the profit potential of the modern infrastructures and facilities recently implanted in the basic telecommunications network, providing a wider variety of services and adapting them to the needs of the customers, through effective technical-commercial support.

Sources at Marconi aver that Teledata de Mocambique is an innovative move to turn Mozambique into a

dynamic center for the provision of services in Africa, promoting the socioeconomic development of the country and its relations abroad.

Dr Luis Sousa Macedo, secretary general of Marconi, went to Maputo to take part in this event, attesting to Marconi's interest in investing in Mozambique.

Observers in Maputo see this major involvement by Portugal's business community in Mozambique as a vote of confidence in the economic development of Mozambique and in the success of the peace efforts of President Joaquim Chissano's government.

* Promoting Trade Links

34420134 Lisbon *O JORNAL* in Portuguese
8 Sep 89 pp 10-11

[Text] To promote the sale of articles of domestic manufacture, at this time when the Mozambican Government is struggling for reforms that will permit the revitalization of the country's economy, which, as high government officials admit, is moving at a crawl: This is the salient point of the Maputo International Fair-FACIM [Agricultural, Commercial, and Industrial Fair of Mozambique] 89.

Visiting the various national pavilions, one sensed the intent to include the fair in these efforts, which have consisted basically in the rehabilitation of the industrial sector and an increase in resources devoted to rural development. They are efforts that might even be fruitless, considering that the country has been at war almost since the day it became independent 14 years ago, not to ignore some failings and "disorganization."

A source connected with the management of the fair told this newspaper: "Now we are working with a solid idea of what we want and ought to do, gaining also from the experiences of fairs in other countries with problems similar to ours."

Local businessmen with whom we spoke referred to the need to respark the economic interest which the FACIM has lost in recent years. "What often happened is that it was only the chief of state who was buying our goods. What kind of business is that? Can you imagine how it is to pay the freight charges on merchandise and not do any business?" asked a businessman.

"The contacts are always made and always followed up. Mozambique is very receptive to contacting and talking to the various exhibitors. Whether or not business is conducted is not related to the situation at the time of the fair," said one of the managers of the FRG pavilion.

Regarding business deals, Christian Lang, the GDR's trade counselor in Maputo, said a trade agreement would be signed with Mozambique covering new areas of cooperation.

The foreign businessmen came to Maputo with photographs or actual samples of products that are not manufactured here and for which Mozambique constitutes a potential market for their countries.

"This means that FACIM is extremely important, since it is a showcase for the potential of the various participating countries and also in terms of contacts that are easier to make while the fair is going on, thanks to the national pavilions," one of the managers of FACIM 89 pointed out.

According to an individual at the pavilion of Brazil, which returned to FACIM this year after a 3-year absence, this fair has helped to improve Mozambique's image abroad. Also, because of its location in southern Africa and in a country whose principal ports (Maputo, Beira, and Nacala) serve the neighboring countries in the interior, such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Swaziland, the fair is a crucial point of political and economic contact for the various countries.

It is justly noted that Mozambique's economic recovery program is clearly beginning to straighten out what was awry, particularly in the commercial area, to the extent that it is now the consumer who dictates what should be produced, creating a competitive market, instead of the situation in which industry had no trouble placing its goods, whether or not they were of good quality.

While they would not offer any statistical data, sources in the Mozambican Ministry of Trade said that FACIM 89 reflected the effects of the nation's economic recovery program with regard to industrial production, both in the quality and quantity of products.

They added that Mozambique had remarkable success with exports this year, considering the destruction of infrastructures provoked by the war. They argued, however, that business should be conducted more aggressively; otherwise, it will be impossible maintain this progress in economic development.

Mozambique's economic growth is still hampered by the lack of security that the country is experiencing. In the first quarter of this year, there were repercussions from the destruction of manufacturing complexes and the blockade of important shipping routes, primarily for cashew nuts, tea, and minerals.

There are also sectors that are in need of reinvestment to rehabilitate their infrastructures (for instance, the shrimp fishing fleet in the state sector). Otherwise, production rates will fall short of the installed capacity. Observers hold that an effort should be made to make FACIM even more commercial and that it should faithfully reflect the efforts exerted within the framework of the Economic Recovery Program (PRE).

* Past Representation

34420134 Lisbon *O JORNAL* in Portuguese
8 Sep 89 p 12

[Text] The Maputo International Fair came into being in 1965 as the Agricultural, Commercial, and Industrial Fair of Mozambique [FACIM], an initiative of a group of colonists linked to various financial interests. The idea was to demonstrate the economic validity of Mozambique.

The first edition of the fair took up an area of 50 square meters and the foreign participants were South Africa and the Angolan Coffee Institute.

Three years later, in 1967, the number of national and foreign participants increased significantly, from 130 to 300 businessmen. At that time, the first cattle exposition was inaugurated and a cattle auction was introduced.

Among the foreign exhibitors, that fair was marked by the entry of Italy, which, as we said, was not represented this year.

In 1969, the United States turned up at FACIM. The fair was better organized that year; substantial improvements were introduced and the infrastructures were expanded. The available data indicate that there were more than 120,000 visitors.

Two countries, FRG and Swaziland, joined FACIM in 1970. There were already 600 exhibitors in all, which led to an increase of about 20 percent in the area occupied by the fair.

In 1971, FACIM went through a major transition, marked by the events occurring in Portugal, with the overthrow of the colonialist fascist regime on 25 April. Held a month after the coup d'état, the fair sought only to maintain its continuity.

In 1975, the year of Mozambique's independence, Algeria, Tanzania, Ghana, Yugoslavia, Zambia, the USSR, Nigeria, and Pakistan participated in FACIM for the first time.

The greatest leap forward for the fair was in 1978, when FACIM had 866 exhibitors, distributed over 120 national pavilions and 40 international pavilions, 25 of which represented countries and 15 represented individual companies. The fair took up 32,715 square meters, as against 50 square meters in 1965.

The novelty in 1980 was the entry of Zimbabwe and in the following year the signing of contracts for commercial transactions was the big innovation. Contracts for orders amounted to an estimated 120,000 contos. For import contracts, according to data made available in the special magazine put out for FACIM 89, the figure reached 1 million contos.

In 1983, the contracts that were signed reflected an increase in exports of products and also an increase in imports of machinery.

In 1988, the promotion of nontraditional export products went hand in hand with an increase in confidence revealed by the foreign exhibitors.

The year 1989 marked the silver anniversary of a fair stimulated by the economic reforms in Mozambique that led to the reactivation of important sectors of the nation's economy, as well as the need to make sales and to win new markets. Thus the theme "Promotion of Foreign Investment and Exportation of Nontraditional Products embodies two great economic policy objectives in Mozambique.

* Spanish Civil Guard Training Troops

34420135b Lisbon *O DIABO* in Portuguese
5 Sep 89 p 12

[Text] Some 150 Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] soldiers are receiving instruction and antiguerilla training at a Spanish Civil Guard post near Ciudad Real. The Mozambican soldiers—who, oddly enough, are wearing Civil Guard uniforms, even in the city—are led by two noncommissioned officers, also from the Frelimo, who received their training in Cuba.

From all indications, this detachment, for which the Spanish are supplying all the equipment and weapons, will be followed by others.

One of the objectives of Spain (where, in spite of everything, Mozambique has no diplomatic mission), along with increasing its influence in southern Africa, is to supply weapons, rations, and military equipment to Mozambique in the future.

Namibia

* Sharp Drop in Karakul Pelt Prices Reported

34000049a Windhoek *THE NAMIBIAN*
in English 8 Sep 89 p 5

[Text] Karakul farmers in Namibia's south are hit by a drastic chill this spring: last week's London auction saw pelt prices drop by nearly half compared to those in February this year.

February prices averaged about R52, while pelt prices in September average R28.

The last time the industry was hit by such a sharp drop was in 1982, when prices plummeted from R17 to R9, according Mr Jack Albertyn, chairman of the Karakul Producers Association.

Mr Tokkels van Wyk of the International Karakul Secretariat advises local farmers to raise many more lambs for meat production for at least the next 18 months—but not to give up pelt production entirely or Namibia would lose its market entirely.

The drop in karakul pelt prices—by 30 percent compared to July's auction—was caused by the international

crisis the fur industry faces because of mink pelt over-production, said Mr Van Wyk.

Mink prices dropped from an average of nearly £29 in 1985-86 to £12 in the present season, Mr van Wyk of the International Karakul Secretariat told THE NAMIBIAN.

Mink makes up over 80 percent of the world fur industry's trade. So the sharp drop in mink prices [affects] all the other fur prices, Mr Van Wyk said. "All prices in the fur industry were depressed as a result," he added.

But, he said, the demand for Namibian karakul as a fashion commodity was still as strong as before. The drop in karakul prices was not because of overproduction or a smaller demand for the product, Mr Van Wyk emphasised.

"But the local market underestimated the effect mink overproduction would have on karakul prices," he conceded.

Swakara was still a "popular fashion" product, Mr Jack Albertyn chairman of the Karakul Producers Organisation, also said.

Namibia's total karakul export product, about 280 000 pelts, was taken up at last week's auction. The duration of the price problem would depend entirely on how soon the mink industry got its house in order, he said.

"We will have to go through a lean period for a year to 18 months, Mr Van Wyk said. He added that he did not think that mink production could be reduced radically before this.

To "neutralise" the effect of low prices, farmers should enter the meat market, Mr Van Wyk said. "One of the big advantages of karakul farming over other sheep is that you can switch over to meat production if prices are low."

Mr Albertyn said that he was hoping that farmers would not take "crisis" decisions by switching over entirely to meat production. "They should keep their karakul sheep and produce more mutton and less Swakara," he asserted.

Farmers should continue producing some pelts for they have a responsibility to the international market to maintain a supply, Mr Van Wyk added.

"Our local producers must continue to produce high-quality skins because the prices of those did not drop so sharply," he advised.

Asked whether prices would continue dropping from the current level, Mr Van Wyk said he was "doubtful."

* Gas Fields To Be Opened to Foreigners

*34000049b Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY
in English 21 Aug 89 p 3*

[Article by Kevin Jacobs: "Swakor To Open Gas Operation to Foreigners"]

[Text] Windhoek—Swakor, Namibia's oil exploration parastatal, plans to open promising offshore gas fields to foreign oil giants.

Explorative drilling in the Kudu field has run up a R42.8m bill with no gas finds, but has showed an estimated one-trillion cubic metres of dry methane gas.

Chairman Skerf Pottas said: "Our engineers are satisfied that we have one-trillion cubic metres of gas in the well, but further drilling is necessary to establish the size of the reserves."

"The consultants said they would want four or five times that proven volume before it could be economically viable."

Because of the expense the company would do all the preparatory work and would then invite oil companies to do any further exploration at their own expense.

"We intend dividing the whole offshore area into blocks, and then to hold information seminars. The companies will be able to make offers and we will accept the best offers," Pottas said.

Swakor consultants were building up a Windhoek-based data bank for oil corporations interested in further exploration and were also preparing a further seismic survey.

Reunion

* Suicides Increasing, Societal Changes Cited

*34190380 Saint-Denis LE QUOTIDIEN
in French 22 Aug 89 p 8*

[Article: "Suicide and Suicide Attempts in Reunion; A Public Health Problem"]

[Text] "In Reunion perhaps more than elsewhere, suicides and suicide attempts represent a public health problem of primary importance." Such is the major message of a study just published by a local research team. Reunion seems to be one French department where the recent trend in the suicide rate has been most spectacular. It increased threefold in 10 years.

On several occasions in recent years physicians have had the opportunity to attract attention to the phenomenon of suicide in Reunion. Compared with the national average, the suicide rate on the island is not excessive. Actually, it is slightly below average. However, "the surprise does not reside in this difference, but in the explosive progression of the suicide rate in Reunion."

say the authors of a study¹ just published by CORI (the Research-Orientation Council of INSERM [National Institute for Health and Medical Research]-Reunion with the help of the region. Both the number of suicides and their percentage for the population increased three-fold between 1970 and 1980.

These discrepancies must be qualified, as the Reunionese population is younger than the national average. They tend to fade when standardized populations are compared. However, several observations emerge: the excess male mortality due to suicide is more marked in Reunion than in metropolitan France, and suicide affects a younger population.

In addition, "the means used by the Reunionese seem quite peculiar." The most common are poisoning with an agricultural product (the exception in Europe), in particular, herbicides, poisoning with medicines, and hanging. Except for the latter, violent means (firearms, drowning, jumping from high places) that account for three-fourths of the suicides in France, are rarely used in Reunion.

Above all, suicide rates vary greatly from one town or village to the next, and there is a marked difference between rural and urban communities. "A 'mugshot' of a Reunionese suicide," the study concludes, "would, therefore, show a male farmer living in a rural area, young, and likely to use medicines or agricultural products rather than 'hard' means."

Attempts: 10 to 20 Times as Many as in Martinique

Another equally concerning fact is the number of suicide attempts. The rate of suicide attempts is about twice as high as the rate shown by pilot studies made in metropolitan France, and 10 to 20 times as high as the rate found in Martinique. In Reunion, the traditional predominance of female-attempted suicides is not as clearly marked as elsewhere. The rate is highest, even "quite spectacular," among girls aged 15 to 19.

Just as suicides, attempted suicides are more frequent in hamlets than in towns, especially in the hamlets of the south (Hauts de Saint-Joseph, Petite Ile).

What is the explanation for these phenomena? The study offers only an "attempt at an interpretation" and mentions: the disruption of social structures that has occurred in Reunion in the past 40 years, the family structure, and "impulsiveness."

For instance, the fact that the island became a French department: this marked the end of the coexistence of a plantation-type society and a traditional rural society and brought with it the consumer society; it caused "a loss of social reference points, a veritable dismantling of social and cultural structures." Such a situation had already been described by a famous sociologist, Durkheim:

"Whenever serious rearrangements occur in the social body, whether due to a sudden spurt of growth or to an unexpected cataclysm, man is quicker to kill himself."

As far as ethnic, religious, and cultural communities are concerned, Dr Duval notes cautiously that the boundaries are often blurred but that "white Creoles" account for a disproportionate number of suicides. "The most tightly knit groups ("Chinese," "Zarabs," "Tamuls" to a lesser degree) tend to be spared," he points out, while still warning that a racial or hereditary interpretation is not warranted.

As far as the family is concerned, the study mentions "the existence of a much disadvantaged father image" and a parental discourse that is often perceived as "discredited." "Acting on a suicide impulse would, therefore, often appear to be a substitute when there is a failure to communicate: failure within the family, but also failure related to the language, as a result of Creole-French bilingualism. The situation would recall that of Alsace and Brittany at the beginning of the century. Finally, the authors of the study mention the Reunionese "impulsiveness" in which Dr Duval sees an "aggressiveness directed against the wrong object." "When the individual gets caught into the defense mechanism that is represented by identification to the aggressor, when he cannot act, when he cannot alter a situation that he finds intolerable, there is nothing left for him to do but to turn against himself or, and that amounts to the same, against that other self represented by his neighbor, his brother, his friend, or just anybody who happens to cross his way at the time."

108 Suicides and 1,774 Attempts in 1987

There were about 108 suicides in Reunion in 1987, the last year considered by the study. This represents an annual incidence of 19.4 suicides per 100,000 inhabitants (compared with 6.3 in 1961). The average age of the suicides was about 38 for men and 34 for women. The three methods most commonly observed were medicines (32 percent, both sexes together), agricultural products (27 percent), and hanging (30 percent).

In addition, there were 1,774 suicide attempts in 1987, including 62 percent by women. From 1985 to 1987, the average annual incidence was 354.3 attempts per 100,000 inhabitants. The incidence of attempted suicides was highest among girls aged 15 to 19 (1,020 per year for 100,000 inhabitants) and among men aged 25 to 29 (641 per 100,000). It is too soon to evaluate any trend in the number of suicide attempts, but a marked decrease was observed between 1986 and 1987. "It may be related to the creation of prevention structures (SOS Solitude)," the authors note.

Among the means used for these suicide attempts, medicines are the most common by far (83 percent among women, 62 percent among men) followed, for men, by agricultural products and alcohol.

Variations between communities show a markedly higher incidence of suicide attempts in Saint-Joseph (612 per year per 100,000 inhabitants, from 1985 to 1987), Petite Ile (600), and Sainte-Rose (570). The incidence was 344 in Saint-Denis and 462 in Saint-Pierre.

Footnote

1. "Suicide et tentatives de suicide à la Réunion" [Suicide and Suicide Attempts in Réunion]. Editions INSERM. This book, written in collaboration by Jean-Claude Combes (pediatrician), Gilbert Duval (reanimation therapist), Christine Hamon (demographer), Albert Lopez (geographer), Jean-François Reverzy and Gérard Vanelven (psychiatrists), will soon be on sale in bookstores.

Zambia

*** New Measures To Restrict Illegal Immigration**

34000050a Lusaka ZAMBIA DAILY MAIL
in English 9 Aug 89 p 1

[Text] The Immigration Department has introduced a number of new requirements to be met by applicants for different types of permits before their applications can be considered.

The new measures, which become effective on September 1 are aimed at reducing irregularities and checking on illegal immigrants, some of whom remain in the country because of loopholes in immigration processes.

According to a press release issued by the department's newly opened public relations unit, all applicants for visiting, study, employment and self-employed permits would now be required to submit, among other supporting documents, two passport size photographs as a way of identification.

Those applying for visiting permits would also be required to produce a covering letter from the host specifying in detail the reason for the intended visit.

For employment permits, employers would be required to submit a copy of the contract to ensure that foreigners did not remain in the country after expiry of contract because of long employment permits a covering letter from the employer should accompany the application.

In the case of employment and self-employment permits, applicants would also produce a police clearance certificate from their countries of permanent residence confirming that they had no criminal record.

Persons already in employment would also be required to produce the said certificate and photographs.

For investors or self-employed people, an investment permit, certificate of shares, investment licence would

have to be obtained from ministry of commerce besides the usual certificates of registration and incorporation.

Other documents required would include a bank of Zambia statement confirming the importation of the invested capital and a customs importation permit confirming the type of machinery and value where capital is imported in form of machinery.

*** Copper Production Down 57,439 Tons From 1988**

34000050b Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 16 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] ZCCM [Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines] made a net profit of K1.832m during the financial year ending March 31, 1989, says a financial report just released in Kitwe.

The group made a profit before tax of K2.723m and paid K891m tax.

Copper production during the period was 415,645 tonnes—57,439 tonnes lower than the previous year.

*** Bulgarian Medical Contract, DPRK Accord**

34000050c Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA
in English 17 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] Sofia, Sunday. Party Secretary-General Cde Grey Zulu has hailed the signing of the \$8 million trade contract between Medical Stores of Zambia and the Kam firm of Bulgaria.

Speaking after touring the Kam company in the city of Plovdiv, about 130 km from Sofia, Cde Zulu said Zambia was looking forward to the implementation of the programme under which the Bulgarian firm would help Medical Stores set up an automated production line of disposable needles and syringes.

Under the same contract, Kam would give Medical Stores a \$2 million raw material grant every year until the company was able to stand on its own.

Cde Zulu said with the setting up of such a facility at Medical Stores, the company would not only be able to meet Zambia's requirements in needles and syringes, but those of the whole sub-region, seven months after production begins.

Company general manager Cde Decho Valev said his firm was interested in investing in Zambia and had besides the contract signed with Medical Stores and made moves for a joint semi-precious mineral exploration venture with the Reserved Minerals Corporation (RMC) of Zambia.

He said in this project, RMC would own 51 percent of the shares while the Bulgarian partners would have the remaining 49 percent.

Earlier, upon arrival in Plovdiv, the oldest city in Europe, Cde Zulu was met at the regional committee of the Bulgarian Communist party by first secretary Cde Panteley Pachov. Cde Zulu is here on a six-day state visit.

Cde Pachov said Bulgaria would not hesitate to invest in Zambia and said everything would be done to strengthen the already cordial and warm relations between the two countries and governments by cooperating further either economically, politically, scientifically and in cultural terms.

Cde Zulu has appealed to the regional committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party in Plovdiv, the country's most industrious and agricultural town to encourage companies there to exploit the investment opportunities abundant in Zambia.

Speaking during a dinner hosted for him by Cde Pachov at the Plovdiv hotel last night, Cde Zulu said Zambia had vast investment opportunities for foreign firms and friendly governments with the means to exploit the available resources.

Cde Zulu said the party in Plovdiv should send a team of experts to Zambia to carry out feasibility studies particularly in the fields of agriculture and industry for joint ventures between Zambian and Bulgarian private firms, parastatal companies or the two governments.

Cde Zulu said the irrigation facilities he had seen at the places he had visited could be adapted to Zambia to supplement the country's sometimes insufficient rains.

In Pyongyang, the UNIP [United National Independence Party] Youth League and the league of socialist for working youth of Korea (LSWK) has signed a protocol agreement of cooperation to strengthen the existing relationship between the youths of Zambia and in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

* Harvest Under Way; Some 1988 Crops Uncollected

34000052b Lusaka ZAMBIA DAILY MAIL
in English 3 Aug 89 p 4

[Text] A few years ago, a visiting World Bank official said Zambia could become the bread-basket of this region of Africa if she continued to receive good rainfall and farmers were given attractive incentives.

This is quite true because over the last two seasons, for example, the country has done very well in the production of maize. This is mainly because of good weather and increased producer prices.

However, while farmers have more than doubled the output of maize over the last two seasons, the country has not yet worked out an effective and systematic way of ensuring that all the produce is collected in time.

Some of the maize produced during the 1987/88 season has still not been collected due to a myriad of problems such as insufficient storage facilities, impassable roads and limited haulage trucks.

In fact, this is one of the reasons why the country has had to look for an export market for the surplus three million bags of maize. But while this is good as the nation will earn some foreign exchange it however, does not augur well in the long term considering that efforts have now been initiated to build up a healthy maize reserve. The weather is always unpredictable and Zambia could, therefore, experience a drought.

At this particular time, it is doubtful that what has been stored away as a reserve could last long. It is, therefore, important that all the produce is collected.

It is worrying to note that apparently even the 1988-89 season's maize may not be collected in good time. There have been reports from some parts of the country that although farmers produced a good crop again during the season, this is still lying uncollected because of a shortage of grain bags.

This is an old and very sad story because the marketing season was supposed to have got underway over a month ago now. Some of the maize should have been in storage depots at this time because it will not be long before the rainy season starts.

Many people till fail to understand just why a lasting solution cannot be found to the problem of moving maize in good time.

While the government has done well in ensuring that producer prices are announced several months before a new season so as to enable farmers to prepare adequately, planning for the collection of the crop is totally lacking. This has to improve.

Those responsible for the moving of maize to the depots should also ensure that all the preparations are made well in advance. Applications to the Foreign Exchange Management Committee (FEMAC) to bring in the bags should be made early. FEMAC, on its part, should consider such applications as a matter of urgency.

New rates for transporters should also be worked out early to avoid a late start in the haulage of produce. Certainly, what happened this year when transport rates were only announced a few days ago and well into the season must be avoided.

It is encouraging to hear that the Zambia Co-operative Federation (ZCF) has obtained a loan from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to build storage sheds for both primary and secondary co-operatives in the Eastern, Southern, Central and Northern provinces. This should go a long way in alleviating the problem of storage facilities. Similar planning is needed in the provision of bags and early mobilisation of transport to move the crop to these depots.

Cape Verde

* Political Liberalization Brings Changes

34420128 Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese
29 Jul 89 pp 34-R—35-R

[Article by Jonuel Goncalves]

[Text] Praia—Sucupira is not only in Bahia but also in the city of Praia, Sao Tiago de Cabo Verde. "Sucupira" is a parallel market that more closely resembles the one in the Praca de Espanha than the one in Luanda's "Roque Santeiro." There you will find products that either cannot be found—or are in short supply—in the official circuit: imported jeans, certain beauty aids, radios, tape recorders, and similar items, which have until recently come from Dakar but are now coming increasingly from Brazil. The prices, however, are not outrageous, unlike those in other African parallel markets. It is a typical informal activity which—in a country with 25 percent unemployment—generates subsistence income that the otherwise strict internal revenue authorities do not dare stifle. Some of the principal interurban bus lines—served by private minibuses—have their terminal in Sucupira. Except for a few dishes prepared and eaten in the shade of the trees, this is not where people get their food. In Cape Verde the basic necessities are in normal commerce, and there are no special or supplementary stores. Despite the country's obvious poverty, its economy is not developing in the atmosphere of disorder, corruption, and coups that characterize the supply system of African countries that are more richly endowed but whose civilian society is subjected to sterilizing pressure from the machinery of government.

Model Is Needed

The major obstacle to Cape Verde's economy is to be found on another level: It is, first, the failure to establish a realistic model and, second, a circumstantial and obviously improvised management of the situation that attempts to reconcile economic dogmas with needs that are not compatible with these dogmas. The Cape Verdians' great ability to adapt—in conjunction with a team of realistic cadres—has prevented extremes of poverty but has been insufficient to enable Cape Verde to emerge from the condition of a country that receives aid from the international community and is dependent on the remittances of emigrants. Of all the members of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), Cape Verde receives the most foreign aid in terms of percentages.

Although the other former Portuguese colonies have a history of greater repression, Cape Verde is without doubt the one that inherited the most dramatic material situation. Portugal was always preoccupied with closing off the archipelago, thereby virtually condemning it to backwardness, for the French and Spanish development of Dakar and the Canary Islands, respectively, subjected Cape Verde to stiff competition and transformed it into

a place virtually without interest for international trade. Nevertheless, Portugal settled the archipelago—toward the end of the 15th century—to serve as a port of call for international navigation and fought to preserve its sovereignty against the claims of the Dutch, British, and French at the high point of the "triangular trade," one of whose angles was based on the "Rivers of Guinea."

Upon leaving its oldest African colony, Portugal left behind "those who were scoured by the west wind" and whom "the goats taught to eat stones." The effects are felt to this day.

The role of the state in the economy following independence accordingly became an imperative, in view of the absence of an authentic business community. There are those who believe, however, that bolder measures similar to the recent legislation could have been adopted at the very beginning. Generally speaking, during these years the economy of the archipelago consisted of managing foreign aid, creating infrastructures, providing for the operation of the state enterprises, and allowing the existing private companies to do business (in both cases, almost always in the tertiary sector). During the first 6 years of the decade of the 1980's the economy recorded an average annual growth of 6 percent, which was higher than the African average but not sufficient to bring it out of the previous abyss.

Free Zone

Cape Verde has survived, demonstrated its viability, and improved the living conditions of its people, but it must still establish an economic vocation.

The year 1989 may serve as a date of reference in the country's recent history. Not only has there been conspicuous activity in the civilian society, but the government is adopting legal provisions that have been successful in other microstates.

The laws governing industrial development and foreign investment are equally oriented toward what is conventionally called extroversion but which Minister of Industry Adao Rocha prefers to call economic reorientation.

"The concept of transforming the entire country into a free zone is virtually established," Rocha says. "An export industry that plans to locate here can do so virtually with free-zone status. While it is true that we have already made much progress, certain objective and subjective conditions remain to be established: The administration of the new industrial laws must be made more flexible to enable them to contribute toward the solution of problems relating to the infrastructure and competition in certain sectors."

Because Cape Verde lacks raw materials it will have to import them, even for its light industry. It can, however, utilize the labor-cost factor and take advantage of the proximity of markets that lack products of this type. "But not just these markets," Rocha says. "We have

proposals that target 'The Five,' the EEC, and even the United States and Canada." Although light industrial production is, in his opinion, the strategic sector, other categories such as agricultural products grown in irrigated areas, fishing, and tourism are components of the formula that the Cape Verdean leadership "is in the process of developing."

'Cabral Didn't Say When'

Cape Verde's successes are accordingly to be found in the area of labor costs, a considerable pool of skilled workers, and its geographical location. Nonetheless, the team of the secretary of state for administration, Renato Cardoso, who is in charge of debureaucratizing the marketing circuits, faces an enormous task, and the debate over what methods to employ to cope with this phenomenon is intense in political circles.

But it is not just extroversion and debureaucratization that are matters of concern to Cape Verdeans. The authorities recently promulgated a new law for municipal elections that authorizes the presentation of independent slates of candidates for local governmental offices. Olivio Pires, secretary of the Political Bureau of the PAICV [African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde] told us: "The objectives that we originally established for the construction of a new society continue, in a sense, to motivate us. Simply put, we must take into account the manner and the time frame in which we shall achieve these objectives. Cabral—and the PAIGC [African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde] beginning with its first platform—set for themselves the objective of creating a society free from man's exploitation of man, but did not say when. This objective can continue to be pursued—and achieved sooner or later—but we do not know whether it will ever be achieved fully. The important thing is to make progress toward a society that has an ever-increasing content of social justice, which is in fact linked to production itself—for you can distribute only what you have."

"Africa," Pires believes, "has experienced too many external influences while making no effort to develop its own ideas. When one opts for copying models, it may turn out that those who constructed the models will change course and those who follow them are left without knowing what to do—and this is happening not just with the models developed in the East but also with those developed in the West. We are a continent of single parties," he added, "that has already tried pluralism in several countries without its having solved existing problems. In many cases the single party has also not approved of debate and participation. The central question is therefore not the single party, because even if pluralism did get results in Mauritius or Botswana, you must also know of countries with a pluralist system that have many problems. Democracy and development," he continued, "are a binomial, but I doubt that democracy can exist only in conjunction with pluralism. I am speaking of a pluralism of political parties, because there

must be a plurality of opinions and debate—for otherwise society dies. I believe that a multiparty system would not be advisable at the present moment in Cape Verde, which is relatively fragile and cannot be exposed to every type of influence that could impede its development."

This is not the view of Eurico Monteiro, attorney and president of the Institute for the Defense and Support of the Judiciary [IPAJ]. "Since 1975," he says, "much has been done with respect to the independence of the judiciary, but we cannot yet regard its independence as an accomplished fact. However much goodwill there may be on the part of the magistrates, this independence is almost impossible wherever there is a party that dominates the entire political system and permeates all the activity of the state. I would say that a single party and a government of laws are mutually incompatible." Concerning the subject of human rights, he goes on to say that "progress has been made by virtue of an irreversible dynamism in civilian society itself and not because of the goodwill of the government, which is adjusting a little and trying to adapt itself. But problems persist. For example, the government is limiting one of the basic rights, the right of association. There is much talk of freedom of speech and thought, but no heed is given to the fact that because there is a single party and a domestic security establishment with a philosophy almost identical to that of all the state security services that concern themselves primarily with political crimes, there is a very fluid border between the exercise of the rights of the individual, on the one hand, and crimes against the security of the state. I have already seen—in this country—someone convicted for distributing pamphlets that criticized some aspects of the agrarian reform and the single party. This activity was judged to be a crime and an attempt at destabilization, but what is most serious is the fact that these crimes are judged in a military court."

As for the municipal elections, Eurico Monteiro believes "that the main concern is to breathe life into the process and test the social base of support for the party. If the situation proves to be cause for alarm," he says, "there can be some reforms in many areas, but within the framework of the single-party system, that is to say, unless the dynamics of the social system bring about a major change—something that I am convinced can occur in the medium term."

The president of the IPAJ compares the idea that Africa is unsuited to democracy with the Salazar postulate concerning the denial of independence. "In a country of slender resources such as Cape Verde," he says, "democracy would serve as a broker favorable to development, not as the sole remedy but as an indispensable condition."

External Dimension

It is a fact that at the diplomatic level, the image projected by Cape Verde is much larger than the country's geographical dimensions.

Cape Verde's participation in the peace process in Angola is an example of this. Although the agreements were signed in New York and Gbadolite, the negotiations with South Africa were conducted over a long period in Praia. Regarding the starting date of this phase of the talks, Cape Verde's Minister of Foreign Affairs Silvino da Luz told us that it gained favor "when the idea of exploratory contacts to put an end to the state of war first surfaced." Without saying any more on the subject, he also told us that he "couldn't say who thought up the idea, but I attributed it to President Neto." The fact that South African planes made stops at the Island of Sal is regarded by Silvino da Luz as a contributing factor. "We enjoyed the confidence of our Angolan brothers, who are aware of our position on apartheid, but also the confidence of the South Africans, who despite our opposition always understood that we are people who keep our word. Moreover, the picture shaping up in southern Africa indicated to us that sooner or later the parties would have to meet," he added.

Today the foreign minister (who was at Gbadolite) believes the process is irreversible. "Commitments were made with almost 20 heads of state present as witnesses. I interpreted the handshake (between President Jose Eduardo and Jonas Savimbi—editor's note) as a gesture of reconciliation. Reconciliation cannot be accomplished with one's back turned, but only by meeting face to face."

On the subject of apartheid, he believes that its dismantlement can be accomplished peacefully as the result of joint action "from within and from outside official circles. If Mandela decided to make a move (the meeting with Pieter Botha—editor's note)," he added, "it is because he has already developed his plan, given the fact that conditions have already been created for certain initiatives that would perhaps have been impossible a few months ago. Another example is the meeting of the South African leaders with President Chissano. It is possible that there are strategies already in play."

Silvino da Luz believes that the economic policy of extroversion will "necessitate" greater diplomatic flexibility." According to this influential player in the Cape Verdean political chess game, the domestic opening to the independents "creates new partners for development."

Cultural Factor

Possessing a centuries-old Creole culture, Cape Verde is everywhere experiencing the winds of change, and much of what will happen depends on the cultural factor. Minister of Information and Culture David Hopffer Almada believes that this opening will be reflected in the press, giving rise to the expression of a variety of currents

of opinion. The concern he expressed to us is echoed by Jorge Alfama, director of the Cape Verdean Institute of Literature, who says for example that "it is a crisis not of production but of escudos." A number of books is waiting for funding to enable them to be published, thereby leaving the potential of the new generations in darkness. It is a context not very different from what is occurring in society as a whole.

Nigeria*** Gas Projects To Yield \$24 Billion Revenue**

*34000834a Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English
24 Aug 89 pp 1, 3*

[Article by Omafume Amurun]

[Text] Nigeria will earn 24 billion dollars (about 148 billion Naira) from 3.4 billion dollars (about 24 billion Naira) investment in two projects, namely the Oso Condensate and the Liquefied Natural Gas [LNG] projects.

Petroleum Resources Minister, Dr. Rilwanu Lukman who announced this in Badagry, Lagos yesterday at this year's annual international conference of the Society of Petroleum Engineers, said these projects could launch Nigeria into the era of international gas trading.

He explained in the address read by his Director-General, Mr. G.P.O. Chikelu, that the Oso Condensate Project was conceived to utilise gas from three major fields to produce 100,000 barrels per day of condensate for export.

According to him, the final bids for the project which were currently being analysed, would be implemented at a cost of one billion dollars and would generate 12 billion dollars over the span of the project.

The other project, the minister explained, included two train liquefaction plants capable of producing 4.6 million metric tonnes of LNG per annum for export to Europe and U.S.A.

He said the capital cost which was estimated at about 2.4 billion dollars, would generate about 12 billion dollars over the life of the project.

The coming on stream of this project, he said, would stimulate deliberate exploration for gas and the development of dormant nonassociated gas fields.

Dr. Lukman said it was envisaged that the LNG project besides the liquefaction of natural gas for exportation, would produce natural gas liquids and liquefied petroleum gas for domestic supply and export.

He said it was because of the importance which the government attached to gas development, that efforts were currently being made to develop gas resources and diversify the natural resources base of the country.

The minister said that it was in line with the federal government commitment to gas that the NNPC [Nigerian National Petroleum Company] was re-organised and a Nigerian Gas Company incorporated as a subsidiary.

Dr. Lukman said the NNPC butanisation programme had a large scope for private sector participation, as it involved the expansion of the production of liquefied petroleum gas for domestic purposes.

He stressed however that gas pricing needed to be looked into because of the heavy investment in exploring, production, transmission and distribution of gas.

In a welcome address, the SPC Chairman, Mr. E.U. Imomoh said because of the various projects being executed by the federal government, the future would hold considerable opportunities and challenges for petroleum engineers.

* **Paper Criticizes NBA's Ultimatum, Retreat**
34000834b Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English
25 Aug 89 p 1

[Editorial: "The NBA's Disorderly Retreat"]

[Text] Quite remarkably, three days after the expiration of a purported ultimatum given to the federal government by the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), the president of the association, Mr. Alao Aka-Bashorun has denied ever giving the federal government an ultimatum. It may be recalled that on Saturday August 5, 1989, purportedly speaking on behalf of the NBA, Mr. Aka-Bashorun had given the federal government fourteen days within which to abolish the state security (detention of persons) Decree No. 2 of 1984 and release or try all those detained under it.

At the time, careful observers had pointed out that this call by Mr. Aka-Bashorun was a meaningless threat, hooded to orchestrate the campaign for the release of fellow-lawyer, and friend, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, using the platform of the NBA. This observation was proved correct when barely one week after the threat, big-wigs at the NBA dissociated themselves from the ultimatum, stating that Mr. Aka-Bashorun did not have their mandate to issue it. They challenged him to show "credible proof or evidence" the association gave him for the reported ultimatum. Shortly thereafter, the NBA secretary, Mr. Ajomiwe Ihekewaba categorically stated that the NBA's views on Decree 2 would be disclosed only after the lawyers' conference scheduled for August 28, to 31, in Lagos.

These internal contradictions were the first pointers to the hasty and disorderly retreat being made now by the NBA—or is it Mr. Aka-Bashorun? What the NEW NIGERIAN sees in all this, is that Decree 2 is only being used as a smokescreen by agents of instability and parochialism, in the ongoing campaign of calumny designed to stampede government into mistakes in the

ongoing transition programme. If not so, the NBA ought to have realised, as pointed out by the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice Prince Bola Ajibola, that a law such as Decree 2 exists in other countries of the world in various forms and names, being "the only weapon available to any government to enforce national security and stability." In fact in Nigeria, the decree's existence precedes the independence era. In the 60s, it was known as the preventive detention act. After the military coup of January 1966, the law was called the state security (Detention of Persons) Decree No 3 of 1966. This decree metamorphosed during the Shagari regime of 1979-83 into the national security (Protection of Persons) Act. Certainly, the conclusions from these hard historical facts are clear. The present hue and cry, coming especially at the time they did, stand therefore as nothing but devilish mischief.

The style of Mr. Aka-Bashorun's umbrage, and the confrontational posturing of the NBA as a pressure group which sees only the negative side of government, raise a number of questions. For instance, why did Aka-Bashorun, acting quite out of character as a learned gentlemen, choose, of all avenues, a press conference to give an ultimatum on such a crucial issue, only to turn around to dodge under the excuse of "misrepresentation."

Indeed, the most telling factor in the NBA's (or is it Aka-Bashorun's?) retraction is the statement that the press "misrepresented" his statement. If so, why was this "misrepresentation" on such a crucial matter not immediately corrected? The entire episode and its conclusion now prove not only disorderly, but a big blow to the credibility of the NBA.

But the NBA's problem began long ago. When in 1984 Chief Fawehinmi, then a staunch defender of Decree 2 and military tribunals, took the NBA to court over the association's boycott of the tribunals, the Supreme Court ended the four-year legal battle by ruling that because of its nature, the NBA can neither sue nor be sued. This judgment irked Fawehinmi who walked out on the NBA and has since not returned to their fold. Also between 1987 and now, the NBA has been involved in three walkouts. The so-called radicals in the association are engaged in a running battle against the silk-robed senior advocates (SAN) whom they regard as conservatives over the issue of precedence. The waning credibility of the NBA should therefore preoccupy the agenda of its August Lagos conference.

In the end, the lessons of NBA's disorderly withdrawal are clear: all dubious machinations and unpatriotic acts must finally face exposure and destruction by their own hollowness and evil intentions. The federal government should of course, ignore all such phenomena and concentrate on the good work it is doing towards evolving a stable democracy for the nation.

*** Islamic, Community Banking Reform Proposed**

*34000835a London AFRICA ANALYSIS
in English 1 Sep 89 p 1*

[Text] Lagos—Nigeria's still-to-be-published 1989 banking decree proposes to radically transform the country's banking system, introducing both Islamic banking and encouragement to form community banks throughout the rural areas. A draft of the decree proposes that 'profit and loss sharing banks', in essence Islamic banks, should exist side by side with traditional institutions.

According to sources within the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the proposed new decree contains a section expressly forbidding the use of certain titles, including Islamic, Christian, Biblical and Koranic. The question of Islamic banking, with its refusal to charge interest, has already caused considerable controversy here.

The fact that the new banks will probably be called 'profit and loss sharing' will probably not lessen the arguments. Such banks make project-tied loans to customers and become directly involved in the customer's business, charging no interest, but sharing in any profits or losses. Licensing terms for these new banks are understood to have been made attractive to investors. It is thought that they will be classified with merchant banks and will require an initial share capital of N12m.

A more popular aspect of the decree will be the provision for community banks. With almost all of Nigeria's more than 60 banks concentrated in Lagos, where they provide few facilities for ordinary citizens, the country is underbanked. If the new proposals are acceptable, community banks may be established by putting up just N3m per bank.

The proposals also outline conditions under which banks will be encouraged to hold an equity interest in agricultural, industrial and venture capital companies. Equity participation must be in small-to-medium industries in urban and rural areas and in agricultural enterprises.

The new decree is also certain to tighten up on revenue collection. Provision for withholding tax on all interest is understood to be included. The relationship between the CBN and bank promoters will also be clearly defined. All money deposited with the CBN on application for a bank license will have to be invested in Treasury bills until such time as the application is dealt with.

*** Babangida Proposes Solutions on Debt Issue**

*34000837b Lagos DAILY TIMES in English
6 Sep 89 pp 1, 16*

[Article by Frank Akinola, State House correspondent: "How To Lighten Third World Burden—IBB"]

[Text] President Ibrahim Babangida yesterday proposed a three-pronged approach towards reducing the \$1.3 (about N9.1) trillion debt burden of the Third World.

Speaking on the second day of the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) General Babangida maintained that since debtor-nations were showing courage in the painful process of economic restructuring they required understanding from their creditors.

The kernel of the President's proposals were that:

- all official government-to-government debts be cancelled,
- repayment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank loans be eased by giving debtors new soft loans, and
- debts to commercial banks be sold at discounts of up to 80 percent to a new agency to be sent up by the IMF and World Bank.

The prescription, earlier accepted by OAU leaders at the Addis Ababa summit in July represent Nigeria's current international campaign for a united stance on debt relief by the developing nations.

Nigeria's proposals, General Babangida told delegates of the 102-member grouping, was borne out of the fact that the creditor-nations took scarce notice of the generalized poverty of the Third World.

This, he said was manifested in the weak and persisting primary structures and monocultural nature of the Third World Economies.

He however stressed the need for developing countries to diversify their productive base and increase the value-added to their primary products.

The president's 11-page address also touched on the vexed issue of toxic waste dumping in the Third World.

Nigeria, he said, was "particularly alarmed that developing countries are increasingly becoming dumping sites for the industrial and other hazardous wastes of the developed countries". He called on NAM to play a central role in stopping the "unwholesome trade."

Contributing to the current debate on NAM's future, the president contended that the movement would continue to be relevant if economic issues were given priority.

On the Namibian situation, President Babangida called for the collective contribution of NAM to ensure that the genuine representatives of the Namibian people were elected.

He said the South West African Peoples Organisation remained the authentic representatives of the Namibian people.

On regional issues he noted current efforts on the Chad-Libya conflicts and similar disputes between Morocco and SADR [Saharan Democratic Republic], Mauritania and Senegal, Sudan and Ethiopia. In condemning apartheid, the President dismissed today's general elections in the enclave as totally unacceptable for excluding the black majority.

He advised the new racist leader De Clerk to initiate dialogue with freedom fighters and his oppressed populace.

* **Babangida's Achievements, Shortcomings Viewed**

34000838a Ilorin SUNDAY HERALD in English
27 Aug 89 p 3

[Text] Four years ago today, when General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida succeeded Major-General Muhammadu Buhari as Nigeria's Head of State, many Nigerians expressed happy feeling more because of the approach of Buhari to governance than for the substance of his administration. Were it not for the style of the Buhari which was getting too tough for Nigerians, any take-over of government soon after the civilian regime of the Second Republic was sacked would not have been welcomed.

But Babangida group had cause to seize government. Decrees upon decrees being produced by the Buhari regime had completely taken away the right of Nigerians and living had became most uncomfortable for many. Decrees four and two especially had made public comments on governance a taboo under the situation prevailing then, the Babangida group arrives to free Nigerians from the bondage.

And truly a new approach which gave Nigerians a respite from the tough rule of Buhari came with the—Babangida team. A smile which because an identifiable character of his style replaced Buhari's straight face. In substance, politicians and numerous other persons held in detention unjustifiably or longer than necessary were released and the trial of those held set in motion. Decree four which market the high point of Buhari's tough guy posture was repealed and the Nigerian press could not but be grateful to Babangida. That started the close romance between the government and the press.

And not until of late the President had in spite of the tremendous powers he had acquired, refused the temptation to take on the tough approach. But now his aides seem to be employing the powers conferred on them by decree two to put the nation back on the course from which it was retrieved some four years ago. Government seems to be hostile towards all groups—students, labour leaders, academicians etc which are vocal in the criticisms of government policies above certain agents of government seem to have been possessed not to tolerate radicals. Students, lawyers journalists have been held for offences many times imagined which did not justify such detentions. Truly the trend is causing concern for all those who had seen the government as special kind of a military regime far better than the country had ever had.

Indeed Babangida had done a lot for which he deserves to be praised. He might not have succeeded as expected on the economic but he created structures—DFRRI [Directorate for Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure] and NDE—which had been appropriately run should have ameliorated the pains of SAP, the albatross of this

government. Under those programmes the unemployed, women and rural dwellers would have cut a better deal in living standard. If the NDE had been operated as expected, many Nigerian youths would have been put on the part of economic self-dependence, and there would not have been need for SAP relief measures. If DFRRI had performed well, Nigerian rural dwellers would have had cause to seek to come to the urban centres. And such special schemes—Better Life for Rural Women would have made rural life still better for women.

On the political front, the President had achieved a lot. To the letter his government has kept so far to the transition programme, moving steadily from one step to the other. So far the government has demonstrated sufficient sincerity to hand over to a civilian regime that would endure. But the greatest test is still to come. The final approval of political associations to be registered as political parties would not be an easy decision for the regime to take. And after it must be ready to tolerate civilian rulers with whom it must necessarily work.

On the whole, the President should ask his men in the security units to soft pedal on the application of decree two. There is need for government to work harder on the economic front to reduce the pains of the prevailing economic situation. We wish the President and his team successful rule till 1992.

* **N10 Million Credit Line for Equatorial Guinea**

34000838b Lagos THE GUARDIAN in English
6 Sep 89 pp 1, 2

[Article by Chukwuma Oraegbu, staff reporter: "Nigeria Grants N10m to Equatorial Guinea"]

[Text] Once again, Nigeria has played the big brother to Equatorial Guinea, extending a N10 million lifeline to the neighbouring Lusophone country.

The credit-line, which is a fulfilment of a promise made last year, will enable Nigeria's south eastern neighbour in the Atlantic to shop for:

- asphaltic emulsion, 4,000 tonnes (20,000 drums);
- bitumen (type 180-200), 10,868 tonnes (54,340 drums); and
- crude oil of which 50,000 barrels will be supplied daily till the gesture elapses.

Diplomatic sources were sure yesterday that President Ibrahim Babangida might have already directed Petroleum Resources Minister Rilwanu Lukman to implement the grant, which was requested for in May by Equatorial Guinea's Vice Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Santiago Eneme, during his visit to Lagos.

In fact, Equatorial Guinean President Mr. Obiang Nguema Mbasogo was said to have already appointed a go-between to oversee the pursuit of the credit-line.

The facility came 16 months after Equatorial Guinea received N5 million to buy Nigerian goods.

And the sources confirmed yesterday that the President has directed the Budget and Planning Ministry to open the credit-line to the nation of about 330,000 inhabitants.

The fresh initiative is all in an attempt to detach Equatorial Guinea from the dangerous but warm embrace of apartheid South Africa, which has been struggling desperately for a foothold on the small island nation.

Diplomatic sources attributed the fresh package to Malabo's renewed willingness to accept Nigeria's aid. It had been footdragging for what some diplomats attributed mainly to:

- natural teething problems; and
- the worrisome activities of foreign interests who, realising the strategic importance of the Island of Bioko (Fernando Po) to the West African and African security zone, would rather that Nigeria's area of influence did not extend to Equatorial Guinea. To repel Nigeria's every move, they provide counter offers.

Other projects initiated by Nigeria to wean Equatorial Guinea from the racists include the 52-bed Polyclinic which cost N2,349,558.9 and \$235,345.05 (N1,701,544.07) Nigerian School (N549,981.32) and \$54,889.5 (N1.25 million), agricultural project—which includes an oil palm nursery (N413,500), cocoa nursery at N414,530 and a food crop farm (N422,290).

Senegal

* Parties Need Political, Economic Programs

*34190305c Dakar WAL FADJRI in French
28 Jul 89 pp 7-9*

[Article by Pathe Diagne: "What Makes Dansokho Run?"]

[Excerpts] There were a number of interesting sidelights to the big showdown between the PIT [Party for Independence and Labor] and the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party]—sidelights that would shock American and European aficionados of political circus. The showdown came about as a consequence of secret negotiations and public dialogues between various components of the "Sopi" alliance [members of the PDS] and Abdou Diouf, his government and his party. This was the third such venture for the PIT, which precipitated the rupture. Prior to its contacts with the PS [Socialist Party], the PIT had held talks with President Dia's MDP [People's Democratic Movement] in 1981 and joined an alliance with the PDS and the LD-MPT [Democratic League-Movement for the Labor Party].

Amath Dansokho, who fired the first shot, defended his position irascibly and pugnaciously. His LD-MPT allies are doing the same, and spokesmen in both camps are beginning to rake each other over the coals.

Society cannot be indifferent to the direction things are going. The recent events provide an opportunity to take stock of our political evolution in the years since publication of my two works on Senegal's 1984 social and political crisis ("Senegal: Crise économique et social et devenir de la démocratie," Edition Sankore, 1984, and "Quelle démocratie pour le Sénégal," Collectif Edition Sankore, 1984).

I will borrow only one basic argument from those works, to which I will not otherwise refer: Senegal's political parties, though very well organized, have not yet elaborated strategies and programs for resolving the crisis or coming to power. As a result, their leaders—both in the opposition and in the government—have made and broken alliances on the basis of expediency, and content themselves with day-to-day management of affairs. [passage omitted]

Risks and Dangers of Power Sharing

The alliances, round tables, and unity governments the political class is always demanding have one serious flaw: they never concern issues that go beyond election disputes, election codes, election timing or media access. This is more than symptomatic. Reading their demands one gets the impression that political leaders are joining forces only to get their share of power over public opinion and the apparatus of the state.

This tendency was plainly visible as far back as 1983, or even earlier, and noted in the two above-mentioned works.

The election disputes in 1983 and 1988 served as pretexts for a regrouping of the 11 other opposition parties and formation of the Sopi movement. But an election dispute is not a program. The PIT is getting closer to the PS and government in the pursuit of a holy union that—at least according to Amath Dansokho—could rescue the nation from its peril, the government from its crisis, the country from its ruin. These are only vague intentions. We are still waiting to see a program, even if along with A. Wade one fears that their proposals will be stolen and distorted by those (in the government) who have no ideas of their own.

The significant opposition cannot forever be satisfied to huff and puff about the social conflicts continually arising. In case there is a merger or coalition, it is important to know right at the start what everyone's position is on the contentious issues wracking Senegal, and what is the substance of the minimum consensus on the basis of which everyone can agree to act. There is a danger that issues will be decided—in secret antechambers, around square or octagonal tables—through negotiations that are purely political in nature.

The main purpose of a unity government is to carry out or execute a coordinated policy in which priorities are clear. Such a government is not just a collection of representatives of parties which—as a group—are of dubious purpose, have a shaky understanding of the

problems, and can make scant claim to standing or representativeness vis-a-vis the electorate or the masses, many of the latter being altogether ignorant of their existence.

Not everyone is a victim of electoral disputes or flaws in the electoral code. The parties should, first of all, explain their policies, or, better yet, issue a platform dealing systematically with the big issues, before moving ahead to participation or power sharing. It isn't all that important who is president, prime minister, president of the senate or president of the economic council. The important things are the actions and policies that people bring to those high offices.

What is interesting about the public debate initiated by the PIT is not the party's exercise of its sovereign right to dialogue with the government, nor even the possibility that it will weaken the opposition or strengthen the government. What is interesting is the public exposure, whether voluntary or involuntary, of the negotiations the opposition parties have undertaken. Now that we have a good look at them, they seem purely political in nature, that is purely opportunistic.

All the same, over and above the maneuvering, the internal crises, shifting party allegiances and restructurings, it would be desirable to have a general dialogue on every front, both bilateral (party-to-party) and multilateral, about the issues and about government responsibilities, before any alliances are made.

The crisis in Sopi can be very instructive. In provoking it PIT took a risk for which it should be congratulated. But the process thus opened up still needs to be channeled in a constructive way. Sopi may end up being strengthened by the affair, since its power does not rest equally on its three component parties. Sopi is not $1 + 1 + 1 = 3$, but perhaps $1 = 3$: in other words the PDS, without the PIT or the LD-MPT, could still be Sopi. Everything depends on the mood of the public, and on its good sense.

The PIT has been condemned for getting the government to discuss a program and getting the PS to try to recapture the identity and credibility it had lost under the excessively personal sway of the Diouf-Collin duo. PIT's initiative may be cut short or founder, like the more or less discreet experiments in Dioufism attempted by the RND [Democratic National Rally] and the PLP [People's Liberation Party]. It would help promote restructuring for the PS-PDS-UDS [Senegalese Democratic Union], Sopi, and the group of eight to gravitate toward two or three programmatically anchored alliance constellations, and away from the current ideologically ungrounded coalitions. This might prevent pluralistic Senegalese democracy from being afflicted by the kind of paralysis characteristic of a single or "unified" party.

Leadership battles and dialogue with the regime are certainly profitable in the short term. Informed observers understand very well why the political class cannot give these habits up. It is well known that public opinion in Senegal (and in Africa generally) is very

sensitive to the fact that any religious or political leader's influence is enhanced by dialoguing with the regime. There is an increasing tendency to have faith in the person who holds power, to get close to him, to maintain visible and profitable contact with him. It is no accident that for the leaders of every political party (whether they will admit it or not) Abdou Diouf and Jean Collin—no matter how much they are denounced—are still the most valued interlocutors. In any event these party leaders, though eminent personalities within the political class, are constantly expressing their frustration at not getting exposure on government-controlled radio. This is not merely exhibitionism: the nature of post-colonial regimes is such that their top priority is neither commerce nor industrial production, but rather distribution of the meager resources available.

This fact sheds light on what Sopi might really do for Senegal: it could talk to us a little more about production, about management of the economy, commerce, African integration: in other words, it could talk about concrete programs, instead of just giving us professions of faith—unless of course it is waiting to come to power to show us what it can do. People cannot wait indefinitely, and bewildered young people don't want to give anyone a blank check.

Society would benefit from increased contacts and negotiations across the entire political spectrum on the important issues:

a) Political issues: democracy assumes that expression of opinions is uninhibited. To make that a reality, several steps have to be taken:

- -Establish, among other things, an independent judiciary, subject to outside control only with respect to ethical breaches, thus ensuring electoral political legality and the proper functioning of institutions.
- Free up the media, by creating an essentially private sector to take the place of the present system, in which a group of more or less representative parties pretend to carve up a governmental sector, using it as a forum for polishing their image and issuing vindictive communiques.
- Make room for initiatives in the regions, by establishing regional authorities and local socioeconomic institutions.

b) Economic issues: the depressed state of the economy is inseparably bound up with technological advances that are squeezing out certain types of enterprises and jobs. The problem is not one of saving ONCAD [National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development], Bata, Dakar-Marine, or USB [Senegalese Banking Union], along with a few jobs in obsolete and unprofitable businesses: it is one of creating thousands of big and small agricultural, industrial, and service enterprises that utilize advanced technology. Above all, we must not forget about the technological restructuring required by an industrial plant that is aging and not very competitive.

An economic boom that would create millions of new jobs presupposes a different kind of banking system to fill the growing need for credit. There is nothing about any of this in the new government policies.

c) Socio-educational issues: higher education urgently needs to be professionalized, on the basis of a common entry-level curriculum as outlined already in the estates general. We must be innovative, above all by establishing multipurpose university colleges to take the place of the technical schools, colleges and junior colleges, by providing training in technologies, know-how and professional disciplines, and finally by providing facilities for graduate training.

d) Geopolitical issues: the immediate issue is a regional one, with the racist military regime in Nouakchott upsetting the centuries-old balance between the black Berbers and the Arabs and deliberately provoking a crisis in Afro-Arab relations. And we must not forget the issue of multiracial pan-Africanism (both cultural and political), not to mention the geopolitical role played by Senegal and West Africa on the global scene.

"Honor, Onus": Senegal will not become the great showcase of democracy and human rights just because we would like it to happen. We will have to earn it by setting ourselves clearly defined objectives.

By addressing some of these and other important issues, more often discussed inside party circles rather than openly debated, we would begin to identify ourselves with the aspirations and concrete interests of the people we claim to serve. Thus the crisis that PIT has provoked may very well be salutary, and it should be sharpened even further, so it may bear fruit in the end.

* Diouf: PS Cadres Ignore National Interest

*34190306a Dakar SUD HEBDO in French
3 Aug 89 p 3*

[Article by Ibrahima Fall: "PS National Council: How To Renovate?"; with introductory editorial paragraph]

[Text] The Socialist Party [PS] held its national council last Saturday. The meetings—very well-attended, since they were supposed to provide an opportunity to evaluate progress to date on the path of Renovation and Opening discussed at such great length by the special congress in March—nevertheless, failed to lead to anything really new. The general secretary of the PS condemned the obstructionism of party officials who have no intention of promoting reform in the organization. Mr Abdou Diouf also used the occasion to pay stirring homage to the PIT [Party for Independence and Labor] for its efforts to build a consensus of support for the ruling party. The PIT action was described as "courageous, highly patriotic, and responsible." After introductory remarks by the secretary general, the national council heard a report from Mr Andre Sonko, minister of

the interior, on "decentralization policy and the development of local communities." After presenting a historical overview of decentralization since the colonial period, Mr Sonko identified particularly the administrative and territorial reform of 1972. Looking at future prospects for decentralization, which should now move into a qualitatively new phase (reforming the reform), Mr Sonko made a number of proposals, including more energetic involvement of local officials in administration of community budgets, the channeling of rural community investment toward more productive sectors, improved management of government-owned land, and better demarcation of community responsibility, by dividing authority between state and local governments.

The secretary general of the PS clearly believes repetition is the best pedagogy. For 8 years he has been spouting the same muscular rhetoric to his party comrades, and it has always had the same effect: the comrades applaud thunderously, they are transformed into a "new breed" of militants, and as soon as they are out the doors of PS headquarters...they return to the good old ways stigmatized by their leader. The PS is strange.

In reality, Mr Diouf's remarks on domestic policy contained nothing new. The special congress last March on what was called "renovation and opening" was supposed to be a sort of "epistemological rupture" for the PS. From that radical break there should have emerged a Socialist Party open to all kinds of consensus-building initiatives, democratic in its internal procedures. The initiators of the congress on renovation and opening were doubtless too optimistic. Four months after the congress, Abdou Diouf stood before his troops to tell them bluntly: "Too many party officials are still too concerned about protecting their personal position, to the detriment of the party's overall interests, even of the national interest. I see that this resistance has greatly retarded the effective and timely implementation of the important changes ordered by the special congress on renovation and opening." Did the PS secretary general seriously expect that in the space of 4 months his party would repudiate its antidemocratic methods and open up to the idea of sharing power with those who do not have it?

One is almost tempted to think that Mr Diouf, despite his 9 years at the helm of the PS, has not yet plumbed all its mysteries. In both its methods and its political orientation, the PS will be difficult to change. It is a party that runs on clientism. It is not strongly attracted to the discussion of ideas and doctrinal positions. According to Mr Diouf, the census-taking and membership campaigns were purely technical in nature. "We are not talking about liquidating some officials or promoting others. I have explained that we were not yet at the point of selling [party membership] cards or membership renewals." However, for PS officials these quite innocuous steps carry serious implications, since they are being taken in preparation for the 1990 congress that will propel the PS in new directions. Right now is the time to get ready for the next allocation of sinecures: that is the only thought

in the minds of PS officials who think speeches about democratization and the sovereignty of the rank and file are so many empty words.

Diouf's stratagem for overcoming opposition inside the party was the appointment of 92 inspectors sent out to the "coordinations" [party organs in charge of groups of local sections] to monitor operations. It is scarcely a novel technique. In times of change the PS provides the coordinations with "political commissars" who are supposed to be unattached to any of the main factions and abide strictly by democratic principles. It is surely no accident that its notorious "political commissars" have not been put back into service for the current campaigns. Those "supervisors" were so thoroughly discredited that it would have been rash to entrust them with the job of laying the groundwork for the PS's "new look." But there is no guarantee that the new supervisors, operating under the monitoring committee headed by Mr Jean Collin, will not fall into the same misguided ways as the old political commissars, who were also working under the auspices of the secretary for party political activities.

According to the leader of the PS, the movement for renovation and opening "is intended to adapt the structures of the party to our environment and to create a new breed of party militants." But can one make a new breed of militant from an old breed of party? That is the great contradiction of the PS, which wants to put new wine into an old bottle. Despite all the repetitious speeches, the petitions, requests, entreaties, and sometimes even violent discourses—there is a danger that the concepts of renovation and opening may bear no fruit until Abdou Diouf can make the PS truly his own.

Paul Biya and Ben Ali understood this lesson clearly. As for Diouf, he is making haste so slowly that one wonders whether he really has the intention or the resolve to create an instrument capable of carrying out his plans. In the meantime, he hopes to reform society with the help of a political apparatus which, thanks to co-optation at the summit, has grudgingly given him a tiny bit of space...not to say a hole.

* Diouf Unable To Implement Renovation

34190306b Dakar SUD HEBDO in French
3 Aug 89 p 1

[Editorial by Babacar Toure: "Causes and Effects"]

[Text] He came. He spoke. But was he heard, did anyone listen? That is not so certain, to judge by his entreaties to the "comrades," who did not seem to grasp the importance of his words. Abdou Diouf, up on the battlements to defend renovation and the "renovators," gave the impression of preaching into the void as he delivered the keynote speech to his party's national council.

The ritual and setting of these socialist high masses may have been the same, but the actors played their parts a little differently. Caught between an audience quite attached to tradition—the secretary general complained

about this—and a speakers' platform dominated by a haughty but battle-ravaged "nomenklatura" whose internal conflicts are still far from resolved. Abdou Diouf spoke in the pathetic tones of a man abandoned in midstream. Suspected by a significant fringe of party leaders of jilting them to curry favor with an irresponsible intellectual clique, unable to change the party without remaking it (as some of his new associates have suggested to him), the PS [Socialist Party] leader appeared like someone who finds himself in the middle of a tunnel and raises his arms to the heavens instead of heading for the exit.

Perhaps he really knows what is happening (as he would have us believe), but if so we must still admit that to date none of the potions administered against the evils he excoriates at every congress and national council have had any effect. After the council, as might be expected, everyone joined in a chorus of praise for the comrade secretary general and Mr Jean Collin—before returning to the trenches and resuming their bombardment of enemy positions. Will Abdou Diouf, caught in the cross fire, succeed in getting the machinery of government to implement the urgent reforms being demanded both within and outside the party? Or will he be content with another of those reshufflings of responsibilities that inevitably leave more power in the hands of Jean Collin, whose controversial role is a source of discord within his own party?

Laurent Fabius, while he was prime minister, once said of Francois Mitterrand, "he is he, and I am I." The refrain Abdou Diouf and Jean Collin are singing in unison is: "He is I, and I am he." In political terms, what their dancing duet signifies is that each is using the other. Nothing is more common in government. But the shoe begins to pinch when everything revolves around the ability of one omnipotent, omniscient person. In other words, the PS needs first of all to open up to itself, to accept its own diversity, even its divisions, instead of letting itself get drawn into a false polarization between so-called renovators and so-called conservatives. The party's French counterpart—whose structure the PS has adopted, but without the substance—contains more currents than all the other French parties combined. But each has its place. Discussions there concern both ideas and patronage.

Seen in this light, last week's national council raises several problems. The track record of the administrative, territorial and local reform enacted in 1972 by the current minister of state (then-minister of interior) and general secretary in the office of the president is a judgment on that system. Thus, over and above carping about the imperfect functioning of the system, one must take a critical look at the system itself. Can this be done without getting bogged down in the business of finding scapegoats to blame for minor and secondary problems? Will the commune and rural community be acknowledged as loci of governmental authority and thus subject to alternance, as the system defines that concept? In plain words, any real opening requires that actual

authority be given to local communities and their representative organizations—including political parties. It may be true that whosoever can do great things can do small things too, but establishing democratization at the local level could very well lead the way to an opening...at the national level and among the leading luminaries in the political arena. Otherwise, the same causes will continue to produce the same effects. Seen in that optic, the unilateral decision to delay municipal and rural elections—however partisan it may have been—should offer an opportunity to smooth the path to democracy. Alternance should not be implemented out of personal allegiance to the president or the minister of state, but rather out of the need to put darkroom alchemy behind us and set up an effective democratic system that will permit free competition at every level.

*** Wade Hits Ban on Meetings, Wants Diouf Out**

34190307c Dakar FAGARU in French
Aug 89 pp 1-2

[Interview with Abdoulaye Wade; date and place not given]

[Text] [FAGARU] What is your analysis of the national situation?

[Wade] Everyone knows that Senegal came to a halt following the scandalous February 1988 elections and the events that followed. The people are still suffering from the shock of this unprecedented violation. After coming to a halt, the country began slowly to sink. The government denied this by means of deceitful propaganda about the rates of growth. But as all lies come to an end, our country has been reduced to the category of the poorest countries of the world. And the government is having difficulty explaining how, by advancing, we have regressed so much. But matters were speeded up with the conflict between Senegal and Mauritania, the refugees, and the forced expatriation. What is happening in the Senegal River Valley has still further aggravated the situation. The government is taking great care not to inform the people, who are unaware of the unimaginable conditions in which thousands of our compatriots and our Mauritanian brothers of black African origin are living all along the valley. They are suffering torture from famine and epidemics, forced into makeshift camps, sometimes exposed to sun and rain without a roof. This is a tragic and unacceptable situation. The contributions of food aid are not being distributed. The representatives of the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] we sent there, who have just returned, report to me that rice is being distributed at the rate of 300 grams per person per week! Where is the aid that has been contributed to help these poor unfortunates?

The government has given up, but will not accept any of the suggestions or proposals that the PDS and the LD [Democratic League] have offered it. To date, there has not even been any acknowledgment that they have been

received. No concern is even being shown for courtesy and proper procedures any longer.

[FAGARU] What, in your opinion, are the solutions that would overcome the crisis?

[Wade] I do not believe that just patching things up is very useful. I am convinced that the only solution is for Abdou Diouf and the team in place to depart. I search in vain in the history of modern countries for a man who has failed as badly as Diouf, or who having received one of the most substantial sums of per capita aid in the world, has reduced his country to such a low level. And, even more serious, to a situation devoid of any prospects.

It is not the billions with which his foreign supporters may provide him that will raise our country up again. The sickness of Senegal is not only economic and financial, but also political, and above all moral, as well. The people, young people above all, are discouraged and desperate. It is necessary to put hope back in their hearts, to put the country back to work.

[FAGARU] After a certain point, the activities of the SOPI [members of the PDS] alliance seem to have come to a halt. Is this a tactic on the alliance level, or exhaustion, or are there still other reasons?

[Wade] The alliance is functioning perfectly well. The leaders of our parties are meeting together periodically, almost daily. To be sure, we have not been able to organize the meetings we had planned together, because they are being systematically prohibited by the government.

You will note, however, that our parties remain very active in the interior of the country. Where we are concerned, we organized a popular meeting on the same day, 2 weeks ago, in every departmental capital, with very few exceptions, and these were for purely local reasons.

The slowdown in activities is also explained by the winter season, the rainfall, the farm work. But I would like to tell you that it would be wrong to believe that things are calm, for this is only an appearance. Popular discontent is such that an explosion can never be excluded.

[FAGARU] We see that the government is systematically prohibiting the meetings the PDS plans in the Dakar region. Why is this, and what do you plan to do?

[Wade] I have already dealt with this question of the prohibitions. You know my position in principle. One of two things is true. Either there are real threats preventing the normal exercise of freedoms, and a state of emergency should be declared by law, because the provisional exercise of liberties can only be suspended by law, which means that the government cannot do it. Or else this is not the case, and the citizens should be allowed to exercise the freedoms the Constitution grants them. The

executive branch cannot suspend freedoms indefinitely on the pretext of alleged threats. The government is in full violation of the law. All of this means that we are not

going to let this go on indefinitely, and it is going to be necessary, in one way or another, to put an end to the arbitrary regime that exists at present.

**END OF
FICHE**

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